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In my PhD-project I investigated the externalization of working memory processes into 
technical tools (i.e. cognitive offloading). Thereby, two main research questions arose – first, 
how do individuals decide to offload working memory processes and second, what consequences 
does this offloading behavior have on immediate and subsequent task performance. Regarding 
the former, I performed two studies investigating metacognitions as determinants of cognitive 
offloading. To measure offloading behavior, I used and adapted the Pattern Copy Task – a free 
choice offloading paradigm. While I did not find a relationship between metacognitive beliefs 
and offloading behavior in Study 1 (N = 80), I used fake performance feedback (below-average 
vs. above-average vs. no feedback) to experimentally manipulate metacognitive beliefs in Study 
2 (N = 159). The participants adopted their metacognitive beliefs according to the feedback, but 
there were no group effects on offloading behavior. I argue that rather actual working memory 
performance and related metacognitive experiences act as a predictor for cognitive offloading 
than metacognitive beliefs. Regarding the consequences of offloading behavior, in Study 3 I 
observed a trade-off between enhanced immediate task processing but decreased subsequent 
memory performance due to cognitive offloading within three experiments (each N = 172). 
Nonetheless, cognitive offloading was not harmful for long-term memory formation under all 
circumstances. If participants were forced to offload maximally but also had the intention to 
foster a strong long-term memory detrimental effects of offloading could be counteracted. In a 
last study (Study 4, N = 133) I tested whether cognitive offloading in one task is beneficial for the 
performance of a simultaneous secondary task. When participants offloaded more within the 
Pattern Copy Task due to low temporal costs associated with offloading, they showed a better 
secondary task performance than when they offloaded less due to high temporal costs. Cognitive 
offloading might therefore foster secondary task performance; however, this influence is not fully 
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explained yet. My studies provide a systematic investigation of the omnipresent phenomena 

























In meinem Dissertationsprojekt habe ich die Auslagerung von 
Arbeitsgedächtnisprozessen in moderne, technische Hilfsmittel (sogenanntes Cognitive 
Offloading) untersucht. Dabei stellten sich zwei zentrale Forschungsfragen - erstens, wie 
entscheiden sich Individuen Arbeitsgedächtnisprozesse auszulagern, und zweitens, welche 
Auswirkungen hat dieses Offloading-Verhalten auf die unmittelbare und nachfolgende 
Aufgabenbearbeitung. Im Hinblick auf Ersteres habe ich zwei Studien durchgeführt, in denen 
Metakognitionen als Determinante für Cognitive Offloading untersucht wurden. Zur Messung des 
Offloading-Verhaltens verwendete und adaptierte ich den Pattern Copy Task, der einen 
individuellen Gebrauch von Cognitive Offloading erlaubt. Während ich in Studie 1 (N = 80) 
keinen Zusammenhang zwischen dem metakognitiven Glauben an eigene Gedächtnisfähigkeiten 
und individuellem Offloading-Verhalten fand, verwendete ich in Studie 2 (N = 159) falsches 
Leistungsfeedback (unterdurchschnittlich vs. überdurchschnittlich vs. kein Feedback), um den 
metakognitiven Glauben von Versuchspersonen experimentell zu manipulieren. Wie erwartet 
passten die Versuchspersonen ihren metakognitiven Glauben dem Feedback an, aber es gab keine 
Effekte auf das Offloading-Verhalten im Pattern Copy Task. Ich argumentiere, dass anstelle des 
metakognitiven Glaubens die tatsächliche Arbeitsgedächtnisleistung und damit verbundene 
metakognitive Erfahrungen einen Prädiktor für Cognitive Offloading darstellen. Im Hinblick auf 
die Folgen von Cognitive Offloading beobachtete ich in Studie 3 einen Trade-off zwischen einer 
verbesserten unmittelbaren Aufgabenbearbeitung und einer verminderten späteren 
Gedächtnisleistung aufgrund des Offloading-Verhaltens über drei Experimente hinweg (á 
N = 172). Nichtsdestotrotz war das Auslagern von Arbeitsgedächtnisprozessen nicht unter allen 
Umständen schädlich für die Bildung von Langzeitgedächtnis-Repräsentationen. Wenn die 
Versuchspersonen gezwungen wurden ihre Arbeitsgedächtnisprozesse maximal auszulagern, aber 
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auch die Absicht hatten, ein starkes Langzeitgedächtnis zu bilden, konnten sie den schädlichen 
Auswirkungen von Cognitive Offloading entgegenwirken. In einer letzten Studie (Studie 4, 
N = 133) habe ich untersucht, ob Cognitive Offloading bei einer Aufgabe vorteilhaft für die 
gleichzeitige Durchführung einer Zweitaufgabe ist. Wenn die Versuchspersonen innerhalb des 
Pattern Copy Tasks aufgrund niedriger zeitlicher Kosten, die mit dem Offloading verbunden 
waren, mehr Arbeitsgedächtnisprozesse ausgelagert haben, zeigten sie eine bessere Leistung bei 
der Zweitaufgabe als wenn sie aufgrund hoher zeitlicher Kosten weniger ausgelagert haben. 
Cognitive Offloading scheint daher die Leistung in der Zweitaufgabe zu fördern, allerdings ist 
dieser Einfluss noch nicht vollständig geklärt. Meine Studien liefern eine systematische 
Untersuchung des allgegenwärtigen Phänomens "Cognitive Offloading" und dienen einem 

















In everyday life, individuals constantly use tools to support their performance in various 
activities. Tools can not only support physical actions, such as using a lemon squeezer instead of 
squeezing a lemon by hand, but they can also be used to support cognitive processing such as 
memory (Osiurak, Navarro, Reynaud, & Thomas, 2018). For instance, one could use a notepad to 
write down notes instead of memorizing them. Humans have externalized cognitive processes 
already thousands of years ago (Nestojko, Finley, & Roediger, 2013). While in the past, 
individuals might have used a simple piece of paper to externalize memorization, these days 
modern technical tools such as smartphones or tablets can be administered for externalization and 
thus support cognitive processing. In 2014, only 55% of the German population used 
smartphones on a regular basis, whereas in 2018 already 81% of Germans used them regularly 
(Bitkom Research, 2019). Additionally, every sixth German adult owns a tablet device (Bitkom 
Research, 2020). Hence, there is an increasing distribution of technical tools which simplifies and 
accelerates the externalization of cognitive processes. In addition to note taking, individuals can 
also, for example, use a smartphone’s calendar function to save appointments instead of 
memorizing them, or the calculator function instead of doing mental arithmetics, or the 
navigation app instead of finding a way themselves. Due such externalizations individuals can 
overcome limitations of internal cognitive processing (Risko & Gilbert, 2016). Effortful cognitive 
processing such as holding information in memory is externalized into the technical tool at hand 
and thus individuals do not need to solely rely on their restricted internal cognitive processing. 
It is beyond dispute that externalizations of cognitive processes with modern technical 
tools influence humans’ private life, their education, and their work environment. While in 
humans’ everyday life external memory stores when using technical tools play a growing role 
(Finley, Naaz, & Goh, 2018), technical tools are also widely distributed in educational as well as 
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working contexts (Krull & Duart, 2017; Pimmer, Mateescu, & Gröhbiel, 2016). For instance, in 
higher education settings (e.g., universities), modern technical tools are administered more and 
more to support lectures (Krull & Duart, 2017; Pimmer, et al., 2016). Also, regarding children’s 
education in schools, multiple countries are counting on digitalization with technical tools to 
support teachers in their classes (e.g, see “DigitalPakt Schule” in Germany or “Masterplan 
Digitalisierung” in Austria). Especially in times of Covid-19 and the accompanying shift to 
home-schooling, technical tools play an important role for learning. A recent study suggests that 
82% of German pupils (12 – 19 years old) use their smartphones for studying during the 
Coronavirus-pandemic (JIMplus, 2020). Moreover, also in working environments individuals 
come across technical tools that should help to simplify their tasks. For example, a waitress might 
be using a tablet device to enter an order instead of using a more effortful externalization process 
such as writing it down on paper or even not externalizing the order at all (i.e. memorizing the 
information).  
In the present PhD-project I focused on these ubiquitous externalizations of working 
memory processes into modern technical tools. In the following theoretical overview, I will start 
with introducing the general concept of externalization (i.e. cognitive offloading) and then 
specifically focus on the offloading of working memory processes. Thereafter, I will describe two 
lines of research that are important for the development of the present project. First, I will 
elaborate on possible determinants of offloading working memory processes and second, I will 
elaborate on potential short-term and long-term consequences of offloading behavior. At the end 
of this chapter I will shortly describe my research questions and proposed studies for each of 




1.1 Cognitive Offloading 
The externalization of cognitive processes is referred to as cognitive offloading. Cognitive 
offloading describes the use of physical actions to modify the requirements of information 
processing in order to reduce the cognitive demands of a task (Risko & Gilbert, 2016). Therefore, 
when offloading cognitive processes physical actions are used to manipulate one’s body or one’s 
physical environment. This offloading behavior in turn reduces demands of internal cognitive 
processing, thus making a task less effortful (Risko & Gilbert, 2016). Over the last years, not 
only cognitive offloading has been used as a term to describe externalizations of cognitive 
processes, but research has also used other terms (Risko & Gilbert, 2016). For instance, Kirsh and 
Maglio (1994) introduced the term epistemic actions describing physical actions making mental 
computation easier, more reliable, and faster. Similarly, Scaife and Rogers (1996) described the 
use of external representations such as diagrams or animations in order to solve informationally 
problems as computational offloading. In external representations relevant information is 
offloaded that would otherwise need to be stored in one’s memory. The use of external 
representations should therefore reduce the invested cognitive effort when solving problems and 
facilitate problem solving. Moreover, Wegner (1987; 1995) introduced the term transactive 
memory system describing the distribution of information among several individuals to support 
each other’s performance. In a transactive memory system other humans can act as transactive 
memory partners, but also technical tools can be used to externally store information for 
individuals (e.g., Wegner & Ward, 2013). This creates a human-technology transactive memory 
system that does not require individuals to remember the content of information that is stored in 
the technical tool but they still need to remember where relevant information is stored (Risko & 
Gilbert, 2016). With regard to using technical tools to externalize cognitive processes, Salomon 
(1990; Salomon & Perkins, 2005) introduced two ways how technology shapes humans’ 
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cognition. On the one hand, he introduced effects with technology describing effects that arise 
immediately while working with technical tools such as an improved immediate task 
performance. On the other hand, he described effects of technology concerning the cognitive 
residues that arise after the use of technical tools (e.g., long-term skill acquisition). In the present 
thesis all these different concepts describing externalizations of cognitive processes will 
henceforth be summarized as cognitive offloading.  
Overall, cognitive offloading can be divided into offloading onto the body and offloading 
into the world. When offloading onto the body, individuals use their body to decrease cognitive 
demands such as using gestures when talking, finger counting to solve an arithmetic task, or 
tilting one’s head to read a tilted text (Risko & Gilbert, 2016). With regard to offloading into the 
world, individuals’ external environment is used to support cognitive processing (Risko & 
Gilbert, 2016). For instance, post-it notes can be placed as reminders for future tasks or a 
shopping list can be typed into a smartphone to later access it in the supermarket. Thus, using 
technical tools for cognitive offloading also falls in this latter category – offloading into the 
world. Via cognitive offloading technical tools extend individuals’ internal cognitive skills 
(Osiurak, et al., 2018) and can be seen as an extended mind (Clark & Chalmers, 1998). Related to 
that, technical tools that are used to offload cognitive processes might imply an extended self. 
This view might arise from the tendency of individuals to heavily rely on technical tools to 
support cognitive processing (Clark & Chalmers, 1998). Cognitive processes that are offloaded 
particularly often into technical tools are memory processes. The majority of people questioned 
in an interview study indicated that they often – if not always – offload memory processes 
(Finley et al., 2018). In the present PhD-project I especially focused on the offloading of 




1.2 The offloading of working memory processes 
Unlike the massive storage capacity of modern technical tools, a human’s working 
memory is strictly limited. Working memory is a cognitive system that enables the temporal 
storage and manipulation of information that is used for cognitive tasks such as comprehension 
and learning (Baddeley, 1992; 2003). However, the strict limitations of working memory only 
allow the storage of a small amount of information for a short time period (Baddeley, 2003; Luck 
& Vogel, 2013). For instance, the capacity of visual working memory that actively maintains 
visual information for the task at hand can only hold about three to four visual objects at a time 
(Baddeley, 2003; Luck & Vogel, 2013). Working memory capacity is often correlated with 
performance in cognitive tasks; thus, the higher individuals’ working memory capacity is, the 
more successful they are in performing cognitive tasks (Baddeley, 2003; Luck & Vogel, 2013). 
Therefore, working memory capacity accounts for individual differences in broad cognitive 
abilities (Luck & Vogel, 2013).  
To overcome limitations of working memory and to support performance in working 
memory tasks, cognitive processing can be externalized into technical tools (Risko & Gilbert, 
2016). Due to the offloading of working memory processes into technical tools the nature of a 
task changes (Zhang & Norman, 1994). Instead of solely relying on internal working memory, 
individuals make the external environment (e.g., a technical tool) store and manipulate the 
necessary information for them and they only access the information when needed (Wilson, 
2002). Thereby, internal working memory resources can be saved as working memory load is 




1.2.1 Investigations of offloading working memory processes  
When conducting laboratory studies to investigate the offloading of working memory 
processes, different methods have been used. For instance, Kirsh and Maglio (1994) administered 
the video game “Tetris” to demonstrate how participants use cognitive offloading to lower 
working memory demands. When playing Tetris, the goal is to properly place shapes that fall 
from the top of the screen in order to complete a horizontal row of already placed shapes on the 
bottom of the screen. To do so, the player has the option to rotate as well as shift the shapes by 
pressing buttons. He or she can therefore try out different combinations in order to find the 
optimal orientation and positioning. When using the option to rotate the shapes, participants do 
not need to perform mental rotations that would fall back onto working memory. Kirsh and 
Maglio (1994) observed that participants used this option to offload working memory processes 
in order to improve task performance. Cognitive offloading simplified the Tetris task and 
therefore task performance was increased compared to solely relying on working memory. As 
another example, Cary and Carlson (2001) performed a study, in which the participants had to 
perform arithmetic tasks while being allowed to record notes (e.g., intermediate results). They 
investigated how participants are able to manage the distribution of task demands on external and 
internal resources. The participants frequently took notes instead of storing all relevant 
information in working memory. This offloading behavior decreased with more practice across 
several trials. Further, Cary and Carlson (2001) showed that the amount of cognitive offloading 
was related to the effort required to offload working memory processes. If there were less 
operational steps in terms of keys that needed to be pressed to take notes with a technical tool, 
more notes were taken than when there were more steps required. The participants therefore 
flexibly distributed their working memory demands on external and internal resources depending 
on the effort of cognitive offloading (Cary & Carlson, 2001). Similarly, Risko and Dunn (2015) 
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showed that participants spontaneously offloaded verbal information (i.e. a presented string of 
letters) through note taking which they needed to remember for a subsequent recall. The amount 
of cognitive offloading increased with a larger amount of information that was presented. Risko 
and Dunn (2015) therefore concluded that individuals offload more when the load on working 
memory increases.  
Another task that was successfully used to study the offloading of working memory 
processes is the Pattern Copy Task (formerly known as Blocks World Task; Ballard, Hayhoe, Li, 
& Whitehead, 1992; Ballard, Hayhoe, & Pelz, 1995). In the basic version of this task the 
participants have to replicate a pattern of colored squares that is displayed in a model window 
into an empty workspace window. First, the participants can inspect the pattern of colored 
squares in the model window and then they can reconstruct the pattern in the workspace window. 
They therefore move the corresponding colored squares from an additional resource window into 
the workspace window. The participants can always look up the pattern of colored squares by 
inspecting the model window again. In the first studies using the Pattern Copy Task, Ballard et al. 
(1992; 1995) observed that the participants tended towards a minimal memory approach 
indicating an extensive use of cognitive offloading (i.e. looking at the model window over and 
over again and memorizing only a small amount of information at once) over internal 
memorization (i.e. looking at the model window not so often and memorizing more information 
at once). They therefore concluded, that the participants did not operate at their maximum 
working memory capacity, but rather minimized working memory load by offloading working 
memory processes into the external environment. In follow-up studies Fu and Gray (2000, see 
also Gray, Sims, Fu, & Schoelles, 2006; Patrick et al., 2015; Waldron, Patrick, & Duggon, 2011) 
could not support this minimal memory approach but rather introduced a soft constraints 
hypothesis predicting optimal performance due to maximizing the expected gains of a strategy 
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while minimizing the related costs. They observed that cognitive offloading depends on the 
associated temporal costs. Thus, when the opening of the model window was associated with 
high temporal costs (e.g., a delay of 1 second) the participants offloaded less than when there 
were low temporal costs. Therefore, the participants adapted their offloading behavior based on 
the associated temporal costs, rather than minimizing working memory load under all 
circumstances.  
These studies show that participants adaptively use the option of offloading working 
memory processes across various tasks to lower working memory demands (Kirsh & Maglio, 
1994; Risko & Gilbert, 2016). Researchers in the field of cognitive offloading have mostly either 
focused on the investigation of determinants of offloading behavior or consequences of cognitive 
offloading. Thus, there are two lines of research – determinants and consequences of cognitive 
offloading (Risko & Gilbert, 2016). In following chapters I will maintain this separation of two 
lines of research and describe studies investigating the determinants of cognitive offloading such 
as metacognitions as well as short-term and long-term consequences of offloading behavior.    
 
1.3 Determinants of offloading working memory processes 
Research on cognitive offloading has suggested several determinants of offloading 
working memory processes. These determinants can be separated into exogenous and 
endogenous factors. Exogenous factors refer to a person’s external environment such as 
characteristics of materials and tools, whereas endogenous factors refer to a person’s own internal 
cognition such as individual abilities and metacognitive beliefs that might affect offloading 
behavior. A recent review on cognitive offloading by Risko and Gilbert (2016) especially 
highlights the importance of metacognitions for the offloading of working memory processes. 
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Before I focus on the details of this specific subject – metacognitions as determinants of cognitive 
offloading – I will shortly describe other empirically observed determinants.  
With regard to exogenous factors, the complexity as well as relevance (Schönpflug, 
1986), difficulty (Hu, Luo, & Fleming, 2019) and amount of information that needs to be 
processed guide the offloading of working memory processes (Arreola, Flores, Latham, 
MacNew, & Vu, 2019; Gilbert, 2015a; Risko & Dunn, 2015). More complex, relevant and 
difficult information as well as a larger amount of information leads to more cognitive offloading. 
Furthermore, the number of operational steps required to offload working memory processes, 
affects offloading behavior (Cary & Carlson, 2001; O’Hara & Payne, 1998; Schönpflug, 1986). 
For instance, Schönpflug (1986) observed more printing out of information instead of 
memorizing it when printing required less operational steps than when more steps were required. 
Moreover, studies consistently showed that temporal costs related to accessing the relevant 
information impact offloading behavior (e.g., Fu & Gray, 2000; Gray et al., 2006; Patrick et al., 
2015; Waldron et al., 2011). All those exogenous factors with regard to a person’s external 
environment seem to affect situational cost-benefit considerations when performing a working 
memory task. Based on the associated costs and benefits of an offloading strategy, individuals 
decide to rely more or less on cognitive offloading (e.g., Cary & Carlson, 2001; Gray et al., 2006; 
Schönpflug, 1986).  
Also, endogenous factors regarding a person’s own internal cognition might affect 
offloading behavior. Onto this account, research has observed a relationship between one’s own 
cognitive abilities and cognitive offloading (Gilbert, 2015b; Risko & Dunn, 2015). In 
experiments of Gilbert (2015b) the participants performed a prospective memory task that 
required them to remember delayed intentions while performing an ongoing task. In the first 
phase, the participants had to solely rely on their memory to remember the intentions whereas in 
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a second phase they were allowed to offload the intentions by setting reminders. A better unaided 
memory performance of participants in the first phase was accompanied by fewer reminder 
setting (i.e. less cognitive offloading) in the second phase (Gilbert, 2015b). Similarly, in a 
working memory task participants’ performance when being prohibited from offloading was 
negatively correlated with the likelihood to write down to-be-remembered information when this 
was allowed (Risko & Dunn, 2015). Thus, better unaided working memory abilities led to less 
offloading of working memory processes (Risko & Dunn, 2015).  
 
1.3.1 Metacognitions as determinants of offloading working memory processes 
Beyond actual abilities, the subjective beliefs of individuals might also guide offloading 
behavior (Arango-Muñoz, 2013; Risko & Gilbert 2016). Hence, metacognitions are a possible but 
not yet fully identified endogenous determinant of cognitive offloading. Metacognitions can be 
described as a person’s cognition about cognitive processing, or in other words, thinking about 
one’s own thinking (Flavell, 1979). Metacognitions include the beliefs and experiences someone 
has with regard to his or her cognitive performance as well as the control of one’s cognition 
based on such beliefs and experiences (Flavell, 1979). Therefore, classical models of 
metacognitions describe two main functions: the monitoring and control of cognition (Garofalo & 
Lester, 1985; Nelson & Narens, 1990). Metacognitive monitoring comprises metacognitive 
knowledge and experiences that both contribute to metacognitive control (Efklides, 2008; Flavell, 
1979). Metacognitive knowledge refers to one’s general knowledge and beliefs about one’s 
cognition and also about tasks, goals, and strategies (Flavell, 1979). For instance, metacognitive 
knowledge about one’s own cognition reflects subjective beliefs about how reliable one’s 
memory is (Flavell, 1979; Garofalo & Lester, 1985). Such metacognitive knowledge can be 
accounted as offline metacognitive monitoring as it is not necessarily related to an ongoing 
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cognitive task but rather generally stored in long-term memory (Efklides, 2008). Metacognitive 
experiences, on the other hand, are any conscious experiences that individuals make when 
coming across a task (metacognitive experiences can occur during or after a task, but mostly 
occur while performing a task; Flavell, 1979) and therefore refer to online monitoring (Efklides, 
2008). Metacognitive experiences influence metacognitive knowledge by adding, changing 
and/or deleting from it (Flavell, 1979), and in turn both metacognitive knowledge and 
experiences contribute to the controlling of one’s cognition (Garofalo & Lester, 1985; Flavell, 
1979). The controlling function of metacognitions is responsible for the planning of actions, 
selection and implementing of strategies as well as revising and discarding strategies, thus 
affecting one’s cognitive processing (Garofalo & Lester, 1985; Nelson & Narens, 1990). While 
metacognitive controlling is informed by metacognitive monitoring, also metacognitive 
controlling informs metacognitive monitoring via metacognitive experiences (Efklides, 2008; 
Nelson & Narens, 1990). Thus, there is a constant information flow between the main two 
functions – monitoring and controlling – of metacognitions (Nelson & Narens, 1990).  
When performing a working memory task and having access to a technical tool, 
individuals can decide whether to rely on internal working memory processing or to offload 
working memory processes into the technical tool at hand (Risko & Gilbert, 2016). This choice of 
different strategies induces an extended selection problem (Arango-Muñoz, 2013). In order to 
dissolve this problem, individuals have to make metacognitive decisions indicating which 
strategy to use (e.g., offloading or internal memorization). Individuals might have metacognitive 
feelings about whether they can solve the problem internally or not. Positive metacognitive 
feelings (e.g., feelings of knowing) might lead to relying on one’s internal cognitive processing 
whereas negative metacognitive feelings (e.g., feelings of forgetting) might lead to relying on 
external resources (Arango-Muñoz, 2013). Following this argumentation, Risko and Gilbert 
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(2016) introduced a metacognitive model of cognitive offloading. This model claims that 
individuals choose whether to rely on cognitive offloading or internal memory based on 
metacognitive beliefs and experiences about one’s abilities, a task and/or a strategy. 
Metacognitive beliefs and experiences then contribute to metacognitive control, and thus to the 
actual selection of a specific strategy such as cognitive offloading. For example, when a person 
thinks that his or her spatial memory is not reliable, he or she might rather use a navigation 
system to find the way. In turn, offloading behavior affects future decision-making and 
metacognitive monitoring via the evaluation of the applied strategy such as evaluating navigation 
system use as a successful strategy for way finding. Thus, the metacognitive model of cognitive 
offloading proposes a circuit claiming that metacognitions affect cognitive offloading and vice-
versa (Risko & Gilbert, 2016). 
To investigate this proposed model, initial studies tested the influence of metacognitive 
beliefs on offloading behavior. Studies focusing on mental rotation paradigms showed that 
participants adapt their offloading behavior based on the believed reliability of a technical tool 
(Weis & Wiese, 2018) and the believed benefit of an offloading strategy (Dunn & Risko, 2015). 
In a study of Weis and Wiese (2018), the participants were able to offload normalization 
processes when working with rotated stimuli by using a knob that rotated the presented stimuli. 
When the participants were instructed that the knob was less reliable than it actually was, they 
used the knob less often to normalize the rotated stimuli than when they were instructed about the 
actual reliability of the knob or not instructed about the knobs’ reliability at all, while actual 
reliability did not differ between the conditions. Therefore, false metacognitive beliefs about the 
used technical tool impacted offloading behavior (Weis & Wiese, 2018). Furthermore, Dunn and 
Risko (2015) observed that participants tilted their head in order to externally normalize a rotated 
text when they thought that this offloading strategy benefits their reading performance although 
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there actually was no such performance benefit (i.e. performance was similar when offloading 
was prohibited). This result indicates that the participants misperceived the benefit of cognitive 
offloading; however, false metacognitive beliefs guided offloading behavior (Dunn & Risko, 
2015). Apart from such beliefs about tools and strategies, also metacognitive beliefs about one’s 
internal cognitive abilities are suggested to be a crucial determinant of cognitive offloading 
(Arango-Muñoz, 2013; Risko & Gilbert, 2016). 
 In a prospective memory task, Gilbert et al. (2020) showed that participants set reminders 
for later intentions based on their underconfidence in their own memory abilities. Thus, 
participants set more reminders than it would have been necessary to support their performance. 
This can be seen as a metacognitive bias towards cognitive offloading. This bias can be 
eliminated by providing the participants with metacognitive advice on the actual effectiveness of 
a strategy (Gilbert et al., 2020). When the participants were informed about the effectiveness of 
cognitive offloading based on their performance at the beginning of a trial, the participants were 
able to offload in the most successful manner (e.g., offloading when it indeed benefited 
performance or no offloading when it did not benefit performance). On a correlational basis, 
studies using the same prospective memory task observed a negative correlation between 
metacognitive beliefs (measured by subjective performance estimations) and offloading behavior 
(Boldt & Gilbert, 2019; Gilbert, 2015b). The higher the participants rated their upcoming 
performance, the fewer external reminders they set to remember delayed intentions (i.e. the less 
they offloaded within this task). Thus, metacognitive beliefs about one’s internal memory 
predicted offloading behavior, while also actual memory abilities predicted offloading behavior 
independently (i.e. metacognitions and actual abilities were not correlated themselves; Gilbert, 
2015b). These findings were further extended by showing that one’s subjective confidence in an 
unrelated task predicted offloading behavior in a prospective memory task (Gilbert, 2015b). 
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Similarly, Risko and Dunn (2015) observed, that participants write down to-be-remembered 
items based on their subjective performance estimations as well as actual working memory 
abilities. Therefore, also in this study more positive metacognitive beliefs about one’s internal 
working memory performance as well as better actual abilities were associated with less 
cognitive offloading. Beyond that, Hu et al. (2019) observed that the relationship between actual 
memory abilities and the likelihood of offloading was mediated by metacognitive beliefs about 
one’s internal abilities. In their experiments the participants had to study word pairs for a later 
memory test. These word pairs were also saved into the computer to access it in the subsequent 
memory test. During the memory test the participants rated their confidence in correctly recalling 
a word pair and then had the option to ask for help (i.e. to access the saved word pair in the 
computer). The participants estimated their own performance higher when their own unaided 
memory abilities were indeed better, and this accurate metacognitive estimation predicted 
participants’ proportion of asking for help. Hu et al. (2019) therefore concluded that 
metacognitive beliefs about one’s memory abilities are a key driver for cognitive offloading (i.e. 
asking for help instead of relying on one’s memory in their study).  
Although these first studies suggest that metacognitive beliefs play a determining role 
when offloading working memory processes, it is not yet fully identified how actual working 
memory abilities, metacognitive beliefs about one’s working memory, and cognitive offloading 
interact with each other. While some studies observed that actual abilities and metacognitive 
beliefs about those internal abilities influenced offloading behavior independently of each other 
(Gilbert, 2015b), other studies observed a relationship between these factors and that the 
relationship of actual abilities and offloading was mediated via metacognitive beliefs (Hu et al., 
2019). Further studies are needed to dissolve these conflicting results and to provide insights into 




1.4 Consequences of offloading working memory processes through released internal 
resources 
In order to successfully use cognitive offloading in different situations consequences of 
cognitive offloading need to be considered. Especially positive immediate consequences of 
cognitive offloading are highlighted in offloading research. Studies showed that the offloading of 
working memory processes into technical tools can increase immediate task performance in terms 
of speed and/or accuracy (Risko & Gilbert, 2016). Hence, with a large variety of different tasks 
(not exclusively working memory tasks) beneficial effects of cognitive offloading on immediate 
task processing were observed. For instance, cognitive offloading increased accuracy in 
arithmetic tasks (Carlson, Avraamides, Cary, & Strasberg, 2007; Goldin-Meadow, Nusbaum, 
Kelly, & Wagner, 2001; Pyke & LeFevre, 2011) as well as in prospective memory tasks (e.g., 
Boldt & Gilbert, 2019; Gilbert, 2015a). Further, in mental rotation paradigms with the possibility 
to offload mental rotation processes, cognitive offloading also improved accuracy (Chu & Kita, 
2011) and accelerated task processing (Risko, Medimorec, Chisholm, & Kingstone, 2014). 
However, cognitive offloading with technical tools does not only have positive effects. The 
offloading of working memory processes can also induce negative effects on later cognitive 
performance such as memory recall.  
 
1.4.1 Consequences of cognitive offloading on memory formation 
Several investigations suggest that cognitive offloading leaves cognitive residues such as 
a reduced problem-solving ability or long-term memory performance after offloading. For 
instance, cognitive offloading interferes with subsequent problem solving, when the possibility to 
offload is not available anymore (Moritz, Meyerhoff, & Schwan, 2020; O’Hara & Payne, 1998; 
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van Nimwegen & van Oostendorp, 2009). In other words, internal problem solving without 
having the option to offload was more successful when offloading was also prohibited in a 
previously performed training phase than when offloading was allowed in the training phase.  
Further, studies focusing on spatial memory observed that using a navigation system when 
finding a way impairs route learning as well as subsequent scene recognition (Fenech, Drews, & 
Bakdash, 2010; for similar results see Gardony, Brunyé, Mahoney, & Taylor, 2013; Gardony, 
Brunyé, & Taylor, 2015). Negative consequences of offloading working memory processes were 
also observed considering the formation of long-term memory (Eskritt & Ma, 2014; Henkel, 
2014; Kelly & Risko, 2019a; 2019b; Pyke & LeFevre, 2011; Sparrow, Liu, & Wegner, 2011). In 
experiments of Kelly and Risko (2019a; see Kelly & Risko, 2019b, for a similar version and 
results) the participants had to write down words that were presented auditorily. In a recall phase 
the participants then could rely on their external notes in the first three trials whereas on the 
fourth trial they were not allowed to use their notes but had to rely on their own memory. Half of 
the participants knew that they will not be able to use their notes on this last trial, but the other 
half believed that they would be able to use them again. Participants who thought they could rely 
on their notes recalled the lists of words from their memory worse than participants who knew 
about not being allowed to access their notes. Thus, the expectation to use an offloaded word list 
impaired internal memory formation for this information (Kelly & Risko, 2019a). Another 
interesting finding was reported by Sparrow et al. (2011). In their study the participants had to 
type trivia statements into a computer file while they believed either that the computer would 
save the file or that the file would be erased. Then, the participants had to recall as many 
statements as possible from their memory. They remembered less information when they thought 
the computer would save the file than when they thought that the file would be erased. Thus, the 
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participants seem to forget information that they believe is available in technical tools (Sparrow 
et al., 2011).  
These studies suggest, that cognitive offloading, compared to relying on internal memory, 
impairs the formation of subsequent long-term memory for the offloaded information. 
Nonetheless, the reported studies typically used a no-choice design that either prohibited the 
participants from offloading or forced them to offload (e.g., Eskritt & Ma, 2014; Henkel, 2014; 
Kelly & Risko, 2019a; 2019b; Sparrow et al., 2011). Such a forced offloading behavior does not 
necessarily have the same long-term consequences as a free choice offloading behavior (i.e. the 
participants can choose the extent of offloading). Onto this account, studies showed conflicting 
results based on the voluntariness of cognitive offloading (Barasch, Diehl, Silverman, & 
Zauberman, 2017; Henkel, 2014). In experiments investigating photo-taking in museums as a 
form of cognitive offloading, Henkel (2014) observed that forcing participants to take photos 
harmed their memory for the photographed images compared to just observing them. In contrast, 
voluntarily photo-taking in museums in the study of Barasch et al. (2017) enhanced subsequent 
memory for the photographed images compared to observing them. Therefore, consequences of 
free choice offloading behavior also need to be considered.  
Studies using the Pattern Copy Task as a free choice offloading paradigm showed a trade-
off between immediate benefits and subsequent risks of cognitive offloading. More cognitive 
offloading due to low temporal costs within the task led to a faster immediate task processing and 
less errors when rebuilding a pattern of colored squares, but also to a worse memory performance 
in a recall test compared to less offloading in a high temporal costs condition (Morgan, Patrick, 
Waldron, King, & Patrick, 2009; similar results were also observed by Morgan, Patrick, & Tiley, 
2013; Waldron, Patrick, Morgan, & King, 2007). Also, the resumption of a trial (i.e. continuing 
to rebuild the pattern) after an interruption was worse when the participants offloaded more than 
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when they offloaded less (Morgan, et al., 2009; Morgan, et al., 2013). However, in these 
experiments, participants’ memory was tested immediately after offloading. Thus, after some 
trials of the task, the participants were prompted to rebuild the last edited pattern of colored 
squares from their memory (Morgan et al., 2009; Waldron et al., 2007). This immediate recall 
test might not have exceeded the duration of working memory maintenance; therefore, no long-
term memory formation was necessary. Unlike this design, in real-life individuals often need to 
remember previously offloaded information at a later point of time. For instance, one might write 
down a shopping list, but then forget his or her shopping list at home. In this scenario one has to 
consult long-term memory to retrieve the offloaded information as well as possible. This raises 
the important question of how well individuals can remember the relevant information across a 
longer timescale after offloading freely.  
On the one hand, offloading working memory processes might not be harmful for long-
term memory formation when released internal cognitive resources are successfully used. When 
offloading working memory processes, internal working memory resources might be released and 
used to enhance overall task performance (Beitzel & Staley, 2015; Kirsh, 2010). On this account, 
released resources due to offloading might be used for a deeper processing of the relevant 
information at hand which in turn fosters memory acquisition (Craik & Lockhart, 1972; Craik, 
2002). In this case released resources would enhance learning (Salomon, 1990; Sweller, van 
Merrienboer, & Paas, 1998) and cognitive offloading would be beneficial for long-term memory 
formation. On the other hand, another possibility is that released resources cannot be used to 
foster long-term memory. Then, the offloading of working memory processes would not be a 
promising approach to enhance memory, but instead rather decreasing offloading behavior and 
relying more on one’s working memory might be a successful attempt. Thereby, reducing 
offloading behavior could be accounted as a desirable difficulty (Beitzel & Staley, 2015). 
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Desirable difficulties are conditions during learning that make learning temporarily more difficult 
(i.e. individuals produce more errors and are slower in memory acquisition) but these conditions 
lead to a more enduring and flexible learning (Bjork, 1994; Bjork & Bjork, 2011). Such desirable 
difficulties support learning by stimulating active cognitive processing and strengthening long-
term memory formation (Bjork & Bjork, 2011). Onto this account, relying on one’s working 
memory instead of offloading might be more cognitively demanding, but might also increase 
long-term memory formation. To the best of my knowledge, empirical evidence for either of 
these theories is lacking. It is therefore a promising attempt for future research to investigate the 
consequences of freely offloading working memory processes through released internal cognitive 
resources on the formation of long-term memory.   
 
1.4.2 Consequences of cognitive offloading on unrelated task processing  
The previous sub-chapters dealt with the consequences of cognitive offloading on 
immediate task processing in a task that allows offloading as well as the formation of long-term 
memory for the offloaded information. In addition to these consequences initial studies showed 
effects of cognitive offloading on the subsequent processing of new information or unrelated 
tasks. In experiments of Storm and Stone (2015) the participants had to study word lists for a 
later recall. When the participants offloaded a first list of words (i.e. saved the list in a computer 
file) before studying a second list, they recalled the second word list better than when they did 
not offload but memorize the first list. Released cognitive resources due to cognitive offloading 
could therefore be redirected towards other matters. This saving-enhanced memory effect shows 
that cognitive offloading facilitates the encoding and memorizing of new, relevant information. 
Importantly, this effect only arose when the saving process was reliable (i.e. the information was 
successfully offloaded). When the participants experienced failures in saving the computer file 
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their memory performance for the second word list did not improve compared to not saving the 
file at all (Storm & Stone, 2015). These findings were replicated and extended by Runge, Frings 
and Tempel (2019; see also Runge, Frings, & Tempel, 2020) who additionally observed that 
offloading a word list into a computer file enhances performance in a subsequent, unrelated task. 
In an arithmetic task the participants solved more problems when they have previously offloaded 
a word list compared to when they could not offload it. Thus, cognitive offloading does not only 
induce a saving-enhanced memory effect but also a so-called saving-enhanced performance 
effect. Runge et al. (2019) concluded that cognitive offloading frees the participants’ from 
needing to internally memorize all information and thus releases cognitive resources. In turn, 
these released resources can be used to enhance performance in a subsequent, unrelated task. It is 
therefore possible to redirect the released resources due to cognitive offloading to a subsequent 
task (Runge et al., 2019). What remains unclear is if released resources can also be redirected to a 
secondary task that is performed simultaneously.  
 
1.5 Present research 
Research on cognitive offloading has investigated determinants that influence the decision 
to offload cognitive processes as well as positive and negative consequences of offloading 
behavior. However, as the previous theoretical overview suggests, very heterogenous methods 
were used for these investigations and there are multiple open questions. To my best knowledge, 
nobody has investigated both – determinants as well as consequences of offloading working 
memory processes – with a systematic and homogenous approach. Therefore, in the present PhD-
project I aimed at systematically testing metacognitions as a key driver of cognitive offloading 
and consequences of offloading behavior through released internal resources with one paradigm. 
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In four studies I tackled the open questions derived from previous research to gain more 
knowledge on the offloading of working memory processes.  
With regard to the determinants of cognitive offloading, I first proposed to follow up on 
the conflicting results regarding the relationship between metacognitions, actual working memory 
abilities, and the offloading of working memory processes in a correlational study (Study 1). The 
metacognitive model of cognitive offloading suggests a causal influence of metacognitions on 
cognitive offloading (Risko & Gilbert, 2015). Therefore, in an experimental study I additionally 
aimed at testing if metacognitive beliefs about one’s working memory abilities causally impact 
the offloading of working memory processes (Study 2). In this study, I manipulated participants’ 
metacognitive beliefs with fake performance feedback in order to test their impact on offloading 
behavior. Together, the correlational study as well as the experimental study served to identify 
metacognitions as determinants of offloading behavior. Knowledge about determinants of 
cognitive offloading helps to understand why individuals often offload cognitive processes into 
technical tools these days. Furthermore, such knowledge is necessary in order to alter cognitive 
offloading in situations that require more or less offloading.  
 With regard to the consequences of cognitive offloading, I focused on the effects of 
offloading on the formation of long-term memory as well as on the processing of a simultaneous 
secondary task. Thus, in the third study I investigated the former – consequences of offloading 
working memory processes on subsequent long-term memory – with three experiments. Thereby, 
I aimed at reinvestigating the suggested trade-off of cognitive offloading, namely enhanced 
immediate task processing but reduced memory performance due to the offloading of working 
memory processes (Morgan et al., 2009; Waldron et al., 2007). Importantly, different to previous 
research, in my study participants’ memory was tested after a retention interval exceeding 
working memory maintenance. This procedure ensured that participants had to rely on long-term 
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memory to recall the offloaded information in the subsequent memory test. Further, I also tested 
the use of potentially released cognitive resources due to cognitive offloading for the intentional 
formation of long-term memory. Moreover, I investigated the consequences of cognitive 
offloading for the formation of long-term memory representations when participants did not have 
the option to reduce offloading behavior (i.e. they were forced to offload maximally). With these 
experiments I systematically tested whether cognitive offloading can be used to foster long-term 
memory through released internal resources or if cognitive offloading is detrimental for long-
term memory acquisition under all circumstances (i.e. offloading should be reduced to foster 
learning if possible). Beyond using released cognitive resources due to cognitive offloading for 
long-term memory formation, such released resources can also affect performance in other, 
unrelated tasks (Runge et al., 2019). In the final study I therefore aimed at testing the effects of 
cognitive offloading on the processing of a simultaneous secondary task through released 
cognitive resources (Study 4).  
Together, the four studies proposed in my PhD-project provide a package of experiments 
that systematically investigated the offloading of working memory processes (see Table 1). For 
this systematic investigation I used a previously established offloading paradigm – the Pattern 
Copy Task. The Pattern Copy Task measures free choice offloading behavior and thus aims at 
reflecting offloading behavior in real-life. In the next chapters, I will describe the proposed 
studies in more detail before discussing the findings at the end of this PhD-thesis. The following 
chapters are written as separately readable manuscripts. This results in overlapping contents with 







Table 1. Overview of Studies in the Present PhD-Project 
Metacognitions as determinants of offloading working memory processes 
Study 1  Correlational study N = 80 
Study 2*  Fake performance feedback N = 159 
Consequences of offloading working memory processes trough released 
internal resources 
Study 3  Trade-off of cognitive offloading N = 172 
  Intentional long-term memory formation N = 172 
  Forced cognitive offloading N = 172 
Study 4  Secondary task performance N = 133 
* Study 2 is included in a manuscript under revision (Grinschgl, Meyerhoff, Schwan, & 
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2. Study 1 
– The relationship of metacognitions, working memory, and cognitive offloading – 
 
 Today, humans can usually access modern technical tools such as smartphones or tablets 
which allow the externalization of cognitive processes. For instance, individuals can externalize 
memorization such as saving an appointment in a smartphone’s calendar instead of memorizing 
it. This externalizing behavior is referred to as cognitive offloading (Risko & Gilbert, 2016). 
Cognitive offloading supports cognitive processing by lowering cognitive demands through 
externalizations (Risko & Gilbert, 2016). Further, due to offloading behavior individuals can 
overcome limitations of internal cognitive processing (Risko & Gilbert, 2016) and internal 
cognitive resources are released (Kirsh, 2010). Especially working memory is a strictly limited 
cognitive system (Baddeley, 1992; Luck & Vogel, 2013), but with the help of cognitive 
offloading capacity limitations of working memory can be overcome (Risko & Gilbert, 2016; 
Wilson, 2002). Therefore, offloading behavior can support performance in working memory 
tasks (Risko & Gilbert, 2016) and improve cognition (Kirsh, 2010).  
Previous studies showed that individuals’ extent of offloading working memory processes 
varies with the perceived relation between costs during offloading and the expected benefits due 
to the released resources (Cary & Carlson, 2001; Gray, et al., 2006; Schönpflug, 1986). If 
technical tools are more costly to use in terms of required physical actions or temporal costs, 
individuals offload less working memory processes into these tools and rely more on their 
internal working memory resources. Onto this account, research addressing cognitive offloading 
mostly has focused on the role and the design of the technical tool at hand (Cary & Carlson, 
2001; Gray et al., 2006; Schönpflug, 1986), however, characteristics of the users that result in 
individual differences in offloading behavior have not yet been fully identified. A good candidate 
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for such a source of inter-individual variance in the amount of cognitive offloading are 
metacognitive beliefs with regard to one’s memory abilities (Arango-Muñoz, 2013; Risko & 
Gilbert, 2016). Metacognitive beliefs might motivate some individuals to rely on internal 
working memory resources whereas other individuals might prefer to rely on external resources 
such as the technical tool at hand (Arango-Muñoz, 2013). For instance, if an individual considers 
his or her working memory capacity to be high, he or she might rely less on offloading strategies 
as they appear to be unnecessary. Another individual who considers his or her working memory 
to be low, however, might prefer to take advantage of the possibility to offload working memory 
processes as a compensatory strategy. Thus, metacognitions might be a key factor that drives the 
decision to offload working memory processes. The present study addresses this proposed 
influence of metacognitive beliefs on the offloading of working memory processes. 
 
Metacognitions and Cognitive Offloading  
 Metacognitions describe individuals’ thinking about their own thinking (Flavell, 1979). 
Thereby, metacognitions can be separated into metacognitive knowledge and metacognitive 
experiences. Metacognitive knowledge refers to one’s general knowledge and beliefs about one’s 
cognitive abilities, tasks, and strategies. Hence, metacognitive beliefs about one’s working 
memory can be accounted as metacognitive knowledge and can be seen as offline metacognitive 
monitoring (i.e. it is not necessarily related to an ongoing task; Efklides, 2008; Flavell, 1979). 
Metacognitive experiences, on the other hand, are related to ongoing experiences while 
performing a task and thus refer to online metacognitive monitoring. Both – metacognitive 
knowledge and experiences – are supposed to influence the control of one’s cognition via 
selecting or discarding specific strategies (Efklides, 2008; Flavell, 1979). Onto this account, 
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metacognitions might determine the use of cognitive offloading as a strategy to perform a 
working memory task.  
 Arango-Muñoz (2013) introduced the extended selection problem dealing with the 
decision to offload cognitive processes into the available technical tool. He argues that this 
decision is motivated by individuals’ metacognitive beliefs such as feelings of knowing (Arango-
Muñoz, 2013). In a similar vein, Risko and Gilbert (2016) proposed the metacognitive model of 
cognitive offloading stating that cognitive offloading is guided by metacognitive beliefs and 
experiences. Based on subjective estimations about one’s abilities and/or properties of strategies, 
tools, and tasks at hand, individuals decide whether to offload cognitive processes or not (or the 
extent of cognitive offloading). Initial studies investigating metacognitions as determinants of 
cognitive offloading, observed that metacognitive beliefs about one’s abilities indeed influence 
offloading behavior on a correlational basis (Boldt & Gilbert, 2019; Gilbert 2015b; Risko & 
Dunn, 2015; Hu et al., 2019). In a prospective memory paradigm, Gilbert (2015b) observed that 
more reminder setting for future intentions was associated with fewer positive beliefs about one’s 
memory performance (for similar results see Boldt & Gilbert, 2019). Also, when needing to 
remember verbal stimuli, Risko and Dunn (2015) observed more cognitive offloading (i.e. 
writing down relevant information) when the participants estimated their unaided memory 
performance worse. These studies therefore suggest that less positive beliefs about one’s own 
memory lead to more cognitive offloading. In addition, they also observed that actual memory 
abilities influence offloading behavior (Gilbert, 2015b; Hu et al., 2019; Risko & Dunn, 2015). A 
better unaided memory performance of participants (i.e. when the task did not allow the 
offloading of cognitive processes) was associated with less cognitive offloading (Gilbert, 2015b; 
Risko & Dunn, 2015). This finding raises the question of whether actual abilities influence 
cognitive offloading directly or whether this influence is mediated via metacognitive beliefs. In 
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the study of Gilbert (2015b), he observed the former – namely, a direct influence of actual 
abilities on cognitive offloading, independently of metacognitive beliefs. Actual abilities and 
metacognitive beliefs were not correlated themselves while they were both correlated with 
offloading behavior (Gilbert, 2015b; see also Risko & Dunn, 2015). Contrary, using a different 
paradigm Hu et al. (2019) observed that actual abilities influenced offloading behavior via 
metacognitive beliefs. In this study the participants had to remember word pairs for a later recall. 
At a memory test, the participants then could choose to either rely on their working memory to 
retrieve the before studied word pairs or to ask for help (i.e. look up the relevant information in a 
technical tool). Hu et al. (2019) observed that both actual memory performance and 
metacognitive beliefs about one’s performance as measured by performance estimations 
predicted cognitive offloading (i.e. asking for help proportion). However, additional analyses 
revealed that the influence of actual abilities on cognitive offloading was mediated by 
metacognitive beliefs. Thus, the participants were able to correctly monitor their own abilities 
and in turn to adapt offloading behavior accordingly. Additionally, Meeks, Hicks and Marsh 
(2007) reported that participants have a basic metacognitive awareness, although, metacognitive 
beliefs about one’s memory abilities do not always absolutely match their actual abilities.  
To conclude, the described studies to not provide consistent findings with regard to 
metacognitions as a key driver of cognitive offloading. It remains unclear how actual abilities, 
metacognitive beliefs about one’s abilities, and offloading behavior interact with each other. To 
further investigate the relationship between these factors – metacognitive beliefs, actual abilities, 







In the present study I administered the Pattern Copy Task to measure cognitive 
offloading. The Pattern Copy Task is a working memory paradigm that allows the individual 
offloading of working memory processes by looking up relevant information in a technical tool 
(e.g., Gray et al., 2006). Before the participants performed this task, I assessed participants’ 
metacognitive beliefs about their general memory abilities with a multifactorial memory 
questionnaire (MMQ; Troyer & Rich, 2002). Additionally, the participants provided a 
performance estimation prior to performing the Pattern Copy Task ask as an index of specific 
metacognitive beliefs about one’s working memory abilities within this task. Thus, I collected 
two indicators of participants’ metacognitive beliefs – the MMQ for general metacognitive 
beliefs and the performance estimation for specific metacognitive beliefs. Then I measured 
cognitive offloading in the Pattern Copy Task and working memory capacity with two additional 
working memory tasks.  
I predicted, that the participants would accurately estimate their working memory abilities 
and in turn select a proper strategy to perform the Pattern Copy Task (i.e. more offloading when 
one’s working memory is worse). More specifically, I predicted a positive correlation between 
actual working memory capacity and metacognitive beliefs (measured by the MMQ and the 
performance estimation). Further, I predicted a negative correlation between actual working 
memory capacity and cognitive offloading. I also predicted a negative correlation between 
metacognitive beliefs and offloading behavior. The more positive metacognitive beliefs 
individuals have about their own working memory, the less they should offload in the Pattern 
Copy Task. As the next step I aimed at testing a mediation effect, namely if the relationship 
between actual working memory capacity and cognitive offloading is mediated by metacognitive 
beliefs about one’s working memory (see Figure 1). If individuals monitor their working memory 
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abilities correctly, they might choose a proper amount of offloading working memory processes. 
Hence, metacognitive beliefs might mediate the influence of working memory capacity on 
offloading behavior. For exploratory purposes, I also calculated absolute monitoring accuracy as 









Figure 1. Illustration of expected relationship between metacognitive beliefs about one’s 
working memory (measured by the MMQ and the performance estimation), working memory 
capacity (measured by two working memory tasks), and cognitive offloading (measured by the 
Pattern Copy Task) in Study 1.  
 
Method 
This study was preregistered with regard to its hypothesis, independent and dependent 
variables, sample size, statistical analyses, and exclusion criteria. The preregistration can be 













 In order to achieve a statistical power of (1- !) = .90 and to detect small to medium effect 
sizes of f = 0.15 my final sample included 80 participants (62 female, 18 male; age 18 - 29 years, 
Mage = 21.81, SDage = 2.42). Based on the preregistered exclusion criteria I excluded and replaced 
participants due to missing data (6) and too large deviations (+/- 3 SD) of the mean of the 
dependent variables (4). Further, I excluded and replaced one participant due to not sufficient 
German language skills and one participant due to a reported red-green deficiency. All 
participants provided informed consent and were reimbursed for their participation with course 
credits or financial compensation. The study was approved by the ethics committee of the 
Leibniz-Institut für Wissensmedien.  
 
Apparatus 
 I used 12.3’’ Microsoft Surface Pro Tablets (2736 x 1824 pixels) for the performance of 
all computerized tasks. The tablets were lying flat on the table at a viewing distance of around 36 
cm. The participants used the tablets’ touch function to perform the tasks which were controlled 
by PsychoPy scripts (Peirce, 2007).   
 
Procedure  
 At the beginning of the study the participants answered an adapted version of the MMQ. 
Thereafter, they read the instruction of the Pattern Copy Task (including visual examples). Then, 
the participants had to estimate their upcoming performance in the Pattern Copy Task in terms of 
how many colored squares they are able to memorize at once. Following this subjective 
estimation, the participants performed the Pattern Copy Task in which they had to rebuild a 
pattern of colored squares. Afterwards, the participants conducted two working memory tasks, 
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the Visual Patterns Test and the Digit Span Task. The whole study took approximately 60 
minutes. 
 
Paper and pencil tasks 
Multifactorial Memory Questionnaire. The MMQ is a questionnaire about one’s 
general memory abilities. I shortened and translated the original version from Troyer and Rich 
(2002) so that it contained 18 statements in German. The adapted questionnaire included 
statements measuring how someone feels about his or her memory abilities such as “I am 
generally pleased with my memory abilities”. The participants rated their agreement with each 
statement on a 5-point Likert scale (strongly agree to strongly disagree). With this questionnaire I 
aimed at measuring metacognitive beliefs about one’s general memory abilities. Therefore, I 
averaged all 18 ratings (higher values indicate more positive beliefs about one’s memory).  
 
 Performance estimation. After reading the instruction to the Pattern Copy Task and 
seeing pictures as examples of the task, the participants had to estimate their upcoming memory 
performance within this task. They did so by providing an indicator of how many colored squares 
(including the correct color and exact position) they can remember (i.e. internally store) and 
correctly rebuild at once. This estimation was supposed to capture task-specific metacognitive 
beliefs about one’s working memory abilities.  
 
Computerized tasks 
 Pattern Copy Task. In this study I used the Pattern Copy Task to measure cognitive 
offloading (e.g., Fu & Gray, 2000; Gray et al., 2006). The participants had to rebuild a pattern of 
twelve colored squares displayed in a model window on the left side of the tablet screen in an 
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empty workspace window on the right side of the screen (see Figure 2). In the model window the 
colored squares were randomly arranged in a 5 x 5 grid of empty squares (2.52 x 2.52 deg each). 
I used the colors blue, orange, red, cyan, green, dark green, yellow, bisque, sienna, purple, pink, 
and gray (no color was repeated). The workspace window consisted of a 5 x 5 grid of empty 
squares. To rebuild the pattern the participants had to drag and drop the colored squares from an 
additional resources window on the lower right side of the tablet screen into the workspace 
window. Gray masks covered the windows and only either the model window or the workspace 
and resource window could be opened at a time. The participants could open the model window 
by moving a slider from its right towards the left side of the screen and the workspace and 
resource window by clicking on a bar to their left. They could either open the model window to 
look at the pattern of colored squares or the workspace and resource window to rebuild the 
pattern. They could switch between the windows whenever and at any time. When the 
participants correctly rebuilt the pattern of colored squares in the workspace window, they were 
able to end the trial and to proceed to the next trial by pressing an “End Trial”-button. If the 
pattern was not correctly rebuilt, the participants were requested to further edit it. The 
participants completed five practice trials and 20 test trials of this task. I measured cognitive 
offloading with two variables: the number of openings of the model window and the number of 
correctly copied items after the first opening of the model window. The first opening is 
independent of any other opening and thus a good indicator of cognitive offloading. More 
openings of the model window and a lower number of initially correctly copied items indicate 




Figure 2. Illustration of the Pattern Copy Task measuring the offloading of working memory 
processes. The participants had to rebuild a pattern of colored squares from the left side of the 
screen (model window) into the workspace window on the right side of the screen. Therefore, 
they dragged and dropped the colored squares from an additional resource window (lower right 
side) into the workspace window. The participants could switch between the model and 
workspace window as often as they wanted, but they were never visible at the same time. (Tablet 
frame was designed by Freepik; hand was designed by Janoon028/Freepik.) 
 
 Visual Patterns Test. The Visual Patterns Test was used to measure visuospatial working 
memory capacity (see Della Sala, Gray, Baddeley, Allamano, & Wilson, 1999, for a similar 
version). In this task, the participants observed a spatial arrangement of colored squares for three 
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seconds (see Figure 3a). The colored squares were arranged in a 5 x 5 grid of empty squares (2.52 
x 2.52 deg each) and could have the following colors: blue, orange, red, cyan, green, yellow, 
sienna, purple, pink, and gray. After the three-second presentation phase, the participants had to 
reconstruct the pattern of colored squares from their memory by dragging them from the right 
side of the screen into an identically shaped empty grid. The task followed an adaptive staircase 
of difficulty. The participants started the task with a grid filled with two colors. The set size 
increased when the pattern was reconstructed correctly (+ 1 square, with a maximum of 10 
squares, whereby no participants achieved the maximal capacity) and decreased when it was not 
correctly reconstructed (- 1 square, with a minimum of 2). The participants performed 30 trials of 
this task. As an index of visuospatial working memory capacity, I averaged the set size (i.e. 
number of squares) of the last 10 correctly solved trials.  
 
 Digit Span Task. The Digit Span Task was used to measure non-spatial working memory 
capacity (see Paul et al., 2005, for a similar version). In this task, the participants observed a 
sequence of single digits (selected from 0 - 9) each presented for one second and separated by a 
fixation cross for 0.3 seconds (see Figure 3b). After the presentation, the participants had to 
reproduce the sequence of digits by pressing the numbers on the tablet screen one after another. 
After a correct reproduction, the number of presented digits increased by one (starting with 2 
digits and a maximum of 20 digits, but no participant achieved this maximum capacity). 
Following an incorrect reproduction, the number of presented digits decreased by one digit (with 
a minimum of 2 digits). The participants performed 30 trials of this task. As a measure of non-
spatial working memory capacity, I averaged the number of presented digits of the last ten 




Figure 3. Illustration of Visual Patterns Test and Digit Span Task, both measuring working 
memory capacity. a) In the Visual Patterns Test, the participants had to reconstruct a spatial 
arrangement of colored squares after a three-second presentation phase. b) In the Digit Span 
Task, the participants observed a sequence of digits (each digit presented for 1 second with a 0.3 
second interim period) and then had to repeat this sequence. Please note that the fixation cross is 
not displayed in its’ original scale for illustrative purposes. (Tablet frame was designed by 
Freepik; hand was designed by Janoon028/Freepik.)  
3 seconds
a)  Visual Patterns Test













Working memory capacity and cognitive offloading  
 Pearson-correlations showed a significant relationship between working memory capacity 
and cognitive offloading across all variables, all |r(78)s| >= .31, all ps <= .001 (see Table 2). The 
higher participants’ actual working memory capacity measured by the Visual Patterns Test and 
the Digit Span Task was, the less they offloaded within the Pattern Copy Task (i.e. the fewer 
times they opened the model window and the more items they copied initially correct).  
 
Table 2. Correlations of Working Memory Capacity and Cognitive Offloading  
 




Capacity in Visual 
Patterns Test 
r (78) = -.49, p <.001 r (78) = .43, p <.001 
Capacity in Digit Span 
Task 
r (78) = -.31, p <.001 r (78) = .35, p =.001 
 
 
Working memory capacity and metacognitive beliefs 
 With regard to metacognitive beliefs about one’s general memory capacity (measured by 
the MMQ) Pearson-correlations revealed no significant relationship with working memory 
capacity, all r(78)s <= -.04, all ps >= .705. Further, specific metacognitive beliefs (measured by 
the performance estimation) were not significantly correlated with working memory capacity, all 
|r(78)s| <= .11, all ps >= .325. Therefore, I did not receive evidence for metacognitive accuracy 
calculated as the relationship between actual working memory abilities and predicted 











Metacognitive beliefs and cognitive offloading 
 To investigate the third relationship between metacognitive beliefs and cognitive 
offloading, I again performed Pearson-correlations (see Table 4). I observed no significant 
correlation between general metacognitive beliefs and the number of openings of the model 
window in the Pattern Copy Task, r(78) = .22, p = .054, whereas general metacognitive beliefs 
were significantly correlated with the number of initially correctly copied items, r(78) = -.24, 
p = .032. However, this correlation did not follow the expected direction (i.e. less cognitive 
offloading when participants’ metacognitive beliefs are higher). Instead, higher ratings about 
one’s general memory abilities were accompanied by more cognitive offloading (as measured by 
initially correctly copied items). There was no significant correlation between specific 
metacognitive beliefs and cognitive offloading, all r(78)s <= .12, all ps >= .271.  
 








 MMQ Performance Estimation 
Capacity in Visual 
Patterns Test 
r (78) = -.03, p =.812 r (78) = -.11, p =.325 
Capacity in Digit Span 
Task 
r (78) = -.04, p =.705 r (78) = .005, p =.956 
 MMQ Performance Estimation 
Openings of the Model 
Window 
r (78) = .22, p =.054 r (78) = .12, p =.271 
Initially Correctly 
Copied Items 




Unexpectedly, I found no relationship between working memory capacity and 
metacognitive beliefs. Further, I also found no distinct relationship between metacognitive beliefs 
and cognitive offloading. Due to this lack of significant correlations between working memory 
capacity and metacognitive beliefs (and in parts between cognitive offloading and metacognitive 
beliefs) no mediation analyses could be performed.  
 
Overconfidence (exploratory) 
To further investigate participants’ metacognitive accuracy, I used the difference of the 
metacognitive performance estimation (i.e. how many colored squares one beliefs he or she can 
copy at once) and working memory capacity measured by the Visual Patterns Test (i.e. how many 
colored squares one actually is able to correctly memorize at once) to determine absolute 
metacognitive accuracy. Positive values suggest overconfidence whereas negative values suggest 
underconfidence. Indeed, 86.25% of the participants were overconfident. On average the 
participants estimated to correctly reproduce 1.6 items (SD = 1.73) more than their visuospatial 
working memory capacity as measured by the Visual Patterns Test allowed (12.5% of the 
participants where underconfident, 1.25% showed perfect absolute metacognitive accuracy).  
 
Discussion 
The present study investigated the interplay of metacognitive beliefs about one’s working 
memory, actual working memory capacity, and the offloading of working memory processes in 
the Pattern Copy Task. I observed that working memory capacity is negatively correlated with 
offloading behavior. Thus, the higher participants’ actual working memory capacity was, the less 
they offloaded. Unexpectedly, actual working memory capacity was not related to metacognitive 
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beliefs about one’s working memory. This finding indicates that the participants did not correctly 
evaluate their own abilities (i.e. there seems to be a lack of monitoring accuracy). Furthermore, I 
also did not observe a distinct relationship between metacognitive beliefs about one’s working 
memory and cognitive offloading. While specific metacognitive beliefs about one’s working 
memory (measured by a performance estimation) were not correlated with offloading behavior at 
all, general metacognitive beliefs provided mixed findings. General metacognitive beliefs were 
not significantly correlated with the number of openings of the model window in the Pattern 
Copy Task, however, they were correlated with the number of initially correctly copied items. 
The higher the participants rated their general memory abilities, the less items they copied 
correctly after the first opening of the model window (i.e. the more they offloaded). This 
relationship did not follow the expected direction (i.e. less offloading with more positive 
metacognitive beliefs), but rather the participants offloaded more when they thought that their 
general memory abilities were higher. Due to these inconclusive results I cannot confirm that 
metacognitive beliefs act as a predictor of cognitive offloading. Furthermore, no mediation 
analyses could be conducted because of the lack of correlation between actual working memory 
capacity and metacognitive beliefs, as well as the unclear relationship between metacognitive 
beliefs and offloading behavior.  
To follow-up on these results, I took a closer look at the participants’ monitoring accuracy 
(i.e. how accurate they estimated their own performance). On the one hand, monitoring accuracy 
can be indicated as the relationship between metacognitive estimations and actual abilities such 
as the calculated correlation of metacognitive beliefs and working memory capacity. This 
correlation is called relative monitoring accuracy (Kelemen, Frost, & Weaver, 2000; Schraw, 
2009) and did not yield a high monitoring accuracy in my study (i.e. there was no correlation). 
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On the other hand, the so-called absolute monitoring accuracy1 can be used to indicate over- and 
underconfidence of one’s memory abilities. Absolute monitoring accuracy is calculated as the 
difference of metacognitive estimations and actual abilities (Kelemen et al., 2000; Schraw, 2009). 
As an index of absolute monitoring accuracy, I calculated the difference of specific 
metacognitive beliefs indicating how many colored squares one thinks he or she can remember at 
once (see “performance estimation”) and working memory capacity of the Visual Patterns Test 
indicating how many visual objects (i.e. colored squares) one can actually store in working 
memory. Interestingly, most participants in my study were overconfident (86.25 %). They 
thought that they would be able to remember more colored squares than they actually could. 
Thus, with regard to both indicators – relative and absolute monitoring accuracy – I observed a 
lack of monitoring accuracy in my study. I hypothesized that when participants are able to 
accurately estimate their own performance (i.e. there is a monitoring accuracy) they might be 
able to select the proper strategy to perform the Pattern Copy Task (e.g., more offloading when 
one’s working memory is worse). In contrast, I actually did not observe monitoring accuracy 
within my study and even false metacognitive beliefs did not guide offloading behavior.  
The findings of the present study contradict previous research that indeed observed a 
relationship between metacognitions and offloading behavior (Boldt & Gilbert, 2019; Gilbert, 
2015b; Risko & Dunn, 2015; Hu et al., 2019). However, what is in line with previous studies is 
the relationship between actual working memory abilities and cognitive offloading (Gilbert, 
2015b; Risko & Dunn, 2015). The higher participants’ actual working memory capacity was, the 
less they offloaded. Therefore, actual working memory abilities seem to be a strong predictor for 
cognitive offloading. Onto this account, the participants might have experienced how good they 
 




are in performing the Pattern Copy Task based on their actual working memory abilities and in 
turn adapted their offloading behavior accordingly (e.g. more offloading when one’s working 
memory is poor). What remains unclear is how metacognitive beliefs contribute to the offloading 
of working memory processes within the Pattern Copy Task. The present study indicates that 
(false) metacognitive beliefs are not related to cognitive offloading as suggested. Nonetheless, I 
propose to further systematically investigate how metacognitive beliefs might contribute to the 
offloading of working memory processes. Beyond the correlational approaches of previous 
studies (e.g., Gilbert et al., 2015b, Hu et al., 2019) I especially propose to test the causal impact 
of metacognitive beliefs on offloading behavior in experimental studies.  
Despite the lack of a distinct relationship between metacognitive beliefs and cognitive 
offloading, also metacognitive beliefs and actual working memory abilities were not related in 
this study. Unlike the findings of Hu et al. (2019), but similar to results of Gilbert (2015b), the 
participants did not correctly estimate their own working memory abilities. Instead, I observed 
that the vast majority of participants was overconfident. Overconfidence in one’s abilities and 
performance was commonly observed across various research regarding metacognitions (e.g., 
Callender, Franco-Watkins, & Roberts, 2016; De Bruin, Kok, Lobbestael, & de Grip, 2017; 
Koriat & Bjork, 2005). For instance, Koriat and Bjork (2005) observed that individuals’ 
metacognitive monitoring suffers from failures in estimating one’s abilities. These failures induce 
a sense of confidence in one’s performance, thus leading to overconfidence. Metacognitive 
accuracy and in turn strategy selection can be improved by metacognitive advice or 
metacognitive training (Gilbert et al., 2020; Callender et al., 2015; Ghatala, 1986). In a 
prospective memory paradigm Gilbert et al. (2020) showed that participants’ strategy selection 
can be improved by providing the participants with metacognitive advice suggesting which 
strategy to solve the task is the most promising one. Metacognitive advice led to optimal 
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offloading behavior that helped to maximize task performance. Similarly, Ghatala (1986) 
provided children with feedback on adequate strategies to perform a task which enhanced 
successful strategy selection. Thus, feedback can increase metacognitive accuracy and support 
the selection of a proper strategy when performing a task (Callender et al., 2015; Ghatala, 1986). 
Onto this account, it might also be possible to enhance metacognitive accuracy with regard to the 
Pattern Copy Task by providing participants with feedback or metacognitive advice.  
Another reason for the lack of metacognitive accuracy in my study might be the study 
design. In my study, the participants estimated their working memory performance before 
gaining any experiences in the Pattern Copy Task. Thus, after only reading the instruction of the 
task the participants estimated their upcoming performance. This method served to collect 
metacognitive estimations that only reflect the participants’ subjective beliefs and not actual 
experiences. However, this is different to previous studies investigating metacognitions in the 
context of cognitive offloading. In the previous studies the participants performed practice trials 
of the task at hand before estimating their performance (Gilbert, 2015b; Boldt & Gilbert, 2019) or 
they estimated their performance after the presentation of the to-be-remembered stimuli (Hu et 
al., 2019; Risko & Dunn, 2015). Therefore, in these studies the participants had some experiences 
with regard to the upcoming task performance or stimuli which might have affected their 
metacognitions and in return offloading behavior. If participants have some experience beyond 
reading the instruction of a task, they might be able to correctly estimate their own performance 
and then select the proper strategy to solve a working memory task. Metacognitive monitoring in 
my study might not have been successful due to missing experiences with the task at hand.  
To summarize, in the present study I did not observe a relationship of metacognitive 
beliefs and the offloading of working memory processes on a correlational basis. My study does 
therefore not support the proposed metacognitive model of cognitive offloading of Risko and 
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Gilbert (2016). Rather actual working memory abilities than metacognitive beliefs seem to be a 
strong predictor for the offloading of working memory processes. Nonetheless, I propose to 
further investigate if metacognitive beliefs causally impact the offloading of working memory 
processes. An experimental investigation of the influence of metacognitive beliefs on offloading 
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3. Study 2 
– From metacognitive beliefs to strategy selection: Does fake performance feedback 
influence cognitive offloading? – 
 
Today, with regard to the pervasive availability of technological aids such as smartphones 
or tablets, individuals can constantly decide between either externalizing cognitive processes into 
these aids by, for example, offloading a shopping list onto one’s smartphone or relying on their 
own internal cognitive processing by memorizing the shopping list instead. Technological aids 
serve as a digital expansion of the individual mind (Clark & Chalmers, 1998) and individuals 
perceive their external memories as part of themselves (Finley et al., 2018). The determinants of 
utilizing either internal cognitive processes or external cognitive resources have been the focus of 
recent research (e.g., Gilbert, 2015a; Gray et al., 2006; Grinschgl, Meyerhoff, & Papenmeier, 
2020; Risko & Dunn, 2015; Weis & Wiese, 2018). With the present experiment, we probed 
whether there is a causal relationship between metacognitive beliefs and offloading behavior by 
manipulating participants’ metacognitive beliefs about their own working memory performance 
with fake performance feedback. 
The externalization of cognitive processes into technological aids is known as cognitive 
offloading (Risko & Gilbert, 2016). Cognitive offloading reduces demands on internal cognitive 
processing and thus minimizes cognitive effort when performing a task. Furthermore, due to 
cognitive offloading, individuals can store and handle more information simultaneously than 
within the restrictions of their internal memory capacity. In other words, cognitive offloading 
allows for overcoming capacity limitations of internal cognitive processing such as in working 
memory (Risko & Gilbert, 2016). With regard to working memory, cognitive offloading avoids 
the internal encoding or actively holding of information that is present in the immediate 
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environment (Wilson, 2002). Instead, individuals can rely on the environment, for example, by 
using a technological aid to externally store and/or manipulate information and only access the 
information when needed (Wilson, 2002).  
Over the last years, research has identified multiple determinants for offloading behavior 
(see Risko & Gilbert, 2016, for a review), such as the characteristics of the technological aid and 
the task at hand. For example, the likelihood of offloading cognitive processes onto a tablet 
device depends on the responsivity of the device and the smoothness of the control type 
(Grinschgl et al., 2020). Current research suggests that cognitive offloading is based on cost-
benefit considerations (e.g., Gray et al., 2006). When cognitive offloading is associated with low 
temporal and/or physical costs while interacting with tools, offloading behavior is more 
pronounced than with high associated costs (e.g., Cary & Carlson, 2001; Gray et al., 2006; 
Grinschgl et al., 2020). Regarding the task at hand, the information that needs to be processed 
also influences offloading behavior. For instance, increases in complexity (Schönpflug, 1986), 
difficulty (Hu et al., 2019), or amount of information (Gilbert, 2015a; Risko & Dunn, 2015) 
results in an increased offloading behavior. 
Recently, researchers interested in cognitive offloading started considering determinants 
of cognitive offloading related to the user of technological aids, such as users’ memory capacity 
or metacognitive beliefs about their own internal abilities. Individuals offloading behavior is 
more pronounced, the lower their own internal performance is (Gilbert, 2015b; Risko & Dunn, 
2015). Importantly, however, prior research suggests that not only objective memory abilities but 
also metacognitive beliefs about one’s internal memory abilities and one’s environment might 
affect offloading behavior (Arango-Muñoz, 2013). In their review article, Risko and Gilbert 
(2016) proposed a metacognitive model of cognitive offloading. This model states that the 
decision between internal and external strategies is guided by metacognitive beliefs about one’s 
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environment – such as the properties of technological aids – and one’s internal memory abilities. 
Regarding the former, that is, the metacognitive beliefs about one’s environment, studies have 
shown that individuals adapt their offloading behavior according to their beliefs about the 
benefits of an offloading strategy (Dunn & Risko, 2015) or the reliability of a technological aid 
(Weis & Wiese, 2018). If individuals expected an offloading strategy to be inefficient for 
reaching their goal (Dunn & Risko, 2015) or a technological aid to be unreliable (Weis & Wiese, 
2018), they offloaded less and relied more on their own internal resources. Regarding the latter – 
metacognitive beliefs about one’s internal abilities – Gilbert (2015b) observed in a prospective 
memory task that the subjective confidence in one’s memory performance predicted offloading 
behavior, regardless of objective accuracy. Lower confidence in one’s memory performance (i.e. 
less positive metacognitive beliefs about one’s memory) was associated with a more extensive 
use of external reminders, thus more cognitive offloading (Boldt & Gilbert, 2019; Gilbert, 2015b; 
similar results were obtained by Hu, et al., 2019; Risko & Dunn, 2015). Therefore, individuals 
might use cognitive offloading as a compensatory strategy if they believe that their internal 
memory abilities are poor. In a recent experimental study using the same prospective memory 
task, Gilbert et al. (2020) manipulated the difficulty of practice trials as well as the valence of 
provided feedback on each trial (positive vs. negative). After performing the practice trials, the 
participants provided metacognitive performance estimations and then performed the task with 
the possibility of offloading memory demands. The participants rated their own memory 
performance to be more accurate when they received positively framed feedback or easier 
practice trials than when they received negatively framed feedback or more difficult practice 
trials. This shift in metacognitive beliefs was accompanied by a matching shift in offloading 
behavior. When a manipulation resulted in less confidence in one’s memory abilities, this led to 
more cognitive offloading. However, all participants showed a bias towards using cognitive 
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offloading extensively, thus metacognitions cannot fully explain offloading behavior in this study 
(Gilbert et al., 2020). While these findings are a first indication of the connection between 
metacognitions and cognitive offloading beyond correlational approaches, further investigations 
are needed to explain their causal relationship as well as the involved processes. 
In the present study, we set out to investigate the causal relationship between 
metacognitive beliefs and offloading behavior by manipulating metacognitive beliefs with fake 
performance feedback. Performance feedback can influence motivation (Venables & Fairclough, 
2009), effort spent on a task (Raaijmakers, Baar, Schaap, Paas, & Van Gog, 2017) as well as 
goals (Fishbach, Eyal, & Finkenstein, 2010; Ilies & Judge, 2005), even if the feedback is 
manipulated and therefore false (Ilies & Judge, 2005). With regard to perceptual learning, fake 
performance feedback has an even higher impact than genuine feedback (Shibata, Yamagishi, 
Ishii, & Kawato, 2009). Additionally, positive and negative performance feedback can influence 
beliefs about one’s self-efficacy (Nease, Mudgett, & Quiñones, 1999). Individuals often evaluate 
their own performance in comparison to other individuals, such as those in their peer group (Ilies 
& Judge, 2005; MacFarland & Miller, 1994). Thus, performance feedback including a social 
comparison (e.g., “you performed worse/better than your peers”) might have a particularly strong 
effect on metacognitive beliefs. In addition, participants might be less able to judge their own 
performance in relation to their peers compared to directly estimating their own abilities (without 
any social comparison). Thus, they might be more vulnerable to fake performance feedback with 
rather than without social comparisons. For these reasons, we provided the participants of our 
study with fake performance feedback indicating a below-average or above-average performance 
compared to their peers (i.e. other students), and we measured metacognitive beliefs with the 
participants’ subjective performance estimations similar to the feedback.   
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We predicted that fake performance feedback should influence participants’ 
metacognitive beliefs about their own working memory performance. We further hypothesized 
that the manipulated metacognitive beliefs should transfer into the control of offloading behavior 
in a working memory task. Therefore, we expected that the participants receiving below-average 
performance feedback rely more on cognitive offloading while performing a working memory 
task than those participants receiving above-average performance feedback, with the control 
group (i.e. no feedback) in between the two. We expected this effect to be due to metacognitive 
beliefs about the reliability of the internal working memory resources. Whereas the participants 
receiving below-average feedback should expect their memory to be poor, thus relying more on 
offloading, those participants receiving above-average feedback should expect their memory to 
be good, thus relying more on internal processing.  
 
Method 
We preregistered the research questions, independent and dependent variables, sample 
size, exclusion criteria, and the analysis plan of this experiment at the Open Science Framework 
prior to data collection (https://osf.io/9hpz5). 
 
Participants 
We collected valid datasets of 159 participants (113 female, 46 male; age 18 – 32 years, 
Mage = 23.16, SDage = 2.81). According to our preregistered exclusion criteria, we excluded and 
replaced data of participants when data went missing (3) and when there were errors in data 
collection (2), participants exceeding threshold values of +/- 3 SD for the dependent variables in 
the Pattern Copy Task (4), participants not performing the Feature Switch Detection Task 
correctly (i.e. always pressing the same button or performing at chance level; 9) and participants 
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who indicated that they had received other feedback than they actually had at the end of the 
experiment (i.e. an attention check; 5). We also excluded and replaced one participant who 
reported difficulties when performing the experiment due to visual impairments. Further, we 
excluded and replaced 13 participants2 due to an error in data collection, resulting in missing 
responses for the paper-and-pencil multifactorial memory questionnaire. The sample size was 
preregistered and intended to achieve a statistical power of (1 - β) = .80 with medium effect sizes 
of f = 0.25. The participants were university students and recruited at the University of Tübingen. 
All participants provided informed consent and received course credits or a financial 
compensation for their participation. The study was approved by the local ethics committee of the 
Leibniz-Institut für Wissensmedien. 
 
Apparatus 
All computer tasks were performed on 12.3’’ Microsoft Surface Pro Tablets (2736 x 1824 
pixels) lying flat on the table at a viewing distance of approximately 36 cm. The tablets were 
controlled by their touch function, and all computer tasks were performed with PsychoPy scripts 
(Peirce, 2007).  
 
Procedure and Computer Tasks  
General procedure. At the beginning of the experiment, we instructed the participants 
that they will perform multiple different working memory tests and that they might receive 
feedback about their actual task performance. Thus, the participants were naïve to our 
manipulations; that is, they neither knew that the performance feedback was actually fake, nor 
 
2 Please note that exploratorily adding the complete datasets of those participants to the respective analyses changes 
neither the reported result patterns nor interpretations. 
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did they know that the fourth test was designed to measure offloading behavior. The participants 
first completed three successive working memory tasks (Feature Switch Detection Task, Adapted 
Corsi Blocks Task, Adapted Visual Patterns Test). Each task started with the participants reading 
the corresponding instructions and then filling out a pre-rating about their expected upcoming 
performance. After each task, fake performance feedback was presented for the below-average 
group and above-average group (see below for details on the feedback). With these three tasks, 
we aimed to achieve a high credibility of the fake performance feedback. As the fourth test, the 
participants performed our main task – the Pattern Copy Task – measuring spontaneous 
offloading behavior. The participants were instructed as if this task would just be another 
common working memory test so that they would transfer the previous fake performance 
feedback and the associated metacognitive beliefs onto the Pattern Copy Task. After reading the 
instructions for the Pattern Copy Task, the participants rated their expected upcoming 
performance. After performing the task, they additionally rated their achieved performance in a 
post-rating. In addition, they indicated the strategy they used during this task in a follow-up 
questionnaire. Finally, the participants answered the multifactorial memory questionnaire (MMQ; 
Troyer & Rich, 2002). All participants were debriefed at the end of the experiment.  
Feature Switch Detection Task. We used the Feature Switch Detection Task to measure 
the participants’ actual visual working memory performance (see Meyerhoff & Gehrer, 2017; 
Wheeler & Traismen, 2002, for similar versions) and additionally provide our participants with 
their first fake performance feedback. In this task, the participants had to memorize a display with 
colored boxes that was presented for 150 ms (presentation display, see Figure 4). After a short 
blank period (900 ms), they then observed another display with only one colored box as the 
probed object (single-probe display) and had to decide whether the color of this probed object 
was identical to its previous color in the presentation display or whether there was a change in 
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this feature. The single-probe display was presented until a response was given. The participants 
gave their response by pressing the corresponding button on the touch display (the color of 
probed object in the single-probe display was the same or was different compared to the 
presentation display). The task started with eight practice trials including the presentation display 
of two colored boxes. After the practice trials, the participants performed three blocks of 40 trials 
with an increasing set size: Block 1 included four colored boxes; Block 2 included six colored 
boxes, and Block 3 included eight colored boxes in the presentation display. The colored boxes 
could have had one of the following colors: red, yellow, green, blue, white, brown, black, 
magenta and were presented on a gray background. Colors were never repeated within a display, 
and the colored boxes had a size of 2 x 2 deg of visual angle. In the single-probe display, the 
probed object either had the same color as in the presentation display (50% of the trials) or it took 
the color of another object from the presentation display (50% of the trials). The trials were 
presented in a randomized order within each block. As an index for visual working memory 
performance, we calculated the proportion of correct responses across all test trials (120 trials in 





Figure 4. Illustration of the Feature Switch Detection Task, measuring working memory 
performance. In the Feature Switch Detection Task, the participants had to detect a change in the 
color of the probed object in a single-probe display. In this example, the color of the probed 
object did not change; thus, the correct answer is “same” color. After multiple trials with an 
increasing set size, the participants received fake performance feedback (here illustrated for the 
below-average group; tablet frame designed by Freepik). 
 
 Fake performance feedback. Directly following the task, the participants who received 
fake performance feedback (below-average group and above-average group) had to wait for 5000 
ms in which the computer program (PsychoPy) was pretending to analyze their performance (see 
  
64 
Figure 4). Then, fake performance feedback was presented for at least 3000 ms and until the 
participants pressed a continue button to exit the feedback. The participants in the control 
condition did not receive any feedback but instead saw a blue circulating rectangle and the 
statement “Please wait a moment” (identical to the waiting screen in the other two conditions 
with exception of the exact statement) on the screen for 8000 ms. They then continued the 
experiment.  
The written feedback gave a fake percentile rank that indicated the performance in the 
task just performed compared to other students (i.e. their peers) and additionally the meaning of 
this rank in terms of one’s working memory capacity. More specifically, the feedback after the 
Feature Switch Detection Task stated the following for the below-average group (in German, 
here translated into English for illustration): 
“In this task, you reached a percentile rank of 21. This means that you performed worse 
than 79% of other students. Your current working memory capacity is therefore below 
average.”  
For the above-average group, the following fake performance feedback was given subsequently 
to the Feature Switch Detection Task: 
“In this task you reached a percentile rank of 79. This means that you performed better 
than 79% of other students. Your current working memory capacity is therefore above 
average.”  
In addition, the percentile rank was also visually displayed in a normal distribution. The 
fake performance feedback for the below-average and above-average groups was consistent 
across the three tasks for which fake performance feedback was provided. Only the reported 
values slightly varied. Following the Adapted Corsi Blocks Task, the fake performance feedback 
for the below-average group was a percentile rank of 23 and for the above-average group a 
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percentile rank of 77. Following the Adapted Visual Patterns Test, the fake performance feedback 
for the below-average group was a percentile rank of 20, whereas for the above-average group, it 
was a percentile rank of 80. 
Adapted Corsi Blocks Task. We presented an adapted Corsi Blocks Task (for original 
version see Della Sala et al., 1999) in order to provide further fake performance feedback. In this 
task, the participants were presented with a 5 x 5 grid of empty squares (2.52 x 2.52 deg) on a 
white display. In a presentation phase, single squares of this grid turned yellow in a specific order 
(one by one, in a 700 ms rhythm). After the presentation phase and a short blank phase (500 ms), 
the participants again observed a sequence of single squares turning yellow. They then had to 
decide whether the second sequence was identical to the first one or not. On 50% of the trials, the 
sequence was identical; on the other 50% of trials, the sequence was different (one single yellow 
square was presented in a different position on the grid). The participants performed 36 trials, 
with the sequence length increasing from four objects turning yellow (12 trials), to six objects 
turning yellow (12 trials), and finally eight objects turning yellow (12 trials). Subsequently, fake 
performance feedback was presented according to the participant’s feedback group. We did not 
analyze actual performance within this task as it only served to provide fake performance 
feedback. 
Adapted Visual Patterns Test. This task was also modified from its original version 
(Della Sala et al., 1999) to provide the participants with fake performance feedback. In this task, 
the participants had to detect a change between two displays. The displays included a 5 x 5 grid 
of empty squares (2.52 x 2.52 deg). Some of these squares were filled with colors in a 
presentation phase (250 ms). After a short blank phase (1000 ms), the participants observed a 
second display that was either identical (50% of trials) or the position of one colored square 
changed (50% of trials; in a randomized order). Thus, the participants had to decide whether the 
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displays were identical or not. In a total of 36 trials, the set size increased, starting with 12 trials 
with six colored squares each, followed by 12 trials with eight colored squares each, and 12 trials 
with 10 colored squares each. At the end of this task, the participants received the third and thus 
last fake performance feedback according to their feedback group. We again did not analyze 
actual performance within this task.  
Pattern Copy Task. The Pattern Copy Task is a working memory task that was designed 
to measure spontaneous offloading behavior (e.g., Ballard et al., 1992; Ballard et al., 1995; Gray 
et al., 2006). The participants were told that they will perform another working memory test that 
measures their visual working memory capacity (i.e. they did not know about our focus on 
cognitive offloading). Within this task, the participants had to copy a color pattern from a model 
window into an empty workspace window (see Figure 5). The model window comprised a 5 x 5 
grid of empty squares (2.52 x 2.52 deg each). Twelve of these squares were randomly filled with 
distinct colors (blue, orange, red, cyan, green, dark green, yellow, bisque, sienna, purple, pink, 
gray; no color was repeated). Thus, the model window presented a color pattern on the left side of 
the screen that the participants had to reproduce in the workspace window on the right side of the 
screen. The workspace window presented the same 5 x 5 grid of empty squares, and additionally 
beneath this workspace window, a resource window was displayed. The resource window 
contained all the colored boxes to be dragged and dropped into the workspace window. 
Importantly, all windows were covered by gray masks and only either the model window on the 
left side of the screen or the workspace and resource window on the right side of the screen could 
be opened. The model window opened by moving a slider to the left, and the workspace as well 
as resource window opened by clicking onto a bar next to it. The participants could switch 
between the windows as often as they wanted. After correctly rebuilding the color pattern in the 
workspace window, the participants could proceed to the next trial by clicking an “End Trial”-
  
67 
button. If the pattern was not rebuilt correctly, they were requested to keep editing it.3 The 
participants performed 20 trials of this task, preceded by five practice trials. The trial order and 
color patterns allocated to the trials was randomized to the extent that one participant of each 
feedback group (below-average, above-average and control group) received the exactly same trial 
order and color patterns in order to eliminate potential effects of different stimuli. We measured 
the offloading of working memory processes with three variables: the number of openings of the 
model window, the number of correctly copied items after the very first opening of the model 
window, and the duration of the very first opening of the model window. A higher number of 
openings indicated more cognitive offloading, whereas more initially correctly copied items and a 
higher initial encoding duration indicated less cognitive offloading and more memorized 
information. This task measured spontaneous offloading behavior; thus, the participants were not 
informed about different strategies (i.e. relying more on cognitive offloading or one’s internal 
memory) that they might use to solve this task. Instead, the participants had to decide 
spontaneously which strategy to apply (see also Ballard et al., 1995). This spontaneous offloading 
behavior resembles the cognitive offloading as performed during daily real-life situations in 





3 Please note that the participants rarely pressed the “End Trial”-button whenever the pattern was not correctly 
rebuilt. Across the 20 trials of the Pattern Copy Task, we observed the following means and standard deviations for 
the number of times the “End Trial”-button was pressed prematurely: below-average group: M = 0.29 (SD = 0.36); 
control group: M = 0.19 (SD = 0.15); above-average group: M = 0.20 (SD = 0.14). Excluding the trials in which 
participants pressed the “End Trial”-button prematurely did not change our findings.  
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Figure 5. Illustration of the Pattern Copy Task measuring offloading behavior. The participants 
had to copy a color pattern from a model window (left side) to a workspace window (right side) 
by dragging colored boxes from an additional resource window (lower right side). The windows 
were never visible at the same time, but the participants could switch between them as often as 
they wanted. They could proceed to the next trial once they had correctly rebuilt the pattern. 
(Tablet frame designed by Freepik). 
 
Paper and Pencil Tasks 
In addition to the computer tasks, we also asked the participants to answer some 
supplementary measures on paper. 
Subjective performance ratings. Before performing any computer task, we asked the 
participants to rate their upcoming performance in comparison to other students. Therefore, they 
read the instruction of the corresponding task first and then indicated their performance on a 0 to 
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100 percentile rank scale. In total, there were four of these pre-ratings (before the Feature Switch 
Detection Task, the Adapted Corsi Blocks Task, the Adapted Visual Patterns Test and the Pattern 
Copy Task). For the final Pattern Copy Task, we additionally collected one post-rating. After the 
completion of this task, the participants rated their actual performance within the Pattern Copy 
Task on the same scale from percentile 0 to 100. 
Offloading-Strategies. After performing the Pattern Copy Task and filling out the post-
rating, the participants were asked about the strategies they used while performing this task. 
Therefore, we presented the following question and answers to the participants: “What strategy 
did you use to complete the last task?” with the response options: “I tried to memorize a lot at 
once instead of having to take a look more often.” or “I tried to take a look more often instead of 
memorizing a lot at once.” (presented in German; here translated into English for illustration). 
Thus, the participants could choose between a strategy that implies a more memory intense-
strategy (i.e. memorizing more information and looking up the required information less often, 
“internal strategy”) or more cognitive offloading (i.e. looking up the required information more 
often and memorizing less information, “offloading strategy”). 
Multifactorial Memory Questionnaire. At the end of the entire experiment, the 
participants filled out the MMQ (Troyer & Rich, 2002; adapted and translated by us). This 
adapted version included statements about meta-memory contentment (18 statements) and 
omitted other parts of the original version. The statements that we included dealt with the 
satisfaction with and confidence in someone’s memory abilities, such as “I am generally pleased 
with my memory ability”. The participants rated how strongly they agreed with these statements 
on a 5-point Likert scale (from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”). We aimed to measure 
participants’ subjective beliefs about their general memory abilities. Thus, we averaged all 18 
ratings to receive an index of subjective beliefs about their general memory abilities (higher 
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values indicate more positive beliefs). Our adapted and translated questionnaire provided a high 
internal consistency with a Cronbach’s alpha of .93. 
 
Design 
Our experiment followed a between-subjects design with three feedback groups (below-
average vs. above-average vs. control). In the below-average group, the participants received fake 
performance feedback indicating below average working memory capacity. In the above-average 
group, the participants received fake performance feedback indicating above average working 




Subjective Performance Ratings  
 To investigate whether the participants changed their metacognitive beliefs according to 
the provided fake performance feedback, we performed a preregistered mixed 2 x 3 ANOVA 
with the within factor “time of pre-rating” (first pre-rating before receiving any feedback vs. 
fourth pre-rating after receiving feedback for three times) and the between factor “feedback 
group” (below-average vs. above-average vs. control). We were especially interested in the fourth 
pre-rating as it was provided immediately before the main task (Pattern Copy Task) measuring 
cognitive offloading. We observed a main effect of the factor “feedback group”, 
F(2, 156) = 19.74, p < .001, η2 = .12, as well as a main effect of the factor “time of pre-rating”, 
F(1, 156) = 22.67, p < .001, η2 = .04. Most importantly, we also found a significant interaction 
between these factors, F(2, 156) = 20.09, p <.001, η2 = .07. Post-hoc t-Tests for independent 
samples between each feedback group showed that there were no group differences in the first 
pre-rating, all ts(104) <= 1.68, all ps >= .094, all ds <= 0.33, whereas all groups differed from 
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each other in the fourth pre-rating, all |ts(104)| >= 3.21, all ps <= .001, all |ds| >= 0.62 (see Figure 
6). Thus, as expected, at the very first pre-rating before receiving any fake performance feedback, 
the participants did not differ in their metacognitive beliefs about their upcoming performance, 
but after receiving fake performance feedback three times, the below-average group indicated the 
lowest performance, whereas the above-average group indicated the highest performance, with 
















4 An exploratory mixed 5 x 3 ANOVA including all four pre-ratings as well as the post-rating after performing the 
Pattern Copy Task and the three feedback groups revealed the same pattern of results for the dependent variable 
“subjective performance ratings”, all F(2, 156)s >= 10.29, all ps < .001, all η2s >= .03. There were no group 
differences at the very first rating (Pre 1), but all groups differed in their performance estimations already after 
receiving fake performance feedback once (i.e. group differences in Pre 2, Pre 3, Pre 4; all |ts(104)| >= 3.21, all 
ps <= .001, all |ds| >= 0.62) and even after performing the Pattern Copy Task (i.e. post-rating; all |ts(104)| >= 3.34, 
all ps <= .001, all |ds| >= 0.65). Participants in the below-average group rated their performance lower than 

















Figure 6. Subjective performance ratings prior to receiving fake performance feedback (Pre 1) 
and after receiving multiple fake performance feedback (Pre 4; with standard errors of the mean 
as error bars). We observed no group differences at the first pre-rating before receiving fake 
performance feedback and significant differences between all feedback groups at the fourth pre-
rating after receiving fake performance feedback and before performing the Pattern Copy Task. 
 
Cognitive Offloading  
 We performed preregistered one-way ANOVAs for the between factor “feedback group” 
(below-average vs. above-average vs. control) and each of the three dependent offloading 
variables of the Pattern Copy Task. The three feedback groups did not differ significantly in the 
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number of times the model window was opened, F(2, 156) = 1.04, p = .354, η2 = .01, the number 
of initially correctly copied items, F(2, 156) < 0.01, p = .998, η2 < .01, and the initial encoding 
duration, F(2, 156) = 0.97, p = .383, η2 = .01 (see Table 5). Thus, our fake feedback manipulation 
did not alter offloading behavior in the Pattern Copy Task. For exploratory purposes, we also 
analyzed the trial duration within the Pattern Copy Task as an indicator of task performance. The 
three feedback groups did not differ in the trial duration, F(2, 156) = 0.73, p = .486, η2 = .01 (see 
Table 5).  
 
Table 5. Means and Standard Deviations of Dependent Variables in Cognitive Offloading as Well 
as Trial Duration in the Pattern Copy Task and Working Memory Performance in the Feature 







Control Group Above-average 
Group 
M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Cognitive Offloading    
Openings of the Model Window 
Initially Correctly Copied Items 










Trial Duration (sec) 43.45 (8.49) 41.42 (10.10) 41.73 (9.38) 




 Following the Pattern Copy Task, the participants stated which strategy they had preferred 
during this task. They could either choose a strategy that indicated more cognitive offloading 
(“offloading strategy”) or a strategy that indicated more internal cognitive processing (“internal 
strategy”). The participants that indicated both strategies were excluded from this exploratory 
analysis (remaining participants: N = 146, see Table 6). We used a logistic regression and the 
Anova-function from the car package (Fox & Weisberg, 2019) in order to analyze the differences 
in the selected strategies across the three feedback groups. There was a significant main effect of 
feedback group on the selected strategies, X2(2) = 10.39, p = .005, d = 0.55, indicating that the 
fake performance feedback had affected the participants’ choice of which strategy they thought 
they had used during the Pattern Copy Task. We used reduced logistic regressions, including only 
two feedback groups each in order to calculate pairwise comparisons. This comparison revealed 
that the participants from the below-average condition indicated that they had preferred an 
offloading strategy over an internal strategy to a larger extent than the participants from the 
above-average condition, X2(1) = 10.39, p = .001, d = 0.69. Thus, despite not having observed an 
objective change in offloading behavior in our Pattern Copy Task, the participants on average 
reported that they had shifted their strategy in the direction that we had predicted. Further, despite 
the fact that the numerical frequencies indicate that the control group was right between the 
below-average condition and above-average condition, those paired comparisons did not reach 
significance, X2(1) = 2.90, p = .088, d = 0.35, and X2(1) = 2.34, p = .126, d = 0.31, respectively. 
 Additionally, we calculated exploratory point-biserial correlations between strategy 
selection and actual offloading behavior (see Table 7). Strategy selection and offloading were not 
significantly correlated in the below-average group. In the above-average group, they were also 
no significant correlations with the exception of the initial encoding duration. In the control 
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group, however, strategy selection did correlate significantly with cognitive offloading, all 
|rs(46)| >= .39, all ps <= .005. Overall, this analysis indicates that self-reported strategies 
matched actual performance only in the control group, but not in the groups with experimental 
manipulations of metacognitive beliefs about one’s own memory performance.  
 
Table 6. Participants per Group That Indicated Using Either an “Offloading Strategy” or an 
“Internal Strategy” in the Pattern Copy Task  
 
 
Table 7. Point-Biserial Correlations Between Reported Strategy Selection (0 = Internal Strategy, 
1 = Offloading Strategy) and Actual Offloading Behavior 





Control Group Above-average 
Group 
N N N 
Offloading Strategy 









Control Group Above-average 
Group 
r(45) r(46) r(49) 
Openings of the Model Window 
Initially Correctly Copied Items 













 An exploratory one-way ANOVA revealed significant group differences in beliefs about 
one’s general memory abilities at the end of the experiment, F(2, 156) = 7.08, p = .001, η2 = .08. 
Additional t-Tests for independent samples showed that the below-average group rated their 
general memory abilities lower than the above-average group, t(104) = 2.98, p = .003, d = 0.58, 
and the control group, t(104) = 3.19, p = .002, d = 0.62. We observed no significant difference 
between the above-average group and the control group, t(104) = 0.25, p = .801, d = 0.05 (see 
Figure 7). Thus, our fake performance feedback manipulation altered the participants’ beliefs 












Figure 7. Ratings of beliefs about one’s general memory abilities measured with the MMQ at the 
end of the experiment (averaged for each group; with standard errors of the mean as error bars). 
Higher values indicate more positive beliefs about one’s general memory abilities. The below-




Working Memory Capacity 
 To exclude that any group effects are due to differences in actual working memory 
abilities, we used the Feature Switch Detection Task to measure visual working memory 
performance for color-location bindings. A preregistered one-way ANOVA indicated that there 
were no significant group differences in this working memory performance measure, 
F(2, 156) = 0.07, p = .929, η2 < .01 (see Table 5), just as one would expect given the randomized 
assignment of the participants to the experimental conditions. 
 
Discussion 
In the present study, we investigated the causal impact of metacognitive beliefs about 
one’s working memory on cognitive offloading in a working memory task. Metacognitive beliefs 
are supposed to influence one’s decision for using specific strategies when performing a task 
based on metacognitive monitoring and controlling. Thus, metacognitive beliefs should affect the 
use of technological aids (and likewise cognitive offloading) or one’s internal working memory 
resources. In order to experimentally test the determining role of metacognitive beliefs when 
offloading working memory processes, we used fake performance feedback. Our fake 
performance feedback successfully manipulated metacognitive beliefs about one’s working 
memory. Before receiving any feedback, the three feedback groups did not differ in their pre-
rating about their upcoming working memory performance, but after receiving fake performance 
feedback, they differed accordingly. The participants receiving below-average performance 
feedback rated their working memory performance the lowest, and those participants receiving 
above-average performance feedback rated their working memory performance the highest, with 
the control group that did not receive any feedback in between. Remarkably, the effect of fake 
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performance feedback was so strong that it even spilled over to general beliefs about one’s 
memory abilities (measured by the MMQ) at the end of the experiment. The participants in the 
below-average group estimated their general memory abilities lower than the other two groups. 
Thus, especially below-average performance feedback affected metacognitive beliefs broadly and 
persistently. Although our manipulation of metacognitive beliefs altered the participants’ 
subjective working memory ratings, it had clearly no impact on offloading behavior within the 
Pattern Copy Task. Within this task, participants could either rely more on a technological aid by 
looking up information more often (i.e. more cognitive offloading) or rely more on their own 
internal memory by looking up the information less often (i.e. less cognitive offloading). We 
observed that spontaneous offloading behavior within the Pattern Copy Task was nearly identical 
across all feedback groups. 
Previous research suggests that metacognitive beliefs are negatively correlated with 
offloading behavior (Boldt & Gilbert, 2019; Gilbert, 2015b; Hu, et al., 2019; Risko & Dunn, 
2015). For instance, in studies applying a prospective memory paradigm (Gilbert, 2015b; see also 
Boldt & Gilbert, 2019; Gilbert et al., 2020), the participants had to drag circles with ascending 
numbers one after another to the bottom of the screen. At the beginning of a trial, the participants 
were instructed that some special circles (e.g., the circle with the number 3) had to be dragged to 
another side of the screen (e.g., the left side) when it was their turn. These special circles induced 
intentions that the participants needed to fulfill later on. After performing practice trials, the 
participants were asked to rate their upcoming performance (0 to 100 % of special circles dragged 
to the correct location). The participants then performed several trials of the task without the 
option to offload, followed by several trials that allowed cognitive offloading. In these latter trials 
the participants could offload the intentions by placing the special circles close to the correct side 
of the screen already at the beginning of a trial. More positive beliefs about one’s unaided 
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memory performance were associated with less cognitive offloading (Boldt & Gilbert, 2019; 
Gilbert, 2015b; see also Hu et al., 2019; Risko & Dunn, 2015, for similar results). While these 
correlational findings suggest a relationship between metacognitive beliefs and offloading 
behavior, we did not observe a matching impact of metacognitive beliefs on cognitive offloading 
in the present experimental study. To resolve these seemingly conflicting results, we suggest that 
differences in the measurement of metacognitions (i.e. measuring metacognitive beliefs vs. 
metacognitive experiences) across studies might explain the diverging results.  
In the present study, we measured metacognitive beliefs after providing the participants 
with the task instruction but – importantly – before they gained any actual experience in 
performing the task. Therefore, metacognitive beliefs within our study were mainly driven by 
general beliefs about one’s working memory based on fake performance feedback in other tasks. 
In contrast, previous research reporting significant effects of metacognitions on offloading 
behavior collected metacognitive performance estimations after participants performed practice 
trials (Boldt & Gilbert, 2019; Gilbert, 2015b) or the presentation of the relevant stimuli (Hu, et 
al., 2019; Risko & Dunn, 2015). Thus, metacognitions measured in the previous studies rather 
reflect metacognitive experiences that are directly related to ongoing metacognitive processing 
and that refer to what individuals experience while performing a task (Efklides, 2008). This latter 
design was also used in a recent study showing that the manipulated valence of feedback on task 
trials influenced metacognitions and in return offloading behavior (Gilbert et al., 2020). 
Therefore, we suggest that it might actually be metacognitive experiences (as measured by the 
previous studies) rather than metacognitive beliefs (as measured in our study) that drive 
offloading behavior.  
The suggestion that metacognitive experiences rather than metacognitive beliefs alter 
offloading behavior fits in well with research showing that actual offloading behavior is 
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determined by the properties of the task at hand and thus probably metacognitive experiences. In 
like manner, cognitive offloading is known to be driven by external factors such as tool design 
(Grinschgl et al., 2020), costs when interacting with external tools (e.g., Cary & Carlson, 2001; 
Gray et al., 2006; Grinschgl et al., 2020), or characteristics of processed information (Gilbert, 
2015a; Hu et al., 2019; Risko & Dunn, 2015; Schönpflug, 1986). Such external factors are likely 
to influence metacognitive experiences while performing a task and in turn influence offloading 
behavior. Within this context, the new finding of our study is that metacognitive beliefs in 
contrast to metacognitive experiences had no influence on offloading behavior – at least not 
within the Pattern Copy Task.    
Interestingly, we observed an influence of fake performance feedback on subjective 
judgements regarding the offloading strategy in the Pattern Copy Task. The participants in the 
below-average group were more likely to report an offloading strategy over an internal strategy 
than the participants from the above-average group, although their actual offloading behavior was 
nearly identical. The distinction between metacognitive beliefs and metacognitive experiences 
also provides a way to resolve the apparent contradiction between perceived and actual strategy 
use. Whereas metacognitive experiences could be the main determinant of actual offloading 
behavior in the Pattern Copy Task, participants might rather consider their metacognitive beliefs 
when giving subjective judgements on their behavior. For instance, negative beliefs about one’s 
performance might lead participants to judge their behavior as offloading more (although they 
actually did not offload more) than positive beliefs about one’s performance. Thus, based on 
metacognitive beliefs, the same actual behavior might be interpreted differently by the 
participants. This assumption was further supported by exploratory correlations showing that the 
reported strategy selection did not correlate with the actual offloading behavior in the below-
average group as well as in the above-average group across most offloading-variables. 
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Interestingly, however, in the control group we did indeed observe such a correlation; that is, 
participants that reported to have used an offloading strategy in fact also offloaded more within 
the Pattern Copy Task. Thus, without a manipulation of metacognitive beliefs with fake 
performance feedback, participants could correctly judge their own performance. 
When relating the findings of our present study to previous research, it is also important 
to consider the differences between the offloading tasks applied. For instance, in a prospective 
memory task that has established a correlation between metacognitions and cognitive offloading 
(Boldt & Gilbert, 2019; Gilbert, 2015b), the participants offloaded future intentions, whereas in 
the Pattern Copy Task the participants offloaded by looking up relevant information. These two 
kinds of offloading behavior might be different per se, thus also be guided by different 
determinants. It is possible that fake performance feedback and in return metacognitive beliefs 
would indeed drive the offloading of intentions in a prospective memory task, but not offloading 
behavior in the Pattern Copy Task. We can only speculate about the different processes involved 
in these offloading paradigms as no study has directly compared them. However, one important 
difference might be the involved timing when offloading memory processes. Whereas in studies 
using the prospective memory task (Boldt & Gilbert, 2019; Gilbert, 2015b; Gilbert et al., 2020), 
the participants offloaded future intentions (i.e. the information is offloaded for remembering it 
later on), in the Pattern Copy Task the participants offloaded information for instantaneous use 
(i.e. looking up information more often for the ongoing copy task). Thus, offloading of future 
intentions might be related to planning before actual task performance, while offloading in the 
Pattern Copy Task might be related to ongoing processes throughout the task.5 Metacognitive 
beliefs could possibly play a greater role for planning before action (thus affecting the offloading 
of intentions) rather than for offloading during ongoing task processing. Further research is 
 
5 We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this idea.  
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needed to investigate the different as well as shared processes involved in cognitive offloading 
across various paradigms.  
Another difference between previous studies investigating metacognitions as determinant 
of cognitive offloading (e.g., Gilbert, 2015b) and the present study is the specific framing of 
participants’ performance estimations. While in previous studies the participants estimated their 
own performance based on how accurate they think their own performance is (0 to 100% 
accuracy; Boldt & Gilbert, 2019; Gilbert, 2015b; Gilbert et al., 2020; Risko & Dunn, 2015), in 
our experiment they estimated their performance in comparison to other students via a percentile 
rank. This latter estimation in our study was in line with the provided fake performance feedback 
that was designed to have a strong impact due to social comparisons (MacFarland & Miller, 
1994). One could argue, that this fake performance feedback and in return metacognitive beliefs 
measured by a comparison indicator did not impact offloading behavior due to its specific 
framing. It might be possible that cognitive offloading was guided rather by metacognitive beliefs 
about one’s performance estimations without any comparison (i.e. the participants might adopt 
their offloading behavior based in their confidence in their own memory, independent of its 
relation to other individuals). However, in our study we also measured metacognitive beliefs with 
the MMQ that did not include any estimations compared to other individuals and - importantly - 
our manipulation also affected the metacognitive beliefs as measured in this questionnaire 
following below-average performance feedback. We thus consider it unlikely that the specific 
framing of the fake performance feedback as well as performance estimations was a key factor in 
explaining differences in results between our present study and previous research on cognitive 
offloading. 
The participants in the below-average group estimated their general memory abilities 
lower than the other two feedback groups. Thus, it seems that below-average performance 
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feedback has a particularly strong influence on metacognitive beliefs and self-perception. In a 
similar vein, Davis and Brock (1975) showed that below-average performance feedback 
influences the participants’ self-awareness compared to no feedback or above-average feedback, 
while the latter two conditions did not differ from each other. However, it might not only be 
below-average feedback per se that strongly influences metacognitive beliefs. Another possibility 
could be that below-average feedback induces a large deviation from one’s primary beliefs before 
receiving feedback. For instance, one might think that his or her performance is slightly above 
average. In this case, receiving above-average feedback suggesting a percentile rank of 79% 
might be less unexpected and thus have less impact than below-average feedback suggesting a 
percentile rank of 21%, which might largely deviate from one’s primary beliefs. Nonetheless, our 
findings suggest that below-average performance feedback is particularly suited to 




Out study aimed to experimentally test the causal impact of metacognitive beliefs about 
one’s working memory performance on the offloading of working memory processes with 
modern technological tools. While fake performance feedback successfully manipulated 
metacognitive beliefs regarding the participants’ performance on the tasks at hand, as well as 
their memory abilities in general, we did not observe a change in actual offloading behavior. We 
propose that that this putative discrepancy can be resolved by taking the distinction between 
metacognitive beliefs and metacognitive experiences into account. Whereas participants’ 
subjective ratings might be largely influenced by their metacognitive beliefs, actual offloading 
behavior might largely depend on metacognitive experiences and properties of the task at hand – 
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at least within the Pattern Copy Task. Thus, performing future research investigating the 
influence of metacognitive beliefs and experiences on both strategy selection before starting a 
task and while performing a task across different offloading paradigms will help to generate a 
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4. Study 3 
– Consequences of cognitive offloading: Boosting performance but diminishing memory – 
 
Already 2.5 million years ago, ancestors of Homo Sapiens used tools in order to improve 
performance on particular tasks (e.g., using bones for butchery; Ambrose, 2001). Since then, 
tools have been developed further and modern technologies not only support physical actions but 
also allow for the externalization of cognitive processes (see Osiurak et al., 2018). Tablets and 
smartphones are examples of such modern technical tools, and they have become ubiquitous in 
everyday life (Greenhow, Robelia, & Hughes, 2009). Even though most of the tools support 
immediate performance, such as performing a task faster and/or with fewer errors, potential 
mental depletion following their extensive use has been discussed for cognitive tools (e.g., 
impaired scene recognition after using navigation systems; Fenech et al., 2010). In the present set 
of experiments, we studied memory as one of the most fundamental cognitive processes. 
Specifically, we investigated a trade-off between immediate performance and subsequent mental 
representations due to cognitive offloading.  
 
Cognitive Offloading 
Using tools for externalizing cognitive processes is typically referred to as cognitive 
offloading (Risko & Gilbert, 2016). With regard to working memory, the act of cognitive 
offloading releases resources which otherwise would be necessary to actively hold information in 
short-term representations. Instead, the corresponding information is externalized into technical 
tools such as mobile touch devices (Wilson, 2002). Whether humans tend to offload cognitive 
processes such as memory depends on cost-benefit evaluations of internal processing versus 
externalization. Raising the costs of externalizations (e.g., by adding additional physical or 
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temporal demands) increases the use of internal strategies such as memory-based processing, 
whereas lowering the costs of externalizations increases the use of technical tools (e.g., Cary & 
Carlson, 2001; Gray & Fu, 2004; Gray, et al., 2006; Morgan & Patrick, 2013; O’Hara & Payne, 
1998; Schönpflug, 1986).  
A typical working memory task used to study the externalization of memory is the  
Pattern Copy Task (called Blocks World Task in previous work; Ballard et al., 1992; 1995). In 
this task, the participants replicate a color pattern displayed in a model window on one side of the 
screen in an empty workspace window on the other side of the screen. In most versions of the 
task, the model window and workspace window are not visible at the same time, but instead one 
window is covered by a gray mask whenever the other one is uncovered (e.g., Fu & Gray, 2000; 
Gray et al., 2006). This design allows participants to decide whether they prefer to rely on 
internal memorization (indicated by fewer switches between the two windows) or to rely on 
externalizations of the memory processes (indicated by more switches between the two 
windows). The participants’ decision between internal memorization and externalization depends 
on subjective cost-benefit considerations. With regard to these considerations, the work of Fu and 
Gray (2000; see also e.g., Gray et al., 2006; Grinschgl et al., 2020; Patrick et al., 2015; Waldron 
et al., 2011) has shown that increasing access costs by adding temporal delays for each inspection 
of the model window results in a shift from offloading strategies to more memory-based 
strategies. Thus, higher temporal costs reduce offloading behavior. In the present research, we 
use this robust and consistent finding to experimentally investigate offloading behavior and its 






Consequences of Cognitive Offloading 
Conceptually, externalization of cognitive processes into a technical tool could be 
considered an extended mind as externalizations spread cognitive processes beyond the 
boundaries of the individual mind (Clark & Chalmers, 1998). Empirically, such externalizations 
have been shown to improve problem-solving accuracy as well as speed (Kirsh & Maglio, 1994). 
Such beneficial effects on immediate task performance in terms of speed and/or accuracy have 
been observed across a large variety of tasks (e.g., arithmetic tasks, see Carlson et al., 2007; 
Goldin-Meadow et al., 2001; or reading, see Risko et al., 2014). Besides these described effects 
with technology (i.e. performing beyond internal cognitive constraints; Salomon, 1990), little is 
known about the effects of technology (i.e. the cognitive consequences of interactions with 
technology; Salomon, 1990; Salomon & Perkins, 2005).  
On the one hand, offloading irrelevant information into technical tools improves cognitive 
performance for subsequent, unrelated tasks (Runge et al., 2019) as well as memory for unrelated 
information (Storm & Stone, 2015). On the other hand, however, a common concern states that 
frequent externalization of internal cognitive processes leads to an impoverishment of the 
corresponding internal abilities. This concern has received empirical support from findings on 
spatial memory (e.g., Fenech et al., 2010; Gardony et al., 2015), problem solving (Moritz et al., 
2020; O’Hara & Payne, 1998; van Nimwegen & van Oostendorp, 2009), as well as the recall of 
information (Eskritt & Ma, 2014; Kelly & Risko, 2019a; Pyke & LeFevre, 2011; Sparrow et al., 
2011). For instance, O’Hara and Payne (1998) observed that problem solving was less successful 
in a transfer phase following an increasing amount of interactions with a technical tool relative to 
using internal mental processes. Moreover, Kelly and Risko (2019a) recently studied how relying 
on external representations affects memory accuracy for the offloaded information. Despite 
identical stimulus encoding, the participants of this study remembered word lists less accurately 
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when they thought they would have access to external representations than when they thought 
they would have to rely on their internal memory.  
Critically, in these lines of research, the participants typically could not choose how to 
perform the task while encoding task-relevant information (e.g., Eskritt & Ma, 2014; Kelly & 
Risko, 2019a; Sparrow et al., 2011). This is different for the Pattern Copy Task, in which the 
participants can freely adapt their offloading behavior and thus choose their preferred strategy. 
Nevertheless, research exploring the Pattern Copy Task points toward a similar trade-off between 
positive and negative effects of cognitive offloading (Morgan et al., 2009; 2013; Waldron et al., 
2007). While an increasing amount of cognitive offloading (e.g. in conditions with low temporal 
costs relative to conditions with high temporal costs) accelerates task processing (Morgan et al., 
2009; Waldron et al., 2007), it subsequently diminishes recall performance for visuo-spatial 
information (Morgan et al., 2009; 2013; Waldron et al., 2007). Further, an increased amount of 
offloading was harmful for resumptions (i.e. continuing to rebuild the color pattern from one’s 
memory) after task interruptions (Morgan et al., 2009; 2013). However, the reported studies 
tested the memory for the offloaded information immediately after offloading, thus not exceeding 
the duration of working memory maintenance (Morgan et al., 2009; 2013; Waldron et al., 2007). 
It still remains unclear whether the detrimental effects of offloading also persist at longer time 
intervals, thus affecting long-term memory. This is especially important, as in real-life situations 
we often offload information in order to access this information at a later stage (i.e. writing a 
shopping list or using a calendar). The question thereby arises whether offloading information 
into a technical tool would also be harmful for long-term memory acquisition.  
With regard to the question of long-term memory acquisition, the awareness of the 
relevance of the offloaded information for subsequent testing might alter offloading behavior 
itself as well as potential consequences. This is because being aware of a subsequent test should 
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induce the goal to foster learning in order to be prepared for later testing. On the one hand, 
cognitive offloading might not generally have detrimental effects on memory for the offloaded 
information but might even have beneficial long-term consequences when participants are 
explicitly instructed to memorize the studied material. For instance, it is commonly argued that 
cognitive offloading releases internal cognitive resources (Kirsh, 2010). In return, these released 
cognitive resources might serve to gain a deeper processing of the remaining task-relevant 
information and, therefore, improve memory (Craik & Lockhart, 1972) as well as learning 
(Salomon, 1990; Sweller et al., 1998). Consequently, someone who aims at acquiring long-term 
memory might strategically use cognitive offloading to form stronger memory representations.  
On the other hand, however, if the released cognitive resources (due to offloading) cannot 
be directed to the remaining task-relevant information even with the explicit instruction to 
memorize the stimuli, the availability of technical tools might provide a risk for subsequent 
memory performance, as offloading decreases the overall amount of internal information 
processing and elaboration. In this case, strategic considerations should minimize cognitive 
offloading in order to create desirable difficulties (i.e. conditions of learning that make it more 
difficult but increase learning; Bjork & Bjork, 2011). Introducing desirable difficulties by using 
more memory-intense strategies and less offloading might be more demanding but might also 
enhance learning and memory (Bjork & Bjork, 2011). Therefore, in our research we also directly 




 In the present research, we systematically investigated how cognitive offloading affects 
subsequent memory for the offloaded information. In particular, we focused on the question how 
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being aware of the relevance of the offloaded information for a subsequent task alters offloading 
and its potentially detrimental consequences. In Experiment 1, we started with a demonstration of 
the proposed trade-off between immediate beneficial effects of offloading on task processing and 
subsequent detrimental effects of cognitive offloading on memory. This experiment is similar to 
the experiments reported by Morgan et al. (2009; see also Morgan, et al., 2013; Waldron, et al., 
2007) with the difference that our memory test was delayed substantially following the 
completion of the Pattern Copy Task, whereas Morgan et al. (2009) presented the memory test in 
between the trials of the Pattern Copy Task. Further, our memorized information consisted of 
more naturalistic stimuli (i.e. images of real-world objects) rather than colored squares. 
Nevertheless, due to the high similarity across the studies, our first experiment could be 
considered to be a conceptual replication of the findings of Morgan et al. (2009).   
In Experiments 2 and 3, we studied how awareness of the upcoming memory test, and 
thus the goal to foster learning, influences offloading behavior as well as its consequences for 
memory. Because the Pattern Copy task is so complex that it cannot be solved without any 
offloading, it allowed us to test whether the detrimental effects of offloading also arise under 
conditions in which participants know that they will have to recall the offloaded information at a 
later point in time. With regard to cognitive offloading, we tested two competitive hypotheses. 
On the one hand, released cognitive resources due to offloading might be used to build long-term 
memory representations. If this is the case, offloading behavior would not be detrimental to long-
term memory acquisition. On the other hand, if devoting released resources to the formation of 
long-term memory is not possible, offloading behavior would be detrimental for long-term 
memory acquisition. In this case, offloading behavior should be minimized in order to create 
desirable difficulties that improve learning. In order to distinguish between these hypotheses, we 
manipulated the awareness of a follow-up memory test and investigated whether test awareness 
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alters the use and the effects of cognitive offloading. In Experiment 2, the participants performed 
the Pattern Copy Task under free choice conditions (i.e. the participants could freely choose 
whether to offload or not). In the final Experiment 3, we compared this free choice conditions 
with a condition in which we enforce offloading to the maximum extent.    
 
Experiment 1 
This experiment focused on demonstrating the proposed trade-off between immediate task 
performance and the formation of memory representations. Our participants completed a version 
of the Pattern Copy Task which clearly exceeds working memory capacity. Therefore, all 
participants had to rely on offloading behavior although the amount of offloading might have 
varied between them. In this task, increasing offloading behavior reduced the amount of 
information that needed to be handled simultaneously within working memory. Importantly, 
however, each participant had to process every unit of information to solve the task. Beyond 
measuring individual offloading behavior, we manipulated the temporal costs of offloading in 
order to alter the amount of cognitive offloading (i.e. higher costs of externalization induce a 
stronger reliance on internal resources). Following a retention interval at the end of the 
experiment, the participants completed an unexpected memory test. We predicted that more 
offloading increases immediate task performance with regard to efficiency (speed and accuracy) 
but impairs the formation of memory representations.  
Except for the retention interval exceeding the duration of working memory as well as the 
more naturalistic objects to memorize, our task and procedure is similar to the experiments 
reported in Morgan et al. (2009). Due to these similarities, our first experiment could be 
considered to reflect a conceptual replication of the previously established result pattern. 
Nevertheless, we consider it important to replicate previous findings with novel variants of tasks 
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to prove the generalizability of the concepts under study as well as the suitability of the present 
materials and procedure. 
 
Method 
 This experiment was preregistered at the Open Science Framework (OSF; 




Our final sample consisted of 172 students (131 females; 18 - 47 years) recruited at the 
University of Tübingen. The participants received course credit or a financial compensation of 8€ 
for one hour of their time. The study was approved by the ethical board of the Leibniz-Institut für 
Wissensmedien, Tübingen, Germany, and all participants provided informed consent prior to 
testing. The sample size was preregistered and intended to achieve a statistical power of 
(1 - β) = .90 at medium effect sizes of d = 0.50. The participants were randomly assigned to one 
of the two conditions (n = 86 per condition). According to the preregistered exclusion criteria, 
data from participants with missing data (16), failures in complying with the instructions (5), a 
priori awareness of the surprise memory test (14)6, too many errors in the working memory tests 
to compute capacity (1), or too large deviations (+/- 3 SD) in any dependent variable of the 
Pattern Copy Task or the memory test (15) were replaced. Each participant performed the 
experiment individually in a testing room. 
 
 
6 Exploratory analyses showed that all reported results and conclusions remained equivalent when participants who 




All tasks were controlled by PsychoPy scripts (Peirce, 2007) running on 12.3’’ Microsoft 
Surface Pro tablets (2736 x 1824 pixels; touch served as input device) lying flat on the table at a 
viewing distance of approximately 36 cm.  
 
Tasks and Stimuli  
Pattern Copy Task. This task was designed to measure cognitive offloading behavior 
(Ballard et al., 1995). The participants dragged-and-dropped 12 images of distinct objects (each 
3.5 x 3.5 deg; selected from the Bank of standardized stimuli; Brodeur, Dionne-Dostie, 
Montreuil, & Lepage, 2010; Brodeur, Guérard, & Bouras, 2014) from a resource window in the 
lower right screen to a workspace window in the upper right screen. The aim was to replicate a 
layout of the same objects from an identically shaped model window in the upper left area of the 
screen (see Figure 8A). At any time, either the model or the workspace window was visible while 
the other window was covered. The participants were able to open the model window by using a 
slider on the right side of that window and the workspace window by touching a bar left to it. For 
one half of the participants, opening the model window resulted in a delay of two seconds (for 
which the slider turned red). Therefore, these participants had to wait in order to open the model 
window (lockout condition), whereas the remaining half of the participants could open the model 
window immediately (no lockout condition; see e.g. Gray et al., 2006; Grinschgl et al., 2020; for 
a similar manipulation). The participants were allowed to switch between the two windows as 
often as they wanted. At the beginning of each trial, gray masks covered all windows, and the 
participants could decide which window to open first. After rebuilding the 12 images, they 
pressed a button in the lower left area of the screen to continue. There were 20 trials with distinct 
spatial arrangements of the patterns to be copied, preceded by one practice trial. The images 
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showed (colored) common objects from everyday life such as kitchenware, clothing, or food 
products (for a further description see Brodeur et al., 2010; 2014; all images we used are 
available on https://osf.io/vmgd4/). A new set of images was selected randomly without 
replacement from a collection of 480 objects (240 for the Pattern Copy Task; 240 additional 
distractors for the memory test) for each trial. The sets of images were counterbalanced across 
conditions (i.e. one participant from each condition saw the same sets of objects in the same 
order).  
As proxies for cognitive offloading, we analyzed the number of openings of the model 
window (i.e. openings of the model window), the duration of the very first opening (i.e. initial 
encoding duration), and the number of correctly copied items following the first opening of the 
model window (i.e. initially correctly copied items; only the first opening within a trial is 
independent of preceding openings). More pronounced offloading behavior is indicated by 
opening the window more often as well as shorter initial encoding durations and fewer initially 
correctly copied objects. Furthermore, as immediate task performance, we measured the trial 
duration (corrected for the two second lockout-times) as well as the number of errors. The 
number of errors refers to the number of incorrectly rebuild images at the end of a trial. Higher 
trial duration and more errors indicate lower immediate task performance. 
 
Memory Test. This task was designed to assess memory performance for the objects 
handled in the Pattern Copy Task. The participants’ task was to restore each of the 20 unique 
spatial arrangements of objects from the Pattern Copy Task from their memory (see Figure 8B). 
In each trial, one of the grids was presented in the center of the screen. Next to the grid, the 
original 12 images of this particular grid were presented intermixed with 12 new distractor 
images from the same database that had not been presented before (each 3.5 x 3.5 deg). The 
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participants were instructed to rebuild the original arrangement by drag-and-dropping the correct 
images to the correct locations within the arrangement. As proxies for memory performance, we 
calculated the proportion of correctly restored identity-location bindings (i.e. correct image at the 
correct location). We calculated this proportion relative to both the reproduced pattern in the 
Pattern Copy Task (i.e. identity-location bindings corrected) as well as the original pattern within 
the Pattern Copy Task (i.e. identity-location bindings). We conducted this two-fold analysis to 
exclude the possibility of our results emerging from carry-over effects of initial copy errors. 
Furthermore, we calculated the proportion of correctly restored identities (i.e. correct image in 




















Figure 8. Illustration of the Pattern Copy Task and Memory Test. (A) Pattern Copy Task. 
Participants copied the layout of images from the model window (left) to a workspace window 
(right). Importantly, only one of the windows was visible at a time. This task measures offloading 
behavior (i.e. the amount of simultaneously copied images) as well as the immediate task 
performance (i.e. speed and accuracy). On a group level, we induced offloading behavior by 
manipulating the temporal costs of accessing the model window. (B) Memory Test. The 
participants restored the configurations of the Pattern Copy Task from memory. (Tablet frame 
designed by Freepik; Index finger designed by Jannoon028 / Freepik.) 
 
 Additional Tests. Between the Pattern Copy Task and the memory test, our participants 
completed two additional working memory tests as a proxy for their working memory capacity 
without offloading. In the first test, the participants had to reconstruct visual patterns of colored 
squares (Visual Patterns Test; adapted from Della Sala et al., 1999). In the second task, the 
participants had to reconstruct a temporal sequence of spatial locations (Corsi Blocks Task; 
adapted from Milner, 1971). Both tests followed an adaptive staircase of difficulty (starting with 
  
98 
2 objects, +1 object if correct, -1 object if false, minimum of 2 objects), and we analyzed the set 
size of the last 10 correctly solved trials (out of a total of 30 trials).  
  
Results 
In line with our preregistered hypothesis, the participants in the no lockout condition 
performed more cognitive offloading and had a higher efficiency in immediate task performance, 
but subsequently showed less accurate memory performance. Further, individual differences in 
offloading behavior revealed the same pattern of results.  
 
Cognitive Offloading 
 For all three proxies of cognitive offloading, t-tests for independent samples indicated 
more offloading in the no lockout than in the lockout condition (see Table 8). The participants in 
the no lockout condition opened the model window more frequently, t(170) = 7.55, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .25, 95% CI [.15; .35], showed a shorter initial encoding of the model window,       
t(170) = -3.87, p < .001, ηp2 = .08, 95% CI [.02; .17], and copied fewer items correctly within the 
first copy cycle, t(170) = -4.13, p < .001, ηp2 = .09, 95% CI [.03; .18], in comparison to those 




Table 8. Means and Standard Errors of Dependent Variables in Experiment 1  
 No Lockout Lockout Test Statistics 
M SE M SE t(170) p ηp2 
Cognitive Offloading: 
Openings of the Model Window  
Initial Encoding Duration (sec) 
Initially Correctly Copied Items 
Immediate Task Performance: 





Identity-Location Bindings (corrected) 
Working Memory Capacity: 
Visual Patterns Test 



































































































Note: Cognitive offloading (openings of the model window and initial encoding duration), 
immediate task performance, and working memory capacity refer to open-ended count or time 
data. Initially correctly copied items and memory performance refer to count data with a 
maximum of 12.  
 
Immediate Task Performance  
Two t-tests for independent samples showed that participants in the no lockout condition 
solved the Pattern Copy Task more efficiently than participants in the lockout condition (see 
Table 8; values are corrected for lockout times). In other words, they solved the task in less time, 
t(170) = -3.31, p = .001, ηp2 = .06, 95% CI [.01; .14], without decrements in accuracy,    
t(170) = -0.37, p = .709, ηp2< .01, 95% CI [.00; .03]. With on average below one error per trial in 
both groups, performance in terms of accuracy was at ceiling.  
 
Memory Performance 
While being more efficient in immediate task performance, the participants in the no 
lockout condition performed less accurately in the unexpected memory test (see Table 8). A 
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series of t-tests for independent samples confirmed that the participants in the no lockout 
condition remembered the identity of the involved images, t(170) = -2.76, p = .006, ηp2 = .04, 
95% CI [.003; .12], as well as uncorrected, t(170) = -2.59, p = .010, ηp2 = .04, 95% CI [.002; .11], 
and corrected (i.e. for errors in the Pattern Copy Task) identity-location bindings, t(170) = -2.63, 
p = .009, ηp2= .04, 95% CI [.002; .11], worse than the participants in the lockout condition. In 
other words, a high degree of cognitive offloading in the no lockout condition negatively affected 
subsequent memory accuracy. This finding was further emphasized by an exploratory analysis of 
individual differences, which showed strong correlations between offloading behavior and 
memory accuracy (see Table 9 and Figures S1.1, S1.2 and S1.3 in the electronic supplementary 
material (ESM) for the corresponding scatter plots). In both experimental conditions, Pearson-
correlations showed that increasing offloading behavior was clearly associated with decreasing 
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Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
Mediation Analyses 
An alternative explanation for improved memory performance in the lockout condition is 
that this benefit does not stem from the reduction in offloading behavior but that participants take 
advantage of the two seconds lockout for additional rehearsal in this condition. In order to 
provide evidence that reduced offloading behavior indeed increased memory performance, we 
conducted a set of exploratory mediation analyses. Within these analyses, we probed whether our 
independent variable, temporal lockout, directly affected subsequent memory performance or 
whether this relationship was mediated by cognitive offloading (see Table 10). We observed a 
mediated effect of the predictor lockout (no lockout/lockout) via cognitive offloading (mediator) 
on all three memory variables (identity, identity-location bindings, identity-location bindings 
corrected), all mediated effects >= 0.58, all ps < .001. In fact, the mediations substantially 
reduced all direct effects of the predictor on the memory performance measures, all 
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|direct effects| <= 0.86, all ps > .040. Only in two cases (out of nine), did the direct effect remain 
significant. This indicates that the reduction in offloading behavior accompanying temporal 
lockouts rather than the lockout manipulation itself enhanced memory performance.  
 
 
Table 10. Mediation Analyses With the Predictor Lockout (No Lockout/Lockout), Mediator 
Cognitive Offloading and Outcome Memory Performance in Experiment 1  
Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; all mediation analyses were conducted with a  
bootstrapping procedure (1000 simulations) using the package “mediation” in R (Tingley, 
Yamamoto, Hirose, Keele, & Imai, 2014).  
 
 
Working Memory Capacity  
Two t-tests for independent samples confirmed that there were no group differences 
between participants in the lockout and the no lockout condition with regard to memory capacity 
as measured by the Visual Patterns Test, t(170) = -0.56, p = .576, ηp2 < .01, 95% CI [.00; .03], 
BF10 = 0.19 and the Corsi Blocks Task, t(170) = 0.23, p = .820, ηp2 < .01, 95% CI [.00; .02], 
BF10 = 0.17 (see Table 8). Exploratory correlational analysis of working memory capacity, 





95% CI Direct 
Effect 
95% CI 
Openings of the Model Window  0.58*** [0.41; 0.83] -0.20 [-0.43; 0.06] 
Initial Encoding Duration (sec) 0.29*** [0.16; 0.47]  0.09 [-0.17; 0.29] 
Initially Correctly Copied Items 0.39*** [0.20; 0.58] -0.01 [-0.23; 0.19] 
 Identity-Location Bindings 
Openings of the Model Window 2.01*** [1.48; 2.55] -0.86* [-1.65; -0.05] 
Initial Encoding Duration (sec) 1.13*** [0.63; 1.70]  0.02 [-0.73; 0.62] 
Initially Correctly Copied Items 1.50*** [0.74; 2.29] -0.34 [-0.92; 0.17] 
 Identity-Location Bindings (corrected) 
Openings of the Model Window 2.01*** [1.54; 2.63] -0.84* [-1.59; -0.05] 
Initial Encoding Duration (sec) 1.13*** [0.58; 1.72]  0.04 [-0.65; 0.73] 




The observation that more cognitive offloading impairs the formation of memory 
representation in Experiment 1 arises from an incidental experimental setup (i.e. participants 
were not aware of the memory test while performing the Pattern Copy Task). Whereas this 
finding shows impaired memory for situations with implicit formation of new memory 
representations, it does not necessarily transfer to scenarios in which participants explicitly aim at 
forming memory representations for subsequent testing. In the second experiment, we therefore 
investigated how awareness of the subsequent memory test alters offloading behavior as well as 
the formation of memory representations. To study this, we added a new factor to the design of 
Experiment 1. Whereas one half of the participants remained uninformed with regard to the 
subsequent memory test, we explicitly informed the other half of the participants that they would 
have to complete a memory test after the Pattern Copy Task. With this setup, we tested two 
competing hypotheses. The first hypothesis is that cognitive offloading releases internal cognitive 
resources and that test awareness is necessary in order to devote these released resources to the 
formation of memory representations. The second hypothesis is that released resources do not 
contribute to the formation of memory representations. In this case, the participants might rely 
more on their own internal encoding strategies and thus avoid cognitive offloading in order to 
foster long-term learning (i.e. a desirable difficulty).  
 
Method 
This experiment was preregistered at the OSF (https://osf.io/pb89m). All materials, data 






The final sample size consisted of 172 students (137 females; 18-35 years), who were 
randomly assigned to the four conditions (n = 43 per condition) and tested individually in a 
testing room. According to the preregistered exclusion criteria, we replaced data from 
participants with missing data (1), a priori awareness of the surprise memory test (19)7, or too 
large deviations (+/- 3 SD) in any dependent variable of the Pattern Copy Task or the memory 
test (4). These exclusion criteria were identical to those of Experiments 1 and 3.  
 
Tasks and Stimuli 
All tasks and stimuli were identical to Experiment 1 with the exceptions described in this 
section. 
 
Pattern Copy Task. For one half of the participants, the instructions included information 
announcing the upcoming memory test at the end of the experiment (translated from German: 
“Please note: Following the task, you will have to take a memory test which will test your 
memory of the presented patterns of images.”). Additionally, before the first trial of the Pattern 
Copy Task, the participants were reminded about the memory test (translated from German: 
“Please try to remember the pictures and patterns as well as possible, as a recognition test will be 
carried out after this test.”). For the other half of the participants, none of this information about 
the upcoming memory test was included in the instructions. The original instructions for each 
condition as well as the tests themselves are available at https://osf.io/ke9dj/. 
 
7 When exploratorily including participants that were excluded due to false memory test awareness in the analysis 
(N = 191), the results remain essentially the same.  
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As the focus of this experiment was on the effect of offloading on subsequent memory 
rather than immediate task performance, we aimed to ensure that all participants had the same 
chance to remember the initial pattern of objects. Therefore, the participants had to solve the 
Pattern Copy Task correctly in this experiment. Consequently, the participants could not proceed 
to the next trial without correctly replicating the layout from the model window. Nevertheless, we 
will still report trial duration as an index of immediate task performance. The patterns of this 
experiment consisted of eight images only (these images are a subset of the images used in 
Experiment 1; see https://osf.io/ke9dj/).8  
 
Memory Test.  The layout within the memory test was slightly different. The eight 
original and eight distractor images were presented below instead of next to the corresponding 




 Matching the results of Experiment 1, more offloading resulted in faster task processing 
but less accurate memory performance. Interestingly, participants who knew about the 
subsequent memory test reduced offloading behavior and subsequently showed an improved 





8 Full disclosure: We conducted Experiment 2 before Experiments 1 and 3. As participants performed rather well on 




We analyzed all three proxies for cognitive offloading using 2 x 2 between-subjects 
ANOVAs with lockout and announcement of the memory test as the independent variables. Each 
proxy of cognitive offloading indicated more offloading in the no lockout than in the lockout 
condition (see Table 11). The participants in the no lockout condition opened the model window 
more frequently, F(1, 168) = 37.25, p < .001, ηp2 = .18, 95% CI [.09; .28], showed a shorter 
initial encoding of the model window,  F(1, 168) = 15.58, p < .001, ηp2 = .09, 95% CI [.02; .17], 
and copied fewer items correctly within the first copy cycle, F(1, 168) = 24.50, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .13, 95% CI [.05; .22], than the participants in the lockout condition. Further, across all 
variables, the participants in the uninformed condition offloaded more than the participants in the 
informed condition. Thus, the participants in the uninformed condition opened the model window 
more frequently, F(1, 168) = 10.31, p = .002, ηp2 = .06, 95% CI [.009; .14], showed a shorter 
initial encoding of the model window, F(1, 168) = 19.29, p < .001, ηp2 = .10, 95% CI [.03; .19], 
and copied fewer items correctly within the first copy cycle, F(1, 168) = 12.21, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .07, 95% CI [.01; .15], than the participants in the informed condition. No interactions 











Table 11. Means and Standard Errors of Dependent Variables in Experiment 2  
Note: Cognitive offloading (openings of the model window and initial encoding duration), 
immediate task performance, and working memory capacity refer to open-ended count or time 
data. Initially correctly copied items and memory performance refer to count data with a 
maximum of 8.  
 
 
 Immediate Task Performance 
 With regard to immediate task performance, more cognitive offloading came along with 
faster task processing (see Table 11). We confirmed this with an exploratory 2 x 2 between-
subjects ANOVA with lockout and announcement of the memory test as the independent 
variables and trial duration as the dependent variable. This ANOVA revealed that the participants 
in the no lockout condition completed the trials faster than the participants in the lockout 
condition, F(1, 168) = 16.24, p < .001, ηp2 = .08, 95% CI [.02; .18] (trial duration was corrected 
for lockout-times). Further, the participants in the uninformed condition completed the trials 
faster than the participants in the informed condition, F(1, 168) = 9.62, p = .005, ηp2 = .05, 95% 
CI [.01; .13]. The interaction between both conditions was not significant, F(1, 168) = 0.14, 
p = .706.  
 
 No Lockout Lockout 
Uninformed Informed Uninformed Informed 
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While offloading more within the Pattern Copy Task, the participants in the no lockout 
condition as well as the uninformed condition performed less accurately in the memory test (see 
Table 11). We analyzed both proxies for memory accuracy using 2 x 2 between-subjects 
ANOVAs with lockout and announcement of the memory as the independent variables. The 
participants in the no lockout condition performed less accurately in identifying the involved 
images, F(1, 168) = 8.29, p = .004, ηp2 = .05, 95% CI [.005; .12]), as well as in retrieving 
identity-location bindings, F(1, 168) = 15.09, p < .001, ηp2 = .08, 95% CI [.02; .17], in 
comparison to the participants in the lockout condition. Further, uninformed participants 
performed less accurately in identifying the involved images, F(1, 168) = 11.58, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .06, 95% CI [.01; .14], and the identity-location bindings, F(1, 168) = 13.20, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .07, 95% CI [.02; .16], than informed participants. There was no interaction between the 
investigated conditions, all Fs(1, 168) <= 0.08, all ps  >= .773. These findings were further 
supported by the exploratory analyses of individual differences which showed correlations 
between offloading behavior and memory accuracy (see Table 12; scatter plots of all correlations 
are available in the ESM Figures S2.1 and S2.2). Increasing offloading behavior was associated 





























 As in Experiment 1, we conducted a set of exploratory mediation analyses in order to 
provide evidence that the reduction of offloading behavior increased memory accuracy in the 
lockout conditions (see Table 13). We observed a mediated effect of the predictor lockout (no 
lockout/lockout) via cognitive offloading (mediator) on all memory variables (identity, identity-
location bindings), all mediated effects >= 0.18, all ps <= .001, all |direct effects| <= 0.53, all 
ps >= .046. In only one case (out of 6), the direct effect remained significant while the mediating 
factor still appears to be the stronger predictor. Hence, the lockout manipulation influenced 
subsequent memory performance by affecting offloading behavior. Further, regarding the 
announcement of the upcoming memory test (informed/not informed), we also observed a 
mediation of the effect of announcement via cognitive offloading, all |mediated effects| >= 0.18, 
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|direct effects| <= 0.50, all ps >= .026 (see Table 14). In two cases (out of 6), the direct effect 
remained significant; however, the mediated effect appears to be stronger overall.  
 
 
Table 13. Mediation Analyses With the Predictor Lockout (No Lockout/Lockout), Mediator 
Cognitive Offloading and Outcome Memory Performance in Experiment 2 
Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; all mediation analyses were conducted with a 
bootstrapping procedure (1000 simulations) using the package “mediation” in R (Tingley et al., 
2014).  
 
Table 14. Mediation Analyses With the Predictor Announcement of the Memory Test 
(Informed/Uninformed), Mediator Cognitive Offloading and Outcome Memory Performance in 
Experiment 2 
Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; all mediation analyses were conducted with a 






95% CI Direct 
Effect 
95% CI 
Openings of the Model Window  0.36*** [0.22; 0.56] -0.06 [-0.29; 0.16] 
Initial Encoding Duration (sec) 0.18*** [0.08; 0.32]  0.12 [-0.12; 0.30] 
Initially Correctly Copied Items 0.30*** [0.18; 0.48] -0.003 [-0.23; 0.17] 
 Identity-Location Bindings 
Openings of the Model Window 0.99*** [0.68; 1.35] 0.09 [-0.42; 0.60] 
Initial Encoding Duration (sec) 0.55*** [0.29; 0.89] 0.53* [0.01; 1.06] 




95% CI Direct 
Effect 
95% CI 
Openings of the Model Window  -0.18** [-0.32; -0.06] -0.18* [-0.36; -0.03] 
Initial Encoding Duration (sec) -0.20*** [-0.31; -0.10] -0.15 [-0.32; 0.02] 
Initially Correctly Copied Items -0.21*** [-0.37; -0.09] -0.15 [-0.33; 0.00] 
 Identity-Location Bindings 
Openings of the Model Window -0.50** [-0.83; -0.19] -0.50* [-0.99; -0.05] 
Initial Encoding Duration (sec) -0.62*** [-1.02; -0.32] -0.39 [-0.88; 0.18] 




Working Memory Capacity 
We analyzed both proxies for working memory capacity using 2 x 2 between-subjects 
ANOVAs with lockout and announcement of the memory test as the independent variables. We 
did not find any main effects or interactions in working memory capacity for identity-location 
bindings as measured by the Visual Patterns Test, all Fs(1, 168) <= 2.38, all ps >= .13, all 
BF10s <= 0.50 (see Table 11). In the Corsi Blocks Task, the participants in the uninformed 
condition showed a lower working memory capacity for temporal sequence of spatial locations, 
than the participants in the informed condition, F(1, 168) = 4.85, p < .029, ηp2 = .03, 95% CI [.00; 
.09],  BF10 = 1.57. However, performance in the Corsi Blocks Task was uncorrelated with 
cognitive offloading, all |r|s(41) <= .21, all ps > .173, as well as memory performance in the main 
task, all |r|s(41) <= .21, all ps > .166 (exploratory analyses; see Table S2 in the ESM). Therefore, 
we will not address this discrepancy any further. Nevertheless, please note, the Corsi Blocks Task 
was performed after the Pattern Copy Task in order to serve as a retention internal. Thus, it 
cannot be considered independent of our experimental design and differences in Corsi Blocks 
capacity might have been induced by our experimental manipulations. There were no other group 
differences or interactions in the Corsi Blocks Task, all Fs(1, 168) <= 0.12, all ps >= .66, all 
BF10s <= 0.37 (see Table 11).  
 
Experiment 3 
 Experiments 1 and 2 both showed that cognitive offloading was associated with reduced 
subsequent memory performance. When participants were aware of the upcoming memory test, 
however, they seem to reduce offloading behavior in order to foster long-term memory 
(Experiment 2). This finding suggests that cognitive resources which are released by offloading 
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are rather “lost” than devoted to the acquisition of memory representations. In this third 
experiment, we further pursue on this finding by probing its’ generality and/or boundaries. 
Therefore, we manipulated whether participants were allowed to freely choose their offloading 
behavior as in the previous experiments (choice condition) or whether they were forced to offload 
to a maximum extent (forced condition). Identically to Experiment 2, we further manipulated 
whether the participants were aware of the upcoming memory test (informed condition) or not 
(uninformed condition). If the cognitive resources that are released due to cognitive offloading 
cannot contribute to the formation of memory representations in general, being aware of the 
upcoming memory test should have no beneficial effect when the participants are forced to 
offload maximally. Furthermore, the condition with the free choice offloading also allows us to 
reinvestigate the interesting finding of Experiment 2, namely, that participants who were aware of 
the subsequent memory test rather avoided offloading in order to improve memory performance.   
 
Method 
We preregistered this experiment at OSF (https://osf.io/4ye2c). Further, all materials, 
data, and analysis scripts are available at (https://osf.io/k6t7q/). All methods of this experiment 
were identical to Experiment 1 and 2 with the exceptions described in this section.   
 
 Participants 
 Our final sample consisted of 172 new students (136 females; 18-66 years), randomly 
assigned to one of four experimental conditions (n = 43 per condition). Based on our 
preregistered exclusion criteria, we replaced data of participants with missing data (12), a priori 
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awareness of the surprise memory test (27)9, or too large deviations (+/- 3 SD) in any 
preregistered dependent variable of the Pattern Copy Task or the memory test (6). These 
exclusion criteria were identical to Experiments 1 and 2. This experiment was conducted in a 
group setting with a maximum of four participants at once. The testing room was divided into 
separate chambers by movable walls so that the participants could not see each other during the 
study.  
 
 Tasks and Stimuli 
 Pattern Copy Task. Identical to Experiment 2, the participants in the informed conditions 
were informed about the upcoming memory test before starting the Pattern Copy Task, whereas 
the participants in the uninformed conditions received no such instructions. Orthogonally to the 
memory test awareness, we manipulated whether participants could freely choose their offloading 
behavior (choice condition) or whether they were forced to offload to a maximum extent (forced 
condition). The choice condition was identical to the no lockout condition in Experiments 1 and 
2. In the novel forced condition, the participants were only allowed to rebuild a single object in 
the workspace window within each copy cycle of the Pattern Copy Task. Therefore, the 
participants had to change between the model and the workspace window at least twelve times to 
rebuild the twelve images in this condition. In this experiment, the participants could open the 
model window by just clicking on the bar next to it (instead of using a slider as in Experiments 1 
 
9 Including these participants in the analysis (N = 199) turned the interactions between announcement of the memory 
test and offloading conditions from statistical significance into numerical trends (i.e., .05 < p < .1). However, as 
participants in the forced offloading condition still benefited from test awareness with regard to their memory 
performance, such a change would not have a major impact on the interpretation of the current study. Further, the 
group difference in the Corsi Blocks Task attenuates from statistical significance into a numerical trend when 
including participants with memory test awareness which deviated from their instructions. Please note, the Corsi 
Blocks Task was performed after the Pattern Copy Task in order to serve as a retention internal. It can thus not be 
considered independent of our experimental design, and differences in Corsi Blocks capacity might have been 
induced by our experimental manipulations.  
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and 2). For all conditions, the Pattern Copy Task had to be solved correctly (see also Experiment 
2). As proxies of cognitive offloading, we preregistered the number of openings of the model 
window and the number of correctly copied items after the first opening10. Additionally, we also 
analyzed the trial duration as an index of immediate task performance.  
 
 Memory Test. The memory test was identical to Experiment 1. 
 
Results 
 In line with our previous findings, we observed that cognitive offloading was detrimental 
to subsequent memory performance when participants were unaware of the upcoming memory 
test. Nonetheless, when participants were aware of the memory test, the detrimental effects of 
cognitive offloading on memory performance were less pronounced. In particular, the 
participants who were forced to offload to a maximum extent recovered remarkably from the lack 
of memory representations relative to their uninformed counterparts.  
  
Cognitive Offloading 
 Because one half of our participants were forced to offload to a maximum extent, we 
analyzed offloading behavior only for the participants performing the task under the free choice 
conditions. First, we confirmed that the participants in the choice condition actually offloaded 
less extensively than maximum offloading. Therefore, we conducted one-sample t-tests for the 
informed and uninformed conditions. In both choice (sub-)conditions, the participants offloaded 
 
10 Due to the forced offloading condition in this experiment, the proxies for offloading were of minor relevance. 
Nevertheless, we analyzed the number of openings of the model window and the number of correctly copied items 
after the first opening to demonstrate that participants were offloading more when they were forced to do so than 




less than they maximally could (see Table 15). We observed fewer openings of the model 
window in the choice/uninformed condition, t(42) = -39.33, p < .001, d =6.07, 
95% CI [4.75; 7.38], as well as the choice/informed condition, t(42) = -43.18, p < .001, d = 6.66, 
95% CI [5.22; 8.10], compared to μ = 12 (i.e. the minimum amount of opening the model 
window in the forced condition). Additionally, we also observed that the participants copied more 
items initially correctly in the choice/uninformed condition, t(42) = 11.01, p < .001, d = 1.69, 
95% CI [1.23; 2.17], and the choice/informed condition, , t(42) = 12.89, p < .001, d = 1.98, 
95% CI [1.47; 2.50], compared to μ = 1 (i.e. the maximum amount of copied items in forced 
condition per opening). Therefore, consistent with the previous experiments, the participants in 
the choice condition relied on offloading, but they did not offload maximally.  
Further, a two-sample t-test showed that offloading behavior in the choice sub-conditions 
did not differ between the conditions with and without announcement of the memory test. Hence, 
the participants in the choice/informed condition and the choice/uninformed condition did not 
differ in the openings of the model window, t(84) = -0.39, p = .693, ηp2 < .01, 95% CI [.00; .03], 
as well as the initially correctly copied items, t(84) = 0.78, p = .439, ηp2 = .01, 95% CI [.00; .04]. 
This finding contrasts with the observation of Experiment 2, in which memory test announcement 
under free choice conditions resulted in reduced offloading behavior. We will further elaborate 









Table 15. Means and Standard Errors of Dependent Variables in Experiment 3  
Note: Cognitive offloading (openings of the model window and initial encoding duration), 
immediate task performance, and working memory capacity refer to open-ended count or time 
data. Initially correctly copied items and memory performance refer to count data with a 
maximum of 12.  
 
 
Immediate Task Performance 
 We analyzed trial duration (Each trial had to be solved correctly.) as a proxy for 
immediate task performance within the Pattern Copy Task. We observed a faster completion of 
the trials when participants were not aware of the upcoming memory test (uninformed condition) 
than when they expected the upcoming memory test (informed condition, see Table 15). A 2 x 2 
exploratory between-subjects ANOVA with memory test announcement as well as offloading 
condition (forced vs. choice) confirmed that this difference was significant. The participants in 
the uninformed condition solved the task faster than the participants in the informed condition, 
F(1, 168) = 8.54, p = .004, ηp2 = .05, 95% CI [.005; .12]. However, there was no main effect of 
the offloading condition, F(1, 168) = 2.70, p = .102, ηp2 = .01, 95% CI [.00; .07], as well as no 
interaction between both variables, F(1, 168) = 2.68, p = .103, ηp2 = .01, 95% CI [.00; .07].  
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 In the conditions forcing participants to offload maximally, awareness of the upcoming 
memory test increased memory performance almost to the level of the condition with free choice 
offloading behavior (see Figure 9). For both proxies of memory performance, we conducted a 
separate 2 x 2 between-subject ANOVA with announcement of the memory test and offloading 
condition as the independent variables as well as memory performance as the dependent variable. 
We observed interactions between the independent variables for both proxies of memory 
performance “identity”, F(1, 168) = 6.89, p = .009, ηp2 =  .04, 95% CI [.002; .11] , as well as 
“identity-location bindings”, F(1, 168) = 5.99, p = .015, ηp2 = .03, 95% CI [.001; .10]. 
Additionally, all main effects in both analyses reached significance, all F(1, 168)s >= 13.92, all 
ps < .001, all ηp2s >= .08.  
To further investigate the interaction effects, we conducted two-sample t-tests. With 
regard to both memory variables (identity and identity-location bindings), we observed less 
accurate memory performance in the forced/uninformed condition than in all other groups, all 
t(84)s >= 4.17, all ps < .001, all ηp2s >= .18. Further, we observed no difference in memory 
accuracy between the choice/informed and choice/uninformed conditions, all t(84)s <= 1.04, all 
ps >= .302, all ηp2s <= .01. Whether or not the forced/informed condition reached the level of 
the free choice conditions differed between the two proxies of memory accuracy. When 
analyzing only the identity of the recalled objects, the participants in the forced/informed 
condition showed a lower recognition accuracy than the participants in the choice/informed 
condition as well as the choice/uninformed condition, all t(84)s >= 2.21, all ps <= .029, all 
ηp2s  >= .05. However, this difference was absent when analyzing identity-location bindings. 
Here, the participants in the forced/informed condition did not differ in their subsequent memory 
  
118 
performance from the participants in the choice/informed condition as well as the participants in 
the choice/uninformed condition, all t(84)s <= 1.59, all ps >= .115, all ηp2s <= .03.  
In line with the previous two experiments, exploratory correlational analyses within the 
free choice conditions revealed that an increased amount of cognitive offloading was associated 
with a lower subsequent memory performance in the choice conditions (see Table 16;  scatter 
plots of all correlations are available in Figure S3.1 and S3.2 of the ESM). Due to the study 
design, there was hardly any variance in offloading behavior in the forced condition. Therefore, 
we did not conduct correlational analyses for these groups. Further, we did not repeat the 
mediation analyses of Experiments 1 and 2 as we directly manipulated offloading behavior in this 
experiment. 
Figure 9. Interaction Effect of the Independent Variables Announcement of the Memory Test 
and the Offloading Condition on Memory Performance in Experiment 3. Error bars refer to the 



















Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
 
Working Memory Capacity 
 With regard to the Visual Patterns Test, 2 x 2 between-subjects ANOVAs with 
announcement of the memory test and offloading condition as the independent variables revealed 
no group differences or interactions, all Fs(1, 168) <= 1.25, all ps >= .265, all ηp2s < .01, all 
BF10s <= 0.85 (see Table 15). With regard to the Corsi Blocks Task, the participants in the 
uninformed condition showed a lower working memory capacity for temporal sequences of 
spatial locations than the participants in the informed condition, F(1, 168) = 4.43, p = .039, 
ηp2 = .02, 95% CI [.00; .09], BF10 = 2.38. This matches the results of the Corsi Blocks Task in 
Experiment 2. As the Visual Patterns Test and Corsi Blocks Task were conducted after the 
experimental manipulation in the offloading task (to delay the memory test), it therefore seems 
likely that the experimental manipulation induced the reduced Corsi Blocks capacity. Offloading 
behavior (in the free choice conditions), however, was uncorrelated with capacity in the Corsi 
Blocks Task, all |r|s(41) <= .23, all ps >= .138. Further, we observed no significant correlations 
between capacity in the Corsi Blocks Task and performance in the two memory measures all 
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correlations). We observed no other group differences or interaction effects in the Corsi Blocks 
Task, all Fs(1, 168) <= 1.96, all ps >= .163, all ηp2s < .01, all BF10s <= 0.69. Given the absence 
of group differences in the Visual Patterns Test (which is conceptually closer to the Pattern Copy 
Task) as well as no correlations of the capacity in the Corsi Blocks Task, we will not address this 
issue any further.  
 
Discussion 
In the present research, we studied how offloading behavior affects memory performance 
for the offloaded information. In particular, we were interested in how the awareness of 
subsequent testing alters offloading behavior as well and its potentially detrimental 
consequences. Our first two experiments demonstrate that cognitive offloading induces a trade-
off between immediate task performance in the Pattern Copy Task and the formation of memory 
representations for the information presented in this task (within the same experiments and 
participants). In other words, while cognitive offloading accelerated task processing, it interfered 
with the formation of memory for the processed information. This finding replicates and extends 
previous results reported by Morgan et al. (2009; see also Morgan, et al., 2013; Waldron, et al., 
2007) on longer retention intervals exceeding working memory maintenance as well as on stimuli 
depicting naturalistic objects (rather than colored squares). This pattern of results appears to be 
genuine for an implicit formation of memory representations (i.e. Experiment 1 and the 
uninformed conditions of Experiment 2). Most importantly, the effect also arose when we 
directly manipulated offloading behavior in Experiment 3. When participants were unaware of 
the memory test, their memory performance was more accurate when they were offloading less 
under free choice conditions than when they were forced to offload to a maximum extent.  
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With regard to explicit formations of memory representations, the results were a bit more 
mixed. In Experiment 2, the participants who were aware of the upcoming memory test reduced 
their amount of cognitive offloading and subsequently revealed more accurate long-term memory 
performance. In the conditions with free choice in Experiment 3, however, we did not observe 
such a reduction of offloading behavior induced by the awareness of the upcoming memory test 
relative to the condition without such awareness. The lack of an equivalent effect with regard to 
reduced offloading behavior in order to foster learning raises questions regarding the generality, 
reliability, or magnitude of this effect. As the origin of this difference in the results pattern cannot 
be fully explained within this manuscript, we will only briefly discuss this finding below without 
drawing strong conclusions from it. A potential source for the diverging patterns might be that 
only one half of the participants performed the Pattern Copy Task under free choice conditions in 
Experiment 3 (the remaining participants were forced to offload and therefore could not adapt 
their offloading behavior). This reduction of statistical power or unexplained variance in the two 
samples seem to be plausible candidates as most other methods were virtually identical (despite 
the number of images). Nevertheless, what remained consistent in Experiments 2 and 3 is that the 
amount of offloading inversely matched the subsequent memory performance under free choice 
and informed conditions. Whereas the reduction of offloading in the informed conditions in 
Experiment 2 came along with more accurate subsequent memory, the absence of such a 
reduction in Experiment 3 was accompanied by the absence of differences in the subsequent 
memory tests. This consistency seems to suggest that there is a link between offloading and 
memory performance. Such a link would suggest that cognitive resources which remain “free” 
due to offloading are “lost” and do not contribute to the formation of memory. However, the 




The results of Experiment 3 demonstrate that the amount of offloading does not 
necessarily determine memory accuracy. On the contrary, despite being forced to offload 
maximally, the participants in the forced/informed condition of this experiment showed almost 
the same memory accuracy as those participants in the choice/informed and choice/uninformed 
condition. Therefore, these conditions demonstrate that offloading does not necessarily have a 
detrimental impact on memory performance. Instead, at least under the extreme conditions of 
enforced maximum offloading, it seems to be possible to counteract the negative impact of 
offloading on the formation of memory (i.e. the released resources were not lost). This finding 
suggests that the announcement of the memory test and the corresponding induction of the 
specific goal to enhance memory accuracy contributes to the formation of long-term memory 
representations. What remains an open question for future research is why such beneficial effects 
of released resources do not arise with free choice offloading behavior. There are at least two 
speculative explanations for this pattern. First, it is possible that it is costly in terms of mental 
resources to coordinate a task solution at a medium memory load with a simultaneous medium 
use of released resources. Second, it could be that a minimum amount of released resources is 
necessary to reveal their positive effects. In the case of forced offloading, there are probably more 
“free” than “used” resources which might have enabled their impact on the general pattern of 
results.  
 A remarkable finding across all experiments are the high correlations between offloading 
behavior and memory performance on an individual level. These correlations were present within 
implicit (i.e. uninformed) as well as explicit (i.e. informed) setups of the experiments and support 
our findings on the group level in Experiments 1 and 2. More pronounced offloading behavior 
diminishes subsequent memory performance for the offloaded information. It seems important to 
note, however, that this correlational relationship is not deterministic. In this third experiment, we 
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forced participants to offload to a maximum extent and observed differences on the group level in 
the memory performance despite constant offloading behavior on the individual level. An 
alternative explanation for our correlational results could be that individual differences in 
memory abilities induce both more offloading behavior as well as lower memory performance. In 
this case, participants who generally memorize information more accurately do not need to rely 
on offloading strategies as extensively as participants with lower memory abilities. However, our 
study was not designed to trace back individual differences. Both working memory tests were 
administered only after the experimental manipulation in order to prolong the retention interval. 
Thus, explaining the individual differences which we consistently observed across all 
experiments urges for further research exploring their causal relationship.   
A central question for the interpretation of our results is whether offloading behavior itself 
impacts memory performance. Alternatively, the participants in the lockout conditions could have 
used the 2-second lockout-times to rehearse the visual information and thus showed an improved 
subsequent memory performance relative to participants in the no lockout conditions. In this case, 
the additional rehearsal time in the lockout condition rather than less cognitive offloading would 
have determined subsequent memory performance. Contrary to this view, however, our 
mediation analyses highlight the detrimental effects of offloading for the formation of memory 
representations. The impact of our manipulations (lockout/no lockout and informed/uninformed 
memory test) on subsequent memory performance was mediated by offloading behavior. This 
suggests that offloading behavior itself is associated with memory accuracy.  
 
The Trade-Off of Cognitive Offloading 
Beyond the conceptual replication of previous reports of a trade-off between immediate 
positive and subsequent negative effects of offloading memory processes in the Pattern Copy 
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Task (Morgan et al., 2009; 2013; Waldron et al., 2007), our results are also in line with studies 
reporting detrimental effects of cognitive offloading in other paradigms (Eskritt & Ma, 2014; 
Kelly & Risko, 2019a; O’Hara & Payne, 1998; Pyke & LeFevre, 2011; Sparrow et al., 2011). For 
instance, Pyke and LeFevre (2011) observed that using a calculator in an alphanumerical test led 
to a higher response accuracy but in return to a worse subsequent recall of the solution. They 
therefore concluded that using a calculator results in less active learning than self-generating 
answers. Studies such as this one show that using technical tools to offload cognitive processes 
diminishes long-term learning across various paradigms and cognitive functions. With regard to 
our Pattern Copy Task, temporarily high loads of working memory (i.e. copying multiple objects 
simultaneously) rather than continuously low loads (i.e. copying the objects sequentially) 
enhanced subsequent memory accuracy under free choice conditions, although all participants 
had to handle the same overall amount of information.  
Please note that these temporarily high loads of working memory enhanced memory for 
the identity of the objects as well as their locations relative to each other. The general pattern of 
our findings matches the notion of desirable difficulties. Conceptually, desirable difficulties are 
supposed to enforce a more effortful and therefore more elaborate processing of information in 
order to enhance long-term learning (Bjork & Bjork, 2011). Thus, saving a lot of information 
internally places a high effort on internal cognitive resources which in return might lead to a deep 
processing of the information at hand and therefore fosters learning. Within this account, 
avoiding offloading behavior (such as in Experiment 2) in order to foster long-term learning 
could be seen as self-generated desirable difficulty. Nevertheless, as observed in Experiment 3, 
the relationship between offloading and memory is not fully deterministic. As differences in 
memory could also arise with the same amount of offloading, it remains possible that participants 
could use released cognitive resources to acquire more accurate memory representations. 
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Whether these released resources are employed in a manner that would be consistent with a self-
generated desirable difficulty is one of the open questions to pursue in future research. 
Our findings are also compatible with the framework of Salomon (1990) who proposed 
effects with technology on task processing as well as effects of technology on the development of 
cognitive abilities in the field of learning sciences. Effects with technology are supposed to affect 
immediate task processing due to utilizing technical tools, whereas effects of technology are 
potential long-term consequences (e.g., development of cognitive abilities) caused by preceding 
interactions with technology. Hence, cognitive offloading with technical tools might enable 
performance beyond internal cognitive limitations and thus increase immediate performance 
(Kirsh & Maglio, 1994; Salomon & Perkins, 2005). However, what users learn in this context 
appears to be how to effectively utilize the offloading device rather than solving the problem at 
hand with one’s own cognitive abilities (Moritz et al., 2020). In return, it might be the absence of 
practice and routine in using internal resources which causes the detrimental effects of cognitive 
offloading (Risko & Gilbert, 2016; Salomon, 1990). 
 
Positive consequences of cognitive offloading  
Although Experiments 1 and 2, as well as the uninformed conditions in Experiment 3, 
constantly suggest that cognitive offloading is generally harmful for the formation of memory, 
one condition in our third experiment demonstrates that participants could counteract these 
detrimental effects under certain circumstances. In this experiment, we observed that the 
participants who were forced to offload to a maximum extent but were aware of the long-term 
memory test hardly differed in their memory performance from those participants who offloaded 
less under free choice conditions. This finding indicates that if it is necessary to acquire memory 
representations and there is no possibility to regulate offloading behavior, individuals can use 
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released internal resources to improve memory performance. Please note that this improvement is 
relative to a condition in which participants are not aware of the subsequent memory test and 
therefore have no incentive to memorize the information. Overall, this improvement brings these 
participants (almost) back to the level of the participants who were able to freely choose their 
offloading behavior. As there is no benefit above the level of freely chosen offloading behavior, 
this might also be a reason why the participants in our Experiment 2 solved that task with more 
internal memory rather than with more offloading when they were aware of the memory test.   
Our observation that participants in principle can take advantage of released resources 
matches a common argument in favor of cognitive offloading. One might consider that such 
released resources which come along with externalizations (Kirsh, 2010) could serve a deeper 
elaboration of the processed information (Sweller et al., 1998). In return, such a deeper 
elaboration could cause stronger memory representations (Craik & Lockhart, 1972). From the 
results of our experiments, it appears that such an argument rests on two essential preconditions. 
First, participants need to have the goal to foster long-term learning, as detrimental consequences 
under implicit learning conditions are likely. Without such a goal, released cognitive resources 
seem to be “lost”. Second, the amount of released cognitive resources needs to be substantially 
large to contribute to learning. In our experiments, we only observed such a contribution of 
released resources when we forced participants to complete the task with a minimum of internal 
resources. It appears likely that the same pattern of results would have emerged if our participants 
had completed the task with minimal internal memory themselves. This leads to the interesting 
hypothesis that a substantial amount of released resources can contribute to learning, whereas a 
small amount cannot. Future research should therefore study the relationship between the amount 
of released resources and their beneficial effects on learning.  
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It seems noteworthy that the announcement of upcoming memory tests does not generally 
result in beneficial effects of cognitive offloading. In an experiment reported by Sparrow et al. 
(2011), the participants transferred trivia statements into a computer document. Whereas the 
participants remembered fewer of these statements when they believed their document was saved 
in the computer rather than when they believed their document was erased, announcing the 
memory test had no effect on performance. Given the substantial differences between both 
paradigms (task, materials, difficulty, etc.), it seems hardly helpful to speculate about the origin 
of the differences in the results. Nevertheless, this discrepancy again shows that the interactions 
between the released resources due cognitive offloading and the goal of acquiring new mental 
representations is understudied and not well understood yet. Given the widespread distribution of 
modern technical tools that allow for cognitive offloading, however, a deeper understanding of 
this interaction is highly relevant to enable an appropriate usage of such tools.   
Our experiments as well as those of Sparrow et al. (2011) focused on the interplay of 
offloading and memory accuracy for the offloaded information itself. Beyond the offloaded 
information itself, however, cognitive offloading could also affect cognitive performance for 
unrelated materials or in unrelated tasks (Runge et al., 2019; Storm & Stone, 2015). For instance, 
Storm and Stone (2015) observed that saving information in a technical tool before studying 
further information improved the memory performance of the latter information (i.e. reduced 
interference from the first information on the second). Further, there appear to be carry-over 
effects in offloading behavior between successive tasks (i.e. participants relying more on 
offloading in one task also rely more on offloading in a subsequent task; Storm, Stone, & 
Benjamin, 2016).11 
 
11 For the interested readers, we added plots displaying offloading behavior across all trials and for each group within 
the Pattern Copy Task in the ESM (Figure S4, Figure S5, Figure S6). These plots show that participants mostly 




Cognitive offloading as a strategy 
Given the growing impact on people’s everyday lives by technical tools including external 
memories (Finley et al., 2018), a careful consideration of the apparent benefits and the hidden 
risks of cognitive offloading seems needed in order to avoid unintended detrimental long-term 
effects. First, it appears necessary to evaluate the goal of the task at hand. If the goal focuses on 
immediate performance, our study suggests that the adequate strategy would be increasing 
externalizations. In contrast, if the task’s goal involves components of memorization or learning, 
different strategies should be applied. On the one hand, offloading behavior could be avoided in 
order to create desirable difficulties and foster learning. On the other hand – if avoiding 
offloading is not possible – released resources due to offloading could be activated to foster 
learning. 
In Experiment 2, we observed that participants who were aware of the upcoming memory 
test offloading less but had a better memory than participants who were not aware of the 
upcoming memory test. This finding suggests that the participants might have been aware of the 
negative consequences of cognitive offloading or at least did not believe that cognitive offloading 
could be used beneficially. Thus, it appears that the participants decided to rely more on their 
internal memory rather than on externalizations. Critically, we did not observe such a change in 
offloading behavior based on the announcement of the memory test in Experiment 3 (choice 
condition). Therefore, we cannot conclude from our experiments whether participants do or do 
not have metacognitive knowledge about the impact of cognitive offloading on memory. 
Nevertheless, our findings from Experiment 2 urge for further research directly investigating how 
metacognitions about the impact of offloading alter offloading behavior across tasks with varying 
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goals focusing either on immediate performance or subsequent memory. A plausible venue for 
such research to explore this question would be to directly manipulate metacognitions.  
 
Conclusion 
Taken together, we can derive the following insights from our experiments: First, there is 
a trade-off between positive immediate and negative subsequent consequences of cognitive 
offloading. Second, under free choice offloading, more cognitive offloading was associated with 
a lower subsequent memory performance on the group level as well as on the level of individual 
differences. Third, announcing subsequent testing could compensate for at least some of the 
detrimental effects of cognitive offloading on memory acquisition. Fourth, reducing the amount 
of offloading as a self-generated desirable difficulty as well as a taking advantage of released 
cognitive resources might reflect competing strategies when counteracting the detrimental effects 
of cognitive offloading. Fifth and finally, resources released by cognitive offloading only 
contribute to the formation of memories in explicit learning contexts (i.e. when participants have 
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5. Study 4 
 
- The impact of cognitive offloading on secondary task performance - 
 
 In humans’ daily life, the use of technical tools such as smartphones or tablets is 
ubiquitous. Technical tools are often used to support individuals’ cognitive processing by 
externalizing important information (e.g., appointments, a shopping list) in the technical tool at 
hand instead of memorizing this information. This externalization of cognitive processes into 
technical tools is described as cognitive offloading (Risko & Gilbert, 2016). A main advantage of 
cognitive offloading is the opportunity to store more information at once than it would be 
possible with one’s internal cognitive resources. A central limitation in the human cognitive 
architecture arises from working memory (Baddeley, 2003; Luck & Vogel, 2013), but due to 
cognitive offloading capacity limitations of working memory can be overcome (Risko & Gilbert, 
2016). Individuals can flexibly distribute the cognitive demands of a task on technical tools and 
one’s working memory which serves to lower working memory demand and makes a cognitive 
task less effortful. When offloading working memory processes task performance can be 
enhanced compared to when solely relying on internal working memory (Kirsh & Maglio, 1994; 
Risko & Gilbert, 2016). Thus, technical tools extend individuals’ skills (Osiurak, et al., 2018) and 
can be accounted as an extended mind (Clark & Chalmers, 1998). Importantly, cognitive 
offloading is also supposed to release internal cognitive resources (Kirsh, 2010). When 
individuals offload information into technical tools that would otherwise need to be stored in 
working memory, working memory resources are saved. In the present study, we investigated if 
released cognitive resources due to the offloading of working memory processes in one task can 
be redirected and used to successfully perform a simultaneous secondary task.  
 Especially individuals’ use of external representations such as diagrams or illustrations to 
solve problems as a form of cognitive offloading was assumed to release internal cognitive 
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resources (Kirsh, 2010). External representations store information which can be used to facilitate 
problem-solving and thus such information does not need to be stored in one’s memory. In turn, 
internal memory resources are released. Onto this account, researchers in the area of cognitive 
offloading (including us) assume that cognitive offloading releases internal cognitive resources 
(Kirsh, 2010; Risko & Gilbert, 2016). However, there are only a few studies that provide first 
insights into this potential release of cognitive resources due to offloading (Runge et al., 2019; 
Storm & Stone, 2015). The initial studies showed that cognitive offloading has positive effects on 
the subsequent processing of new information (Storm & Stone, 2015) or unrelated tasks (Runge 
et al., 2019) – potentially due to the release of internal cognitive resources. 
In a study of Storm and Stone (2015) the participants had to learn a word list A which 
they then could either save in a computer file (i.e. offload the word list) or were not allowed to 
save (i.e. no offloading). Subsequently, they studied a word list B and performed a recall test. 
Storm and Stone (2015) showed that the offloading of the first word list A facilitated the learning 
and subsequent recall of the second word list B. When the participants were allowed to save the 
world list A in a computer file before studying the second word list B, their recall performance 
for the word list B was better than when they were not allowed to save the word list A. 
Interestingly, this was only the case when the offloading process was deemed reliable (i.e. word 
list A was successfully saved in the computer file). When the computer file did not successfully 
save word list A (i.e. offloading was not reliable), there was no advantage for memory recall of 
word list B. Successfully offloading the first word list seems to release internal cognitive 
resources that might be devoted to studying the second word list more elaborately (see Runge et 
al., 2020 for a replication of these results). This saving-enhanced memory effect shows that the 
offloading of irrelevant information can be used to support the encoding of new, relevant 
information. Runge et al. (2019) extended this finding by showing that released cognitive 
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resources can be applied to perform an unrelated task. In their study, the participants also either 
offloaded a word list into a computer file or had to memorize the word list. Afterwards the 
participants performed an unrelated arithmetic task. The participants performed better in this 
arithmetic task (i.e. solved more problems correctly) when they had offloaded the previously 
studied word list compared to when they were not allowed to offload it but had to memorize it. 
Therefore, cognitive offloading also induced a saving-enhanced performance effect. Runge et al. 
(2019) concluded that cognitive offloading actually releases internal cognitive resources and that 
these released resources can even be utilized for the performance of a later, unrelated task. 
However, what still remains unclear is if such released cognitive resources can also be used 
instantaneously to perform a simultaneous, secondary task.  
In the present experiment the participants performed a Pattern Copy Task (see Fu & Gray, 
2000; Gray et al., 2006) that allowed the offloading of working memory processes. In this task 
the participants had to copy a color pattern from a model window into a workspace window. The 
participants could rely more on cognitive offloading and memorize less information at once by 
looking up the relevant information in the model window over and over again. In this task, the 
participants either experienced high temporal costs or low temporal costs of cognitive offloading. 
Previous research showed that the amount of cognitive offloading depends on cost-benefit 
considerations (e.g., Fu & Gray, 2000; Gray et al., 2006). Therefore, when the opening of the 
model window to access the relevant information is associated with high temporal costs (e.g., a 
temporal delay) the participants usually offload less working memory processes than when the 
opening of the model window is associated with low temporal costs (e.g., no temporal delay). A 
manipulation of the temporal costs within the Pattern Copy Task thus serves to experimentally 
manipulate the participants’ amount of cognitive offloading and the related released cognitive 
resources. In addition to the Pattern Copy Task the participants either performed a simultaneous 
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secondary task (N-back Task) or they did not perform such a task. We investigated how the 
manipulated temporal costs within the Pattern Copy Task as well as the presence of a secondary 
task impacts offloading behavior. Most importantly, we also investigated the effects of released 
internal resources due to the offloading of working memory processes on the performance of the 
secondary task. We expected that participants that offload more working memory processes due 
to low temporal costs within the Pattern Copy Task have more released internal resources that 
they can devote to the simultaneous performance of the secondary task compared to participants 
that offload less due to high temporal costs within the Pattern Copy Task. In turn, more released 
internal cognitive resources should increase secondary task performance compared to less 
released internal cognitive resources.  
 
Method 




 We preregistered a sample size of 172 participants in order to achieve a power of 
(1 – !) = .90 and medium effect sizes of f = 0.25. Due to the outbreak of Covid-19, we had to 
pause data collection before achieving this preregistered sample size and can now only report 
data of N = 133 participants (101 female, 31 male, 1 diverse; 18 – 39 years old, Mage = 24.04, 
SDage = 3.81). As preregistered, we excluded one participant due to a too low working memory 
capacity in the Corsi Blocks Task, five participants due to a low performance in the secondary N-
back Task (sensitivity/d’ < 0.5), two participants due to missing data and one participant because 
of not complying with the task instructions. The participants received a financial compensation or 
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course credits for their participation. Data collection will be resumed when the situation allows it 
again. All participants provided informed consent and the experiment was approved by the ethics 




 The participants used a 12.3’’ Microsoft Surface Pro tablet (2736 x 1824 pixels) and its 
touch function to perform a Corsi Blocks Task and the Pattern Copy Task. The tablet laid flat on 
the table at a viewing distance of approximately 36 cm. To perform to the secondary task (N-back 
Task), the participants wore headphones for the auditory stimulus presentation and gave answers 




 The participants performed the tasks in the order they are described. 
 
 Corsi Blocks Task. The Corsi Blocks Task measures working memory capacity (adapted 
from Milner, 1971). In this task, the participants had to observe a spatial sequence and then had 
to recall this sequence from their working memory. Thus, the participants observed a 5 x 5 grid of 
empty squares (each 2.52 x 2.52 deg) in which one square after another turned yellow in a 1-
second rhythm. After observing the sequence of squares turning yellow and a retention interval of 
0.3 seconds, the participants had to recall the sequence by tapping the corresponding squares in 
the correct order. The task was adaptive, meaning that after a correct recall of a whole sequence 
the number of squares turning yellow increased by one (with a maximum of 20, but no participant 
reached this maximal capacity), whereas after an incorrect recall the number squares decreased 
by one (with a minimum set size of 2). The first sequence started with a set size of two squares 
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turning yellow. The participants performed 30 trials of this Corsi Blocks Task. To calculate 
working memory capacity, we averaged the set size of the last ten correctly solved trials.  
 
 Pattern Copy Task. The Pattern Copy Task is a working memory task that measures 
cognitive offloading (see also Fu & Gray, 2000; Gray et al., 2006). In this version of the task, the 
participants had to copy a color pattern of colored squares from a model window into a 
workspace window (see Figure 10). The participants could either open the model window to 
observe the pattern by clicking on a bar to its right or open the workspace and resource window 
to rebuild the pattern by clicking on a bar to its left. Whenever either the model window or 
workspace and resource window were opened, the other one was covered by a gray mask. The 
model and workspace window both displayed a 5 x 5 grid of empty squares (each 2.52 x 2.52 
deg) whereby the grid in the model window was filled with 12 distinct colored squares (blue, 
orange, red, cyan, green, dark green, yellow, bisque, sienna, purple, pink, and gray). The resource 
window included the same twelve colored squares which the participants had to drag and drop 
into the workspace window.  
Within this task I manipulated the temporal costs of cognitive offloading with a no 
lockout vs. lockout condition. In the no lockout condition the model window opened 
immediately, whereas in the lockout condition the participants had to wait two seconds first. In 
the lockout condition the bar that had to be clicked to open the model window turned red for two 
seconds after clicking. The model window could only be opened after expiration of this two 
second interval by again clicking onto the bar. This manipulation induced high temporal costs of 
offloading in the lockout condition whereas the costs of offloading were low in the no lockout 
condition.  
After correctly rebuilding the pattern, the participants could continue with the next trial by 
pressing an “End Trial” button. When the pattern was not correctly rebuilt, the participants had to 
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keep editing it. The participants performed 20 trials of this task, preceded by two practice trials. 
The distribution of colored squares within a pattern was randomized to the extent that one 
participant of each experimental group received the exact same color patterns in the same order. 
However, due to pausing the study before the whole sample size could be collected, the groups 
vary in their sample size (see section “Design” for information on group sizes) and thus the equal 
distribution of patterns is not yet complete. In this task I measured offloading behavior with the 
following three variables: the number of openings of the model window, the number of correctly 
copied items after the first opening of the model window and the duration of the very first 
opening of the model window. A higher number of openings and a lower number of correctly 
copied items as well as a shorter duration of the first opening indicate more cognitive offloading 
and thus less internally memorized information.  
 
 N-back Task. Simultaneously to performing the Pattern Copy Task, an auditory N-back 
Task was presented (adapted from Jaeggi et al., 2010; see Figure 10). For all participants the 
stimuli of the auditory N-back Task were played via headphones during the Pattern Copy Task. 
Importantly, only half of the participants had to actually perform the task (i.e. react to it; 
secondary task condition) whereas the other half of participants only listened to it while not being 
instructed to react to it (no secondary task condition). When starting a trial of the Pattern Copy 
Task a male voice began to present a random sequence of German consonants (c, g, h, k, p, q, t, 
w)12. Every three seconds a new consonant was presented. Each time when the presented 
consonant was the same one as the one presented two position before (i.e. 2-back task) the 
participants in the secondary task condition had to press the foot pedal. They were asked to 
 
12 Retrieved from https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Datei:German_alphabet-2.ogg. 
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answer as fast and as accurate as possible. The sequence ended when a Pattern Copy Task trial 
was completed and a new sequence started when a new trial began.  
With a chance of 33%, an auditory stimulus was a target (i.e. the participants had to react 
as the same stimulus occurred 2 stimuli back as well). The stimuli were completely randomized 
to the extent that no 1-back and 3-back compilations were allowed. To analyze the performance 
in this secondary task for participants in the secondary task condition, I excluded the last auditory 
stimulus of each trial and responses with a response time below 0.2 seconds. If a participant 
reacted to a single stimulus more than once, only the first reaction to this stimulus was analyzed. 
As proxies of secondary task performance, I then calculated the sensitivity (d’) across all 20 test 
trials and the response time for accurate responses averaged across the 20 trials. The sensitivity 
(d’) was calculated based on the signal detection theory (Macmillan & Creelman, 2004). 
Accordingly, we performed standard corrections for hit rates of H = 1 (reducing the hit rate by 
0.5) and false alarm rates of FA = 0 (increasing the false alarm rate by 0.5). A higher sensitivity 


















Figure 10. Illustration of the Pattern Copy Task and the simultaneous N-back Task. In the Pattern 
Copy Task, the participants had to copy a color pattern from a model window into a workspace 
window. For half of the participants (lockout condition) the opening of the model window 
resulted in a delay of two seconds, whereas for the other half of participants the model window 
could be opened immediately (no lockout condition). This task measured offloading behavior. 
Simultaneously in the N-back Task the participants listened to an auditory presentation of 
consonants in a three-second rhythm. Half of the participants (secondary task condition) had to 
react via a foot pedal when the presented stimulus was the same as the one two positions back to 
measure secondary task performance. The other half of participants (no secondary task condition) 
did not react to the stimuli. (Lock and headphones designed by rawpixel.com/Freepik; shoe 






























Paper and Pencil Tasks 
 
NASA-TLX. Following the completion of the Pattern Copy Task and the N-back Task, 
the participants answered the NASA-TLX questionnaire (Hart & Staveland, 1988; Hart, 2006). 
This questionnaire aims at measuring the workload participants experienced when performing a 
task or multiple simultaneous tasks. The participants were asked to rate the following variables 
on a scale from 1 to 21 (very low to very high): mental demand, physical demand, temporal 
demand, effort, frustration, and performance (perfect performance to failure). As an index of 
overall workload, I averaged the rating to those questions for each participant. 
 
Self-reported Offloading-Strategies. After answering the NASA-TLX questionnaire, the 
participants were questioned about the strategy they applied to solve the Pattern Copy Task. I 
presented them with the following question: “What strategy did you use to complete the pattern 
copying task on the tablet device?” accompanied by the response options: “I tried to memorize a 
lot at once instead of having to take a look more often.” or “I tried to take a look more often 
instead of memorizing a lot at once.” (in German; here translated to English for illustration). 
Therefore, the participants could decide between an internal memory strategy (i.e. memorizing 
more and offloading less) or an offloading strategy (i.e. offloading more by looking up 
information more often and memorizing less).  
 
Design 
 This experiment followed a 2 x 2 between-subjects design (see Figure 11). Within the 
Pattern Copy Task, the participants either experienced low temporal costs (no lockout condition) 
or high temporal costs of offloading (lockout condition). Simultaneously an auditory N-back 
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Task was presented. Half of the participants had to actually perform this task by giving responses 
with a foot pedal (secondary task condition), whereas the other half did not perform this task (no 






Figure 11. Two by two between-subjects design of the present experiment and sample size of 





 To analyze offloading behavior, I performed 2 x 2 between-subjects ANOVAs for each 
dependent variable of the Pattern Copy Task and the independent variables “temporal costs” as 
well as “secondary task performance”. Participants in the no lockout condition opened the model 
window more often, F(1, 129) = 100.37, p < .001, ηp2 >= .44, showed a shorter initial encoding 
duration, F(1, 129) = 42.49, p < .001, ηp2 >= .25, and copied fewer items correctly at the first 
opening of the model window, F(1, 129) = 68.67, p < .001, ηp2 = .21, than participants in the 
lockout condition. Further, also when a secondary task was present the participants opened the 
model window more frequently, F(1, 129) = 75.43, p < .001, ηp2 = .25, showed a shorter initial 
encoding duration, F(1, 129) = 28.82, p < .001, ηp2 = .14, and copied fewer items initially 
correctly, F(1, 129) = 120.00, p < .001, ηp2 = .37, than when no secondary task was present. 
There was also a significant interaction of the independent variables “temporal costs” and 
Temporal Costs
Secondary Task Performance
Yes                                     No
No Lockout
Lockout
n = 36 
n = 32 n = 32 
n = 33 
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“secondary task performance” with regard to the number of openings of the model window and 
the initial encoding duration,  all Fs(1, 129) >= 5.01, all ps <= .027, all ηp2s >= .04. Post-hoc t-
Tests for independent samples showed that with regard to the openings of the model window the 
presence of the secondary task affected both the no lockout as well as lockout condition, all 
ts >= 6.45, all ps < .001, all ηp2s >= .37, but the difference in means was larger within the no 
lockout condition than the lockout condition on a descriptive basis (see Figure 12). With regard 
to the initial encoding duration we observed the opposite pattern, namely a larger differences of 
means within the lockout condition than the no lockout condition depending on the presence of 
the secondary task, whereby both comparisons were significant, all ts >= -2.89, all ps <= .006, all 
ηp2s >= .11. Regarding the dependent variable “initially correctly copied items” no significant 
interaction effect was observed, F(1, 129) = 3.00, p = .086, ηp2 = .02. Thus, across the three 
offloading variables the interaction effect did not provide a consistent pattern of results. Instead, 
we consistently observed two main effects showing that the participants offloaded more in the no 
lockout condition compared to the lockout condition as well as when a secondary task was 
present compared to when it was absent. Due to its inconsistency the interaction effect will not be 






Figure 12. Offloading behavior in the experimental groups. Across all three offloading variables 
I observed two robust main effects. Error bars present the standard error of the mean.  
 
 
Secondary task performance 
To investigate performance in the secondary N-back Task between the no lockout and 
lockout condition, we performed two t-Tests for independent samples with the dependent 
variables “response time” and “sensitivity (d’)”. With regard to response time, we observed no 
group difference between the no lockout and lockout condition, t(65.75) = 0.65, p = .516, 
ηp2 <= .01. However, we observed a higher sensitivity (d’) in the no lockout condition than in the 
lockout condition, t(65.79) = -2.37, p = .021, ηp2 = .08 (see Table 17). To investigate whether the 
lockout manipulation (no lockout/lockout) impacted sensitivity as a measure of secondary task 
performance directly or whether this relationship is mediated via cognitive offloading, we 
performed exploratory mediation analyses (see Table 18). We did not observe a mediated effect 
of the predictor lockout (no lockout/lockout) via cognitive offloading (mediator) on sensitivity, 
all mediated effects <= -0.16, all ps >= .082. Also, the direct effect of the lockout manipulation 
on sensitivity when taking cognitive offloading into account was not significant, all 
direct effects <= -0.38, all ps >= .122. Thus, solely when taking both predictors into account, 
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neither cognitive offloading nor the lockout manipulation (no lockout/lockout) seems to predict 
sensitivity as a measure of secondary task performance. For exploratory purposes we also 
calculated Pearson-correlations between offloading behavior and secondary task performance 
(see Table 19). Across all variables and groups (except one), we did not observe a correlation 
between cognitive offloading and response time, all |rs| <= .34, all ps >= .044, as well as 
between cognitive offloading and sensitivity, all |rs| <= .22, all ps >= .019. The exploratory 
mediation analyses as well as correlations suggest that cognitive offloading is not driving 
secondary task performance, however, it should be noted that due to pausing our study the 
analyses are based on a reduced sample size and thus our intended power is not yet achieved.  
 
Table 17. Means and Standard Deviations of Independent Variables in the Secondary N-back 

















M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Secondary Task Performance: 
Response Time (sec) 
Sensitivity (d’) 
Working Memory Capacity:  
Corsi Blocks Task 
 
1.23 (0.18)  
  2.31 (0.78) 
  
4.90 (0.64)   
 
       - 
       - 
   




1.89 (0.66)  
 
4.71 (0.74)    
 
         - 
         - 





Table 18. Mediation Analyses with the Predictor Lockout (No Lockout/Lockout), Mediator 
Cognitive Offloading and Outcome Sensitivity  
Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; all mediation analyses were conducted with a  

























Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
Working memory performance 
As an indicator of working memory performance, the participants performed the Corsi 
Blocks Task at the beginning of the experiment. A 2 x 2 between-subjects ANOVA with the 
 Sensitivity (d‘) 
 Mediated 
Effect 
95% CI Direct 
Effect 
95% CI 
Openings of the Model Window  -0.08 [-0.45; 0.31] -0.33 [-0.88; 0.20] 
Initial Encoding Duration (sec) -0.16 [-0.37; 0.06] -0.25 [-0.67; 0.19] 
Initially Correctly Copied Items -0.03 [-0.29; 0.23] -0.38 [-0.84; 0.10] 
 Cognitive Offloading 
Openings of the Model Window 
 Secondary Task 
No Lockout Lockout 
Secondary Task Performance: 
Response Time (sec) 
Sensitivity (d’) 
 
  .13 
  .08 
 
-.17 
  .01 
 Initial Encoding Duration (sec) 
 Secondary Task 
No Lockout Lockout 
Response Time (sec) 
Sensitivity (d’) 
  .34* 
-.22 
  .27 
-.15 
 Initially Correctly Copied Items 
 Secondary Task 
No Lockout Lockout 
Response Time (sec) 
Sensitivity (d’) 
-.11 
  .01 




independent variables “temporal costs” and “secondary task performance” showed no significant 
main effects or interaction, all Fs(1, 129) <= 1.14, all ps >= .288, all ηp2s <= .01. Thus, the 
experimental groups did not differ in working memory capacity (see Table 17).  
 
Overall workload (exploratory) 
 To investigate the perceived overall workload of participants measured by the NASA-
TLX questionnaire we performed an exploratory 2 x 2 between-subjects ANOVA. Participants in 
the no lockout condition perceived the performance of the tasks as less demanding than 
participants in the lockout condition, F(1, 129) = 13.06, p < .001, ηp2 = .09 (see Figure 13). 
Further, participants not performing a secondary task perceived the task performance as less 
demanding than participants performing a secondary task in addition to the Pattern Copy Task, 
F(1, 129) = 38.10, p < .001, ηp2 = .23. There was no interaction effect, F(1, 129) = 0.14, p = .704, 








Figure 13. Two main effects of perceived overall workload. Error bars present the standard error 





Offloading Strategies (exploratory) 
 At the end of the experiment the participants were asked to indicate the strategy they used 
to perform the Pattern Copy Task (see Table 20). They could choose an offloading strategy (i.e. 
relying more on cognitive offloading than one’s internal memory) or an internal strategy (i.e. 
relying more on one’s internal memory than offloading). One participant that indicated both 
strategies was excluded from this exploratory analysis (N = 132). To analyze the difference in the 
selected strategies across the experimental groups we used a logistic regression and the Anova-
function of the car package (Fox & Weisberg, 2019). We observed two significant main effects. 
Participants in the no lockout condition were more likely to choose an offloading strategy over an 
internal strategy than participants in the lockout condition, X2(1) = 4.95, p = .026, d = 0.39. 
Further, participants that performed a simultaneous secondary task were more likely to choose an 
offloading strategy over an internal strategy than participants not performing a secondary task, 
X2(1) = 21.66, p < .001, d = 0.89. This finding suggests, that the participants’ reported strategy 
selection displayed actual offloading behavior. There was no interaction effect between the two 
independent variables, X2(1) = 0.54, p = .460, d = 0.13.  
 
Table 20. Participants per Group That Indicated Either Using an Offloading Strategy or an 
Internal Strategy to Perform the Pattern Copy Task 









 N N N N 
Offloading Strategy 33 22 28 13 






 In the present study we tackled the potential influence of released cognitive resources due 
to cognitive offloading on the performance of a simultaneous secondary task. Therefore, the 
participants performed the Pattern Copy Task while either experiencing low temporal costs (no 
lockout condition) or high temporal costs (lockout condition). Furthermore, they either 
simultaneously performed a secondary N-back Task or did not perform such a secondary task. 
The participants offloaded more within the Pattern Copy Task in the no lockout compared to the 
lockout condition. Beyond this replication of previous findings (see Chapter 4 and e.g., Fu & 
Gray, 2000; Gray et al., 2006), we also observed an effect of the presence of a secondary task on 
offloading behavior. The participants offloaded more when a secondary task was present 
compared to when there was no secondary task. While not observing group differences in 
response times in the secondary task, participants showed a better secondary task performance in 
terms of sensitivity in the no lockout than the lockout condition. Thus, our confirmatory analysis 
suggest that more offloading in the no lockout condition enhanced secondary task performance 
compared to less offloading in the lockout condition. Released cognitive resources due to 
offloading in the Pattern Copy Task might thus have been redirected to the simultaneous 
performance of the secondary task. However, additional exploratory analyses did not support this 
assumption. The influence of the no lockout/lockout manipulation on sensitivity was not 
mediated via cognitive offloading in the Pattern Copy Task, nor was cognitive offloading 
correlated with secondary task performance. Also, the direct effect of the no lockout/lockout 
manipulation on sensitivity was not significant when taking cognitive offloading into account. 
Based on these exploratory analyses it remains unclear what actually drives secondary task 
performance. We will discuss two possible explanations for this discrepancy between the 
confirmatory and exploratory analyses.  
  
149 
On the one hand, we have to consider that cognitive offloading does indeed not impact 
secondary task performance (as suggested by the exploratory analyses). Thereby the question 
arises what drives secondary task performance – if not offloading behavior. With our study we 
cannot provide any data that would illustrate the driving factor for secondary task performance. 
However, please note that due to pausing our study the reported results are not based on our 
intended sample size and statistical power. Our results might be different after finishing data 
collection. Beyond the present study, we propose to perform further studies that focus, for 
instance, on the direct effect of the no lockout/lockout manipulation on secondary task 
performance. Rather than cognitive offloading factors related to the task properties or 
participants’ individual abilities such as working memory capacity might have caused the group 
difference in secondary task performance within our confirmatory analysis.  
On the other hand, the conflicting results emerged from the confirmatory and exploratory 
analyses might stem from a lack of reliability in the used measures. The maximum correlation 
between two variables of interest is determined by the reliability of each measure (Danner, 2015).  
Thus, a prerequisite to observe correlational effects between offloading behavior and secondary 
task performance is the reliability of the used measures. As we did not test the reliability of the 
measures in the Pattern Copy Task as well as the N-back Task, we cannot verify this prerequisite 
for observing correlational effects. It is indeed possible that offloading behavior drives secondary 
task performance, but that our measures were not reliable enough to detect a correlational 
relationship within our exploratory analyses.  
 Retaining the assumption of our confirmatory analyses (i.e. cognitive offloading is driving 
secondary task performance), we can extend previous findings on the use of released cognitive 
resources due to cognitive offloading. While Runge et al. (2019) showed that released resources 
due to offloading can be used for the subsequent performance of an unrelated task, our study 
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suggests that this is also possible when an unrelated task is performed simultaneously. Thus, the 
saving-enhanced performance effect might also apply to simultaneous task processing. In a 
similar vein, studies on gesturing as a form of cognitive offloading showed that gesturing while 
solving a cognitive task releases internal cognitive resources which can be used for the 
simultaneous memorization of relevant information (Goldin-Meadow et al., 2001; Wagner, 
Nusbaum, & Goldin-Meadow, 2004). Thus, cognitive offloading seems to improve memory 
performance for other information through released internal cognitive resources (Goldin-Meadow 
et al., 2001; Wagner et al., 2004; Storm & Stone, 2015) but also to increase sequential (Runge et 
al., 2019) as well as simultaneous task processing.  
Based on these findings, cognitive offloading might be beneficial for situations that 
require multitasking (i.e. the performance of multiple tasks at once). Multitasking is highly 
distributed in everyday life (Colom, Martinez-Molina, Shih, & Santacreu, 2010) as well as in 
work settings (Appelbaum, Marchionni, & Fernandez, 2008; Kirchberg, Roe, & Van Eerde, 
2015). Working memory capacity predicts the simultaneous performance of multiple tasks 
(Colom et al., 2010), thus lowering working memory demands by offloading working memory 
processes might facilitate multitasking. In turn, offloading might also decrease psychobiological 
stress induced by multitasking. Studies showed that multitasking increases psychobiological 
stress reactivity such as heart rate and blood pressure (Wetherell & Carter, 2013). If cognitive 
offloading decreases cognitive demands in multitasking scenarios, also the related stress-level 
might be reduced. Nonetheless, while the present research focused on the positive consequences 
of cognitive offloading on unrelated task processing, cognitive offloading is also known to have 
negative consequences especially with regard to the formation of long-term memory 
representations. Onto this account, studies observed that the offloading of information into 
technical tools harms subsequent recall performance for this information (e.g., Kelly & Risko, 
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2019a; 2019b; Sparrow et al., 2011). Therefore, cognitive offloading should be carefully used in 
different situations in order to achieve the desired outcome. While it might be beneficial when 
performing multiple tasks at once, it might be harmful when the subsequent recall of information 
is needed.  
 Beyond measuring secondary task performance, in the present study we also tested the 
effects of the experimental manipulations on offloading behavior. The decision to offload 
working memory processes is known to depend on cost-benefit considerations (e.g., Gray et al., 
2006; Risko & Gilbert, 2016; Schönpflug, 1986). When offloading is associated with high costs 
such as additional time or operational steps, offloading behavior usually decreases compared to 
when it is associated with low costs. Also, in the present study we can support this assumption by 
showing more offloading when the associated temporal costs were low (no lockout) compared to 
when they were high (lockout). In turn, participants in the no lockout condition indicated a lower 
perceived overall workload (measured by the NASA-TLX questionnaire) than participants in the 
lockout condition.  
Additionally, the participants offloaded more when a secondary task was present than 
when there was no secondary task. Based on this finding it can be assumed that the Pattern Copy 
Task and the secondary N-back Task require the same working memory resources. The 
participants seemed to offload more within the Pattern Copy Task in order to free internal 
resources for redirecting them to the secondary task performance compared to when no secondary 
task was present. The assumption that the Pattern Copy Task and the N-back Task fall back onto 
the same working memory resources supports the view of a central capacity limitation of working 
memory (Cowan, 2000). Studies using dual task paradigms showed that the concurrent retention 
of verbal and visual information reduces working memory performance compared to performing 
a single task, thus suggesting the maintenance of verbal and visual information requires the same 
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working memory resources (Cowan, 2000; Cowan & Morey, 2007). In the present study the 
presence of a secondary task might thus have increased the load on participants’ working 
memory and therefore enhanced the benefits of an offloading strategy within the Pattern Copy 
Task. Indeed, although offloading more, the participants performing a secondary task indicated a 
higher overall workload than participants who did not perform a secondary task. This finding is 
in line with previous studies suggesting more cognitive offloading when a task includes more 
information to be processed (Arreola et al., 2019; Gilbert, 2015a; Risko & Dunn, 2015), more 
complex information (Schönpflug, 1986) or is more difficult (Hu et al., 2019).  
The cost-benefit considerations when performing a task might be guided by metacognitive 
estimations about different strategies, tools, tasks, and one’s own abilities (Risko & Gilbert, 
2016). While such metacognitive estimations and the related behavior are not always conscious 
(Efklides, 2008), in the present study we observed that the participants were indeed aware of the 
strategy they choose to perform the Pattern Copy Task. After performing the Pattern Copy Task, 
the participants could indicate the strategy they have used to perform this task by choosing either 
an offloading strategy (more cognitive offloading and less internal memorization) or an internal 
strategy (less cognitive offloading and more internal memorization). Displaying actual offloading 
behavior, participants in the no lockout condition were more likely to indicate an offloading 
strategy over an internal strategy than participants in the lockout condition. Also, participants 
performing a secondary task were more likely to indicate an offloading strategy over an internal 
strategy than participants not performing a secondary task. The participants therefore correctly 
indicated the strategy they have used in the Pattern Copy Task.  
 To conclude, the present study was the first attempt to test the redirection of released 
cognitive resources due to the offloading of working memory processes into technical tools on 
the performance of a simultaneous secondary task. As expected, the manipulation of temporal 
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costs impacted offloading behavior itself as well as secondary task performance. More offloading 
due to low temporal costs might have increased secondary task performance compared to less 
offloading due to high temporal costs. Therefore, released resources due to offloading in a 
working memory task might support the performance of a simultaneous secondary task. 
However, as the relationship between cognitive offloading and secondary task performance is not 






















6. General Discussion 
 
 
A major restriction of a human’s cognitive system arises from limitations in working 
memory (Baddeley, 2003; Luck & Vogel, 2013). To overcome these strict limitations and to 
decrease working memory load, individuals can offload working memory processes into their 
external environment (Risko & Gilbert, 2016; Wilson, 2002). These days, especially modern 
technical tools such as smartphones and tablets are widely accessible and easily used for 
cognitive offloading. In the present PhD-project I addressed two lines of research investigating 
the offloading of working memory processes into modern technical tools. First, I investigated 
why individuals offload working memory processes. More specifically, I focused on 
metacognitions that might act as determinants of cognitive offloading. Second, I investigated the 
consequences of offloading working memory processes through released internal cognitive 
resources. Importantly, for both lines of research I have used and adapted a free choice offloading 
paradigm – the Pattern Copy Task (e.g., Fu & Gray, 2000; Gray et al., 2006).  
With regard to the first line of research – metacognitions as determinants of cognitive 
offloading – I performed two studies (Study 1 and Study 2). In the first correlational study I 
focused on a potential relationship between metacognitions, working memory abilities, and 
cognitive offloading. I observed that offloading behavior was related to actual working memory 
abilities. The higher individuals’ working memory capacity was, the less they offloaded. 
However, I did not observe the expected relationship between metacognitive beliefs and 
offloading behavior. More positive beliefs about one’s working memory abilities did not relate to 
less cognitive offloading. Further, I did not observe a correlation between actual working 
memory abilities and metacognitive beliefs about one’s working memory. Thus, the participants 
did not correctly monitor their own working memory abilities (i.e. there was a lack of monitoring 
accuracy). To further test the influence of metacognitions on cognitive offloading, in the second 
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study I experimentally manipulated participants’ metacognitive beliefs about their own abilities 
with fake performance feedback before they performed the Pattern Copy Task. As expected, fake 
performance feedback strongly influenced participants’ metacognitive beliefs. Participants 
receiving negative fake performance feedback (i.e. indicating a performance below-average) 
estimated their upcoming performance within the Pattern Copy Task worse than participants 
receiving positive fake performance feedback (i.e. indicating a performance above-average; with 
a control group in the middle). Also, participants who received negative feedback indicated to a 
larger extent that they have used on offloading strategy over an internal strategy to perform the 
Pattern Copy Task than participants who received positive feedback. In addition, following 
negative feedback the participants indicated more negative beliefs about their general memory 
abilities at the end of the whole experiment. However, although the fake performance feedback 
strongly influenced participants’ self-perception, it did not impact actual offloading behavior 
within the Pattern Copy Task. In sum, the two studies suggest that metacognitive beliefs about 
one’s working memory do not guide offloading behavior – at least not within the Pattern Copy 
Task. Instead, actual working memory abilities might act as a strong determinant of cognitive 
offloading. Individuals might adapt their offloading behavior based on how well they actually 
perform. Thus, based on metacognitive experiences gained during task performance individuals 
might decide which strategy to use.  
 Regarding the second line of research – consequences of cognitive offloading – I 
conducted two more studies in which I tackled the effects of cognitive offloading on the 
formation of long-term memory representations (Study 3) as well as on the performance of an 
unrelated secondary task (Study 4). For both – long-term memory formation and secondary task 
performance – released internal cognitive resources due to cognitive offloading might play an 
important role. In the third study I observed a trade-off of cognitive offloading suggesting a better 
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immediate task performance but a worse subsequent memory performance due to the offloading 
of working memory processes. In two experiments I illustrated such a trade-off in an implicit (i.e. 
the participants were uninformed about the memory test) as well as explicit learning setting (i.e. 
when the participants were informed about the memory test). These findings suggest that 
cognitive offloading is harmful for long-term memory formation and cognitive resources released 
by cognitive offloading are “lost” rather than used for building strong long-term memory 
representations. Interestingly, in the third experiment I showed that this assumption is wrong. 
When participants were forced to offload to a maximum extent but still had the intention to build 
strong long-term memory representations detrimental effects of cognitive offloading could be 
counteracted. Thus, in this case the participants were able to use the released cognitive resources 
due to offloading for long-term memory formation. This highlights the importance of an explicit 
intention to build strong long-term memory representations when offloading working memory 
processes as negative effects of cognitive offloading on long-term memory could not be 
counteracted without such an intention.  
In the fourth study I tested whether released cognitive resources due to cognitive 
offloading can be used for the performance of a simultaneous secondary task. Participants 
performing the Pattern Copy Task with low temporal costs and thus offloading more, showed a 
better secondary task performance than participants performing the task with high temporal costs 
and thus offloading less. Cognitive offloading in the Pattern Copy Task might therefore have 
released internal cognitive resources which could be devoted to the successful performance of the 
secondary task. Exploratory correlational analyses, however, showed that offloading behavior 
and secondary task performance were not directly related. Thus, the impact of cognitive 
offloading and the related released cognitive resources on secondary task performance is not yet 
fully identified. It is a promising avenue for future research to follow up on the direct impact of 
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cognitive offloading on secondary task performance. In the following sub-chapters I will discuss 
my findings in the light of previous research, theoretical and practical implications of my studies, 
their strengths and limitations, as well as future directions.  
 
6.1 The decision to offload working memory processes  
 Researchers investigating cognitive offloading have identified exogenous factors referring 
to a person’s external environment as well as endogenous factors referring to a person’s own 
internal cognition guiding the decision to offload cognitive processes. Especially metacognitions 
are supposed to be an endogenous factor that strongly determines the offloading of working 
memory processes into technical tools (Arango-Muñoz, 2013; Risko & Gilbert, 2016). Earlier 
studies suggested a negative correlation between metacognitions and offloading behavior (Boldt 
& Gilbert, 2019; Gilbert, 2015b; Risko & Dunn, 2015; Hu et al., 2019). More positive 
metacognitive beliefs about one’s memory abilities were related to less cognitive offloading. In 
contrast, within the present PhD-project I did not observe such a relationship. Also, I did not 
observe a relationship between metacognitive beliefs and actual working memory abilities. While 
this latter finding is in line with previous studies suggesting that actual abilities predict cognitive 
offloading independently of metacognitive beliefs (Gilbert, 2015b), other studies suggested that 
the relationship of actual abilities and cognitive offloading is mediated via metacognitive beliefs 
(Hu et al., 2019). My findings do not support such a mediating role of metacognitions. The 
participants in my studies did not show a metacognitive monitoring accuracy (i.e. they did not 
correctly estimate their own performance; Study 1) neither did metacognitive beliefs predict 
(Study 1) or causally influence offloading behavior (Study 2). However, higher actual working 




To resolve the tension between previous research and the present study regarding the 
relationship of metacognitions and cognitive offloading the distinction between metacognitive 
beliefs and metacognitive experiences needs to be considered. On the one hand, metacognitive 
beliefs (as measured in my studies) reflect offline metacognitive monitoring referring to 
individuals’ general metacognitive knowledge and beliefs about their cognition (Efklides, 2008). 
On the other hand, metacognitive experiences describe experiences that participants gain while 
performing a task and therefore are accounted as online metacognitive monitoring (Efklides, 
2008). While the former – metacognitive beliefs – seems to strongly affect one’s self-perception 
(e.g., believing that one’s memory is unreliable after receiving negative feedback in Study 2), the 
key factor for guiding the actual control of cognition and thus individuals’ selection of specific 
strategies (e.g., cognitive offloading) might be metacognitive experiences.  
In the present studies, I measured participants’ metacognitive beliefs before they gained 
any actual experience of performing the Pattern Copy Task. This method ensured to measure 
participants’ general metacognitive beliefs independent of any actual experience gained when 
performing a task. However, this method is different to the previous studies observing a 
correlational relationship between metacognitions and offloading behavior. In these studies, the 
participants estimated their own performance as an indicator of metacognitions after performing 
practice trials of the task at hand (Boldt & Gilbert, 2019; Gilbert, 2015b) or after the presentation 
of the relevant stimuli (Hu et al., 2019; Risko & Dunn, 2015). Thus, in these studies the 
participants did have actual experiences with regard to the task at hand or the relevant stimuli 
before providing metacognitive estimations. These metacognitive estimations might therefore 
reflect metacognitive experiences which in turn seemed to guide offloading behavior in the 
previous studies.  
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Similarly, also the participants in my studies might have experienced how good their 
working memory is while performing the Pattern Copy Task and based on these metacognitive 
experiences might have adapted their offloading behavior. This would result in a negative 
correlation between actual working memory abilities and cognitive offloading (Study 1) as well 
as no group differences in offloading behavior based on fake performance feedback (i.e. the 
groups did not differ in their working memory abilities and thus did also not differ in offloading 
behavior; Study 2). Interestingly in my second study I observed that participants’ metacognitive 
beliefs did not coincide with actual behavior (e.g., participants indicated a different strategy to 
perform the Pattern Copy Task than they actually used). This finding was supported by 
correlational analyses showing that participants’ indication of the used strategy did not correlate 
with strategy selection (i.e. offloading behavior) following positive and negative fake 
performance feedback. Thus, there was a discrepancy between metacognitive beliefs and 
experiences, probably induced by the experimental manipulation of metacognitive beliefs with 
fake performance feedback. Without a manipulation of metacognitive beliefs in the control 
group, participants’ indication of the selected strategy was indeed correlated with actual strategy 
selection (i.e. indicating to have used an offloading strategy when actually offloading more). 
Further, also in the fourth of my PhD-project I observed that the participants were able to 
correctly monitor the strategy they used to perform the Pattern Copy Task.  
 Based on metacognitive experiences individuals might consider the costs as well as 
benefits of an offloading strategy (Arango-Muñoz, 2013; Risko & Gilbert, 2016). For instance, 
when the costs of offloading are low and the benefit is high (e.g., offloading would increase one’s 
performance when his or her unaided working memory performance is poor within a task) 
individuals might decide to rely more on cognitive offloading and less on their own internal 
cognitive processing. With regard to such cost-benefit considerations, my studies also provide 
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insights into exogenous factors, such as temporal costs and the amount of information that needs 
to be processed, that adaptively guide offloading behavior. Replicating previous studies (e.g., Fu 
& Gray, 2000; Gray et al., 2006; Patrick et al., 2015; Waldron et al., 2011) the participants 
offloaded more within the Pattern Copy Task when offloading was associated with low temporal 
costs than when it was associated with high temporal costs (Studies 3 and 4). This finding 
supports the soft constraints hypothesis suggesting an optimal performance due to the adaptive 
use of cognitive offloading based on the associated costs and benefits of an offloading strategy 
(Gray et al., 2006). Less offloading and relying more on one’s working memory resources due to 
high temporal costs was further associated with a higher perceived workload of participants 
compared to more offloading and relying less on one’s working memory due to low temporal 
costs (Study 4). Reducing the offloading of working memory processes therefore increased the 
cognitive demands of the task.  
In addition, the presence of a secondary task influenced participants’ perceived workload 
and offloading behavior (Study 4). The presence of a secondary task led to a higher perceived 
workload and more cognitive offloading than when no secondary task was present. This indicates 
that an auditory secondary task and the Pattern Copy Task actually fall back onto the same 
working memory resources. When a secondary task was present, there was a high load on 
participants’ working memory resources, thus increasing offloading behavior within the Pattern 
Copy Task seemed a successful approach to free internal resources for the simultaneous 
performance of the secondary task. This assumption is similar to prior studies using dual task 
paradigms to investigate if working memory has a central capacity limitation (Cowan, 2000; 
Cowan & Morey, 2004). These studies suggest that the simultaneous retention of visual and 
verbal information draws on the same working memory resources, thus limiting working memory 
performance compared to single task performance (Cowan & Morey, 2007). In my study, the 
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benefits of cognitive offloading increased due to the presence of a secondary task as did actual 
offloading behavior. This finding is in line with earlier studies suggesting more cognitive 
offloading when a task is more effortful and/or difficult due to the processing of more complex 
information or a larger amount information (e.g., Arreola et al., 2019; Gilbert, 2015a; Hu et al., 
2019; Risko & Dunn, 2015; Schönpflug, 1986).  
 Moreover, also the announcement of an upcoming memory test affected offloading 
behavior as observed within my studies focusing on the consequences of cognitive offloading for 
long-term memory formation. In one experiment (second experiment of Study 3) the participants 
seemed to purposely reduce offloading behavior in order to foster a strong long-term memory 
when the upcoming memory test was announced. Such a reduction of cognitive offloading when 
a memory test was announced could be accounted as a self-generated desirable difficulty that 
serves to foster learning (Bjork & Bjork, 2011). However, I was not able to replicate this finding 
in the third experiment of Study 3, thus it is not possible to draw strong conclusions regarding 
participants being metacognitively aware of negative effects of cognitive offloading on long-term 
memory and in turn purposely reducing offloading behavior.  
 To summarize, while metacognitive beliefs were not a predictor for offloading behavior in 
my studies, I argue that metacognitive experiences based on related endogenous factors such as 
individuals working memory abilities as well as exogenous factors such as temporal costs and 
amount of information when performing a task guided offloading behavior. Knowledge on such 
determinants of cognitive offloading is necessary in order to optimally adapt offloading behavior 
in specific situations. To identify situations in which cognitive offloading can be beneficial or 
harmful for task performance (and should therefore be adapted), the next sub-chapter deals with 




6.2 Consequences of offloading working memory processes 
Due to the ubiquitous availability of technical tools nowadays, working memory 
processes are easily offloaded in different situations of humans’ life. However, cognitive 
offloading might be accompanied by both – benefits and risks for immediate as well as 
subsequent task performance. On the one hand cognitive offloading might enable individuals to 
perform beyond their own internal abilities, but on the other hand the question arises what 
happens if offloaded information is not available (e.g. during exams or in daily life when the 
phone’s battery dies), thus requiring the internal recall of important information. In the following 
sections I will discuss the positive and negative consequences of offloading working memory 
processes on the formation of strong long-term memory representations as well as the 
performance of unrelated tasks.  
 
6.2.1 A trade-off of benefits and risks of offloading working memory processes 
 Cognitive offloading is supposed to lower demands on internal cognitive processing and 
to improve cognition (Kirsh & Maglio, 1994; Risko & Gilbert, 2016). The use of technical tools 
to offload working memory processes might thus increase immediate task performance but might 
also affect subsequent cognitive processing. In my PhD-project I illustrated the suggested trade-
off of cognitive offloading (Study 3). While cognitive offloading improved immediate task 
performance within the Pattern Copy Task, it diminished subsequent long-term memory 
performance for the offloaded information. Cognitive offloading is therefore indeed accompanied 
by both – benefits and risks on immediate and subsequent cognitive processing. My studies 
replicated and extended previous research showing a similar trade-off of cognitive offloading 
when performing the Pattern Copy Task (Morgan et al., 2009; 2013; Waldron et al., 2007). 
However, in these previous experiments the participants’ memory performance was tested 
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immediately after offloading, thus probably not exceeding working memory maintenance. 
Importantly, in my studies I introduced a longer retention interval until the memory test was 
performed, thus assuring that memory performance falls back onto long-term memory. In 
addition, I adapted the Pattern Copy Task depicting more naturalistic offloading behavior using 
images of daily objects to be copied and memorized instead of colored boxes. With this adapted 
design I supported the notion of a trade-off of cognitive offloading when offloading working 
memory processes in a free choice offloading paradigm. This finding is also in line with studies 
focusing on long-term memory formation after forcing participants to offload. Also, in no-choice 
paradigms cognitive offloading harmed long-term memory formation (e.g., Eskritt & Ma, 2014; 
Henkel, 2014; Kelly & Risko, 2019a; 2019b; Sparrow et al., 2011). Thus, across various 
paradigms both no-choice and free choice offloading behavior increases immediate performance, 
but also diminishes long-term memory formation for the offloaded information. In other words, 
relying more on one’s own working memory instead of offloading fosters the formation of strong 
long-term memory representations. The need of temporarily high loads of working memory to 
enhance long-term memory formation follows the notion of desirable difficulties. Relying more 
on one’s working memory instead of offloading makes a task more effortful and can therefore be 
seen as a desirable difficulty. In turn, this more effortful cognitive processing enhances long-term 
learning (Bjork & Bjork, 2011). In an incidental learning setting reducing offloading behavior 
seems therefore a successful attempt to foster long-term memory formation. The observed trade-
off of cognitive offloading also follows the framework of Salomon (1990; Salomon & Perkins, 
2005) suggesting effects with and of technology. When interacting with technology immediate 
task processing is enhanced, however, effects of technology refer to cognitive residues after 
technology use such as a reduced long-term memory performance. Nonetheless, in the following 
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section I will discuss why cognitive offloading is not necessarily detrimental for long-term 
memory under all circumstances. 
 
6.2.2 Positive effects of cognitive offloading on long-term memory through released 
internal resources 
 In an incidental learning setting cognitive offloading was harmful for long-term memory 
formation (Experiment 1 and 2 of Study 3). Nevertheless, the explicit intention to form a strong 
long-term memory might alter the consequences of cognitive offloading. Cognitive offloading is 
supposed to release internal cognitive resources (Kirsh, 2010) and these released resources might 
be used for a deeper processing of the information at hand when individuals have the explicit 
intention to do so (Craik & Lockhart, 1972; Craik, 2002). Supporting this assumption, I 
demonstrated that when participants had the explicit intention to foster long-term memory but 
also had to offload to a maximum extent, they were able to counteract the detrimental effects of 
offloading (Experiment 3 of Study 3). Thus, under these circumstances the participants were able 
to use the released cognitive resources due to cognitive offloading in order to enhance long-term 
learning. Interestingly, the use of released cognitive resources for long-term learning was only 
observed when the participants were forced to offload to a maximum extent and not when they 
could freely choose the amount of cognitive offloading – even if the memory test was announced. 
More offloading under free choice was always related to a worse subsequent memory 
performance. One reason for the ability to counteract negative consequences of offloading 
maximally might be the requirement of a certain amount of released cognitive resources. 
Maximally offloading is supposed to release a maximum amount of internal cognitive resources 
which might be required for long-term memory formation. On the other hand, offloading at a 
medium extent under free choice conditions might not release enough internal cognitive 
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resources to build a strong long-term memory. Another reason might be that operating at a 
medium memory load under free choice conditions is too effortful for using released internal 
cognitive resources. Further studies are required to investigate the specific mechanisms involved 
in cognitive offloading that harm or foster long-term memory. Importantly, with an explicit 
intention to build a strong long-term memory cognitive offloading is not necessarily detrimental 
for long-term memory formation. 
 
6.2.3 Using released resources due to offloading to perform unrelated tasks 
Released resources due to cognitive offloading might also be used for the performance of 
unrelated tasks. Onto this account, I investigated if cognitive offloading fosters the performance 
of a simultaneous secondary task (Study 4). While low temporal costs increased offloading 
behavior compared to high temporal costs it was also accompanied by a better secondary task 
performance. Thus, as expected more cognitive offloading seemed to foster secondary task 
performance. Released cognitive resources due to offloading might therefore be instantaneously 
redirected to successfully perform an unrelated task. However, this interpretation must be treated 
with caution. Exploratory analyses of my data did not support the assumption of cognitive 
offloading being the key driver for secondary task performance (e.g., there was no correlation 
between cognitive offloading and performance in the secondary task). Therefore, it is a promising 
avenue for future studies to aim at explaining the positive effects of offloading working memory 
processes on secondary task performance.  
 Previous studies showed that released cognitive resources due to cognitive offloading in 
one task (i.e. saving information in a technical tool) can enhance the subsequent performance in 
an unrelated task (Runge et al., 2019). With my study I can extend this saving-enhanced 
performance effect to the simultaneous performance of a task. Thus, released resources due to 
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offloading might be used to foster not only subsequent cognitive processing but also 
instantaneous cognitive processing. In addition, released cognitive resources are also known to be 
beneficial for the memorization of new information (Runge et al., 2020; Storm & Stone, 2015). 
Due to the offloading of irrelevant information released resources could be used to memorize 
relevant information. Therefore, the use of released resources due to cognitive offloading also 
induces a saving-enhanced memory effect (Storm & Stone, 2015). In addition, not only offloading 
into the world (e.g., into a technical tool) supports unrelated task processing or memorization, but 
also offloading onto the body releases internal cognitive resources which can be used for 
memorization. Studies investigating gesturing as a form of cognitive offloading when solving 
mathematical problems illustrated that gesturing releases internal cognitive resources. In turn 
these released resources could be used for the memorization of relevant information while 
solving the mathematical problems (Goldin-Meadow et al., 2001; Wagner et al., 2004).  
Based on the beneficial effects of cognitive offloading through released internal cognitive 
resources on unrelated task processing, cognitive offloading might be helpful for multitasking. 
Multitasking (i.e. performing multiple tasks at once) is highly distributed in work settings 
(Appelbaum et al, 2008; Kirchberg et al., 2015) as well as in daily life (Colom et al., 2010). 
Performance in multitasking settings is determined by working memory capacity (Colom et al., 
2010). When participants have a higher working memory capacity, they are usually more 
successful in multitasking. Thus, lowering working memory demands via cognitive offloading 
might enhance multitasking performance and especially support individuals with a low working 
memory capacity. In turn, cognitive offloading could also serve to decrease psychobiological 
stress induced by multitasking. Multitasking is known to increase individuals’ stress-level as 
indicated by mood, heart rate, and blood pressure, for instance (Wetherhell & Carter, 2013). Due 
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to offloading, multitasking performance could be enhanced while also lowering the related 
psychobiological stress-level. 
 
6.3 Theoretical implications 
 In their review on cognitive offloading Risko and Gilbert (2016) introduced a 
metacognitive model of cognitive offloading. This model claims that lower-level cognitive 
processes such as one’s memory abilities influence individuals’ metacognitive beliefs and 
experiences. Both metacognitive beliefs and metacognitive experiences then guide the 
metacognitive evaluation of different strategies such as relying on internal memory or cognitive 
offloading. Based on this evaluation individuals decide which strategy to use for task 
performance. In turn, the use of a specific strategy such as offloading is supposed to directly 
influence future metacognitive beliefs and experiences but also lower-level cognitive processes 
such as one’s memory. Thus, it is assumed that cognitive offloading is accompanied by long-term 
consequences on internal cognitive processing. Together, the metacognitive model of cognitive 
offloading claims a circuit of lower-level cognitive processes influencing metacognitions and in 
turn offloading behavior, whereby then the selection of a specific strategy (i.e. cognitive 
offloading) affects future metacognitions as well as lower-level cognitive processes.  
A central advantage of the present PhD-project was the use of one offloading paradigm –
the Pattern Copy Task – to investigate both, determinants and consequences of cognitive 
offloading. Therefore, I can combine the findings of my studies to evaluate the metacognitive 
model of cognitive offloading (Risko & Gilbert, 2016). First, I observed that offloading behavior 
within the Pattern Copy Task is determined by individuals’ working memory abilities and task 
properties. Therefore, as suggested by the metacognitive model of cognitive offloading lower-
level cognitive processes such as individuals’ memory abilities indeed predicted offloading 
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behavior. However, the present studies do not support the claim that metacognitive beliefs 
influence cognitive offloading. Rather metacognitive experiences gained during task performance 
with regard to one’s working memory abilities and/or task properties might influence the 
metacognitive evaluation of costs and benefits of an offloading strategy and further impact 
strategy selection. In turn, the decision to offload working memory processes had consequences 
for immediate and subsequent task processing. On the one hand, cognitive offloading accelerated 
immediate task performance in the Pattern Copy Task and fostered performance in an unrelated 
secondary task. Thus, cognitive offloading had positive immediate consequences within my 
studies. On the other hand, cognitive offloading negatively affected individuals lower-level 
cognitive processes (measured as long-term memory performance). The participants showed a 
reduced long-term memory performance for offloaded information within my studies. This 
finding supports the metacognitive model of cognitive offloading by showing that the use of an 
offloading strategy indeed affects subsequent cognitive processing. As suggested by Risko and 
Gilbert (2016), if individuals then experience a poor memory for specific information, they might 
metacognitively evaluate their internal abilities as unreliable and in turn keep relying on cognitive 
offloading. In sum, my studies mostly provide support for the metacognitive model of cognitive 
offloading when systematically investigating the offloading of working memory processes with 
the Pattern Copy Task. Only with regard to the influence of metacognitive beliefs on offloading 
behavior my studies cannot support this model.  
The lack of metacognitive beliefs influencing cognitive offloading raises two important 
questions. First, it raises the question whether a more differentiated metacognitive model of 
cognitive offloading is needed. On the basis of previous research, I would suggest metacognitive 
experiences as a key driver for cognitive offloading, however, the potential influence of 
metacognitive beliefs on offloading behavior needs further investigation. Most importantly, it 
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appears necessary to disentangle the effects of metacognitive beliefs and metacognitive 
experiences on offloading behavior instead of assuming that metacognitions are a general driver 
for cognitive offloading.  
Second, beyond the differentiation of metacognitive beliefs and experiences, also general 
differences in the administered paradigms to measure cognitive offloading need consideration. 
While previous studies indeed observed a relationship between metacognitions and cognitive 
offloading in, for instance, a prospective memory task (e.g., Boldt & Gilbert, 2019; Gilbert, 
2015b), my studies could not support these findings. These conflicting results might arise from 
the different offloading paradigms used and thus from different forms of cognitive offloading. 
For instance, within a prospective memory task (e.g., Gilbert, 2015b) the participants could 
offload future intentions whereas within the Pattern Copy Task the participants offloaded by 
instantaneously looking up relevant information. These two forms of offloading behavior – 
intention offloading and offloading in the Pattern Copy Task – might be different per se, thus 
they might also be driven by different determinants. The offloading of future intentions might be 
related to more planning before action and thus be guided by metacognitive beliefs whereas 
offloading in the Pattern Copy Task might be related to ongoing cognitive processing during the 
task. However, no study has directly compared these different forms of cognitive offloading. 
Therefore, it is a promising direction for future research to compare different offloading 
paradigms and related factors such as determinants and consequences of cognitive offloading in 
each paradigm. Such investigations would help to further evaluate the metacognitive model of 
cognitive offloading that does not take different forms of cognitive offloading into account so far.  
 Another relevant theory for the present project is the proposed extended selection problem 
by Arango-Muñoz (2013). Individuals often have to decide whether or not to externalize 
cognition into technical tools which raises the extended selection problem. Arango-Muñoz (2013) 
  
170 
describes metacognitions as an experience-based control system that guides this decision (and 
thus solves the extended selection problem). Similar to Risko and Gilbert (2016), he proposed 
that individuals metacognitively evaluate the costs and benefits of different strategies to perform 
a task. These metacognitive evaluations often induce metacognitive feelings that guide strategy 
selection such as relying on one’s own cognitive processing or offloading cognition into the 
technical tool at hand. This theory follows my suggestion of metacognitive experiences with 
regard to one’s internal abilities and/or task properties influencing offloading behavior. 
Interestingly, individuals are not always aware of their metacognitive evaluations and related 
strategy selection. Metacognitive trainings might increase individuals’ consciousness about their 
metacognitive processes and thus optimize strategy selection. I will further discuss this idea in the 
following sub-chapter.  
 
6.4 Practical implications 
 Humans offload cognitive processes into technical tools in various situations of their life. 
Cognitive offloading is present in work contexts, educational contexts, as well as in daily 
routines. Importantly, cognitive offloading comes along with both – benefits and risks; thus, 
using cognitive offloading as a strategy to perform tasks should be treated with caution. In some 
situations, cognitive offloading might be beneficial, whereas in other situations it might be 
harmful depending on the present goal. In order to reach one’s goal it is therefore necessary to 
adaptively use cognitive offloading. In situations that require an optimal immediate task 
performance, cognitive offloading is recommendable as it is known to improve immediate task 
performance. For instance, in working contexts individuals might rely on a technical tool rather 
than their internal cognitive processing when a task needs to be performed quickly and without 
any errors. Onto this account, a cashier might use a calculator instead of doing mental arithmetics 
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or a waiter/waitress might write down an order instead of memorizing it. Also, when performing 
multiple tasks at once (i.e. multitasking) cognitive offloading in one task might be beneficial for 
the performance of another task. For instance, an individual might be on the phone listening to a 
friend while also planning the next trip to the grocery store. This individual might be able to pay 
more attention to his or her friend on the phone when he or she writes down the groceries he or 
she needs to buy later than when trying to memorize them. In these examples cognitive 
offloading can be used for an optimal task performance, however, in other situations individuals 
should reduce offloading behavior. Cognitive offloading is known to harm the formation of long-
term memory. Thus, if the later recall of information is necessary and then a technical tool is not 
available to retrieve the relevant information, one should rather rely on internally memorizing 
important information instead of offloading it. For instance, in an educational context, individuals 
should try to memorize relevant information instead of storing it into technical tools as this 
information should be recalled from memory in situations in which technical tools are not 
available (e.g., during exams). Nevertheless, if individuals have the goal to foster long-term 
learning and offloading cannot be avoided, they might still be able to form a strong long-term 
memory. This highlights the importance of an explicit intention to foster learning when using 
technical tools. 
 After identifying situations that require more or less cognitive offloading, the proper 
strategy needs to be selected in order to maximize performance. I propose two approaches that 
might support individuals’ strategy selection. On the one hand, individuals might be 
metacognitively trained to properly estimate their own performance and to know the benefits and 
risks of an offloading strategy. Onto this account, Gilbert et al. (2020) showed that participants 
usually offload more than is optimal for their performance. This bias towards cognitive 
offloading could be eliminated by providing the participants with metacognitive advice on the 
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effectiveness of offloading. Similarly, Ghatala (1986) showed that metacognitive training 
supports the successful strategy selection of children. Furthermore, knowledge about one’s 
internal cognitive abilities can enhance optimal strategy selection. Individuals are often 
overconfident with regard to their performance but providing participants with performance 
feedback can increase their metacognitive accuracy (Callender et al., 2016). If individuals are 
able to correctly judge their own performance, they might be able to use the proper strategy to 
perform a task (e.g., more offloading when one’s working memory is unreliable). In addition, 
supervisors in working contexts or teachers might be trained on the benefits and risks of cognitive 
offloading in order to guide their staff or students to use technical tools successfully.  
 Another approach to support strategy selection is the implementation of constraints into 
technical tools that guide the adaptive use of cognitive offloading. A recent study showed that 
individuals offload more working memory processes into technical tools when the tool is highly 
responsive and easy as well as intuitive to control (Grinschgl et al., 2020). Thus, in situations that 
require more cognitive offloading tools could be designed to be highly responsive and easy to 
use, whereas in situations that require less offloading tools could be designed less responsive and 
hard to use. Such constraints in tool design are supposed to then guide individuals’ offloading 
behavior (see also Grinschgl et al., 2020; for a discussion of this idea). Thus, knowledge on 
benefits and risks of cognitive offloading is important for designers creating different 
applications and tools.  
 Beyond direct benefits and risks of cognitive offloading, optimizing offloading behavior 
is also relevant because of some accompanying factors. For instance, studies showed that when 
individuals interact with external knowledge such as information on the internet, they intermix 
their own knowledge and this external knowledge (Fisher, Goddu, & Keil, 2015; Hamilton & 
Yao, 2018; Ward, 2013; Wegner & Ward, 2013). Such illusions of knowledge might lead to a 
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suboptimal performance when external knowledge stored in the internet or in technical tools 
cannot be accessed. In addition, a recent study showed that participants are vulnerable to 
manipulations of information stored in technical tools (Risko, Kelly, Patel, & Gaspar, 2019). In 
this study the participants offloaded information into a technical tool and then the offloaded 
information was manipulated by the experimenter. The participants rarely noticed this 
manipulation when retrieving the information from the technical tool. Further, the use of internet 
to retrieve information as a form of cognitive offloading affects future internet use (Storm et al., 
2016). This suggests that extensively offloading in one task leads to more pronounced offloading 
in another task. All those consequences of cognitive offloading encourage a careful use of 
cognitive offloading in daily life, work, and educational contexts.  
 
6.5 Strengths, limitations, and future directions 
 Starting with the strengths of the present PhD-project I would like to highlight its’ 
innovativeness. I did not only follow up on previous findings of offloading research, but I also 
used innovative methods in order to gain additional insights on humans’ offloading behavior. 
Based on a theory-driven hypothesis generation, I tested metacognitions as determinants of 
cognitive offloading and consequences of offloading behavior. Therefore, I was able to 
empirically test the validity of proposed theories such as the metacognitive model of cognitive 
offloading by Risko and Gilbert (2016) with innovative methods such as a manipulation of 
metacognitive beliefs via fake performance feedback, a long-term memory test for offloaded 
information, and a dual task approach. While most research on cognitive offloading has either 
tackled the determinants of cognitive offloading or consequences of offloading, my PhD-project 
provided a systematic investigation of both factors using one offloading paradigm, thus allowing 
a combination of my findings. Further, I administered the Pattern Copy Task on  
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tablet devices – aiming at reflecting offloading behavior into modern technical tools. The Pattern 
Copy Task entails another advantage – the measurement of free choice offloading behavior. Even 
though many studies on cognitive offloading used a design in which participants were either 
prohibited from or forced to offload, such a no choice design is rather sub-optimal as it does not 
reflect real-life offloading behavior. In daily life, individuals can usually decide on their own 
when and how much cognitive processes to offload. Therefore, using a free choice offloading 
paradigm such as the Pattern Copy Task allows an investigation of cognitive offloading that is 
closer to offloading in real-life than using a no-choice paradigm. As another strength of my 
studies I would like to highlight the large sample sizes that provide a sufficient statistical power. 
Especially in times of the replication crisis a substantial sample size is important for the 
interpretation of statistical results. Onto this account, I also point out that all my studies were 
preregistered with regard to the sample size, exclusion criteria, independent and dependent 
variables, as well as statistical analyses. All analyses that were not preregistered were marked as 
“exploratory”. 
 As a limitation of my studies the measurement of metacognitions needs to be discussed. 
Research on metacognitions classically uses measures such as judgments of learning (e.g., 
judgments about memory performance on previously learned word pairs) or feelings of knowing 
(e.g., rating of likelihood to remember specific information; Kelemen et al., 2000; Nelson & 
Narens, 1990; Schwartz, 1994). However, these classical measures were not transferrable to my 
studies in which I aimed at measuring how individuals’ beliefs about their internal abilities 
impact offloading behavior. I therefore used subjective performance estimations as an indicator 
of metacognitive beliefs. As this measurement of metacognitions has not been previously 
established, I have to consider the possibility that it did not fully depict metacognitive beliefs. 
Hence, I urge for further studies using different measures to investigate metacognitions in the 
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context of cognitive offloading. Another limitation of the present PhD-project concerns the 
measurement of long-term memory performance following cognitive offloading. Compared to 
previous research (Morgan et al., 2009; 2013; Waldron et al., 2007) I significantly increased the 
retention interval until a memory test was performed. The processing of the relevant information 
within the Pattern Copy Task and the memory test were separated by two working memory tests 
taking about 20 minutes. Nevertheless, it would still be interesting to further increase this 
retention interval in order to investigate consequences of cognitive offloading across longer time 
frames. I suggest testing memory performance on the following day or even after several days. In 
my studies such an increased retention interval was not possible due to economic reasons. With 
large sample sizes of N = 172 it was not feasible to test the participants twice on two successive 
days.  
 With the Pattern Copy Task, I was able to measure free choice offloading behavior in 
order to depict offloading behavior in real-life. Nonetheless, the Pattern Copy Task is still a 
highly experimental paradigm. This is beneficial for systematic empirical investigations but of 
course might not be fully transferrable to real-life offloading behavior. As a future direction I 
therefore suggest conducting field studies that focus on cognitive offloading in situations of daily 
life, classroom settings, or work environments. Due to the proceeding digitalization in schools, 
students need to interact with technical tools more and more. In some situations, cognitive 
offloading might be successfully used to support students’ performance whereas in other 
situations it might be harmful. Similarly, cognitive offloading should also be investigated in work 
environments, especially when employers have the goal to foster their employees’ long-term 
abilities. 
 As many other experimental investigations, my studies used student samples. However, 
student samples are often not representative of the whole population (Hanel & Vione, 2016; Rad, 
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Martingano, & Ginges, 2018). Thus, the generalizability of my findings is limited. I assume that 
the participants in my studies were familiar with working with modern technical tools and thus 
might have some knowledge on how to successfully administer these tools to reach their goals. 
Onto this account, Hamilton and Yao (2018) showed that device familiarity modifies individuals’ 
assessment of their personal knowledge. Device familiarity, related knowledge, and offloading 
behavior might be different when using other samples such as young pupils that just start using 
technical tools or older adults that did not grow up with technical tools in their daily life. One 
study testing offloading behavior across a wider age-span showed that offloading behavior is 
more pronounced in older adults than younger adults (Gilbert, 2015a). I therefore recommend 
replicating the main findings with regard to determinants and consequences of cognitive 
offloading with different samples and age-groups. In this regard I also see a high potential of field 
studies, for instance, in schools that can serve to broaden the knowledge on cognitive offloading 
as a strategy for task performance.  
 
6.6 Conclusion 
 In the present PhD-project I systematically investigated the offloading of working 
memory processes using the Pattern Copy Task. As a first line of research I focused on 
metacognitions as possible determinants of offloading behavior. I conclude that metacognitions 
are not a universal predictor for cognitive offloading. Within my studies, metacognitive beliefs 
about one’s internal abilities did not impact the offloading of working memory processes, but I 
propose that metacognitive experiences might guide cognitive offloading. I urge for a careful 
distinction between metacognitive beliefs and metacognitive experiences and their differentiated 
effect on offloading behavior. As a second line of research I investigated the short-term and long-
term consequences of offloading working memory processes. I observed that cognitive offloading 
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improves immediate task performance but also diminishes long-term memory performance for 
the offloaded information. Nonetheless, with an explicit intention to foster a strong long-term 
memory and no possibility to reduce offloading behavior individuals could counteract the 
detrimental effects of cognitive offloading. Therefore, internal cognitive resources released by 
cognitive offloading are not necessarily lost but can be used for long-term memory formation 
under specific circumstances. Moreover, released cognitive resources due to cognitive offloading 
might be beneficial for the performance of a simultaneous secondary task. My studies serve for a 
better understanding of the offloading of working memory processes into technical tools and 
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Figure 1.1. Scatter Plots of Correlational Analyses between Cognitive Offloading and Memory 

















































Figure 1.2. Scatter Plots of Correlational Analyses between Cognitive Offloading and Memory 
Performance (Identity-Location Bindings) for Experiment 1 (see also Table 9 in Chapter 4). 
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Figure 1.3. Scatter Plots of Correlational Analyses between Cognitive Offloading and Memory 
Performance (Identity-Location Bindings corrected) for Experiment 1 (see Table 9 in Chapter 4).
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Figure 2.1. Scatter Plots of Correlational Analyses between Cognitive Offloading and Memory Performance (Identity) for Experiment 2 



































Figure 2.2. Scatter Plots of Correlational Analyses between Cognitive Offloading and Memory Performance (Identity-Location Bindings) 
for Experiment 2 (see also Table 12 in Chapter 4). 
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Figure 3.1. Scatter Plots of Correlational Analyses between Cognitive Offloading and Memory 
Performance (Identity) for Experiment 3 (see also Table 16 in Chapter 4). 










































Figure 3.2. Scatter Plots of Correlational Analyses between Cognitive Offloading and Memory 























































Figure 4. Plots of Offloading Behavior across Trials in Pattern Copy Task in Experiment 1. The 




















































Figure 5. Plots of Offloading Behavior across Trials in Pattern Copy Task in Experiment 2. The 













































Figure 6. Plots of Offloading Behavior across Trials in Pattern Copy Task in Experiment 3. The 













Correlations for Experiment 1 
 
Table 1. Pearson-Correlations Between Working Memory Capacity and Cognitive Offloading, 
Immediate Task Performance as Well as Memory Performance in Experiment 1 
 
 Cognitive Offloading 
Openings of the Model Window 
No Lockout Lockout 
Working Memory Capacity 
Visual Patterns Test 







  Initial Encoding Duration (sec) 
No Lockout Lockout 
Visual Patterns Test 





 Initially Correctly Copied Items 
No Lockout Lockout 
Visual Patterns Test 





 Immediate Task Performance 
Trial Duration (sec) 
No Lockout Lockout 
Visual Patterns Test 






No Lockout Lockout 
Visual Patterns Test 





 Memory Performance 
Identity 
No Lockout Lockout 
Visual Patterns Test 





 Identity-Location Bindings 
No Lockout Lockout 
Visual Patterns Test 





 Identity-Location Bindings (corrected) 
No Lockout Lockout 
Visual Patterns Test 














Correlations for Experiment 2 
 
Table 2. Pearson-Correlations Between Working Memory Capacity and Cognitive Offloading, 
Immediate Task Performance as Well as Memory Performance in Experiment 2 
 
 Cognitive Offloading 
Openings of the Model Window 
No Lockout Lockout 
Uninformed Informed Uninformed Informed 
Working Memory Capacity 
Visual Patterns Test 













 Initial Encoding Duration (sec) 
No Lockout Lockout 
Uninformed Informed Uninformed Informed 
Visual Patterns Test 









 Initially Correctly Copied Items 
No Lockout Lockout 
Uninformed Informed Uninformed Informed 
Visual Patterns Test 









 Immediate Task Performance 
Trial Duration (sec) 
No Lockout Lockout 
Uninformed Informed Uninformed Informed 
Visual Patterns Test 









 Memory Performance 
Identity 
No Lockout Lockout 
Uninformed Informed Uninformed Informed 
Visual Patterns Test 









 Identity-Location Bindings 
No Lockout Lockout 
Uninformed Informed Uninformed Informed 
Visual Patterns Test 



















Correlations for Experiment 3 
 
Table 3. Pearson-Correlations Between Working Memory Capacity and Cognitive Offloading, 
Immediate Task Performance as Well as Memory Performance in Experiment 3 
 
 Cognitive Offloading 





Working Memory Capacity 
Visual Patterns Test 











Visual Patterns Test 





 Immediate Task Performance 
Trial Duration (sec) 
Choice Forced 
Uninformed Informed Uninformed Informed 
Visual Patterns Test 









 Memory Performance 
Identity 
Choice Forced 
Uninformed Informed Uninformed Informed 
Visual Patterns Test 









 Identity-Location Bindings 
Choice Forced 
Uninformed Informed Uninformed Informed 
Visual Patterns Test 









Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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